


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Scope

The aim of Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) is to further the study of and teaching on the cultural, social, ethnic and (geo-)political characteristics, processes and developments in different areas of the world, at universities, institutes and colleges in and outside the Netherlands. The association's peer-reviewed and open-access journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* and our publishing house *EGxPress* are above all intended to elicit analytic debate by allowing scholars to air their views, perspectives and research findings—with critical responses from others who may hold a different view or research approach. One can submit manuscripts—main articles (peer-reviewed), critical responses (published peer-reviews), short articles and/or book reviews and larger review essays—to info@ethnogeopolitics.org. We charge no fees for any of the submitted and/or published manuscripts. See www.ethnogeopolitics.org on the association's foundation, founding (editorial) board members, aims, activities and publications—and particularly the freely downloadable copies of the journal's issues and the individual contributions in each issue.



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
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Guest Column

Amendment of the Bosnian electoral law by the High Representative on election night in 2022: its effects and consequences on the election results, politics and society in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Alden Pervan *with* Ab de Buck



* * * Call and Guidelines for Contributions * * *

Our journal is nowadays ready to receive contributions in Russian, German, Spanish, Arabic, Persian and other non-English languages (though all require English abstracts) as well. We at the Editorial Board do not apply a strict wordlimit, but we prefer full-fledged research articles of no more than 10,000 words. We also welcome short analytical articles, book reviews, review essays, and opinion pieces. We charge no fees for any of the submitted and/or published manuscripts. We provide Open Access in accordance with our Creative Common License policy which can be consulted on our website.

Regular contributors may get a guaranteed space in multiple issues of our journal, with a recognisable header like 'Dorsey's Column' for James M. Dorsey's contributions. From now on, if requested, authors may get online prepublications of their contributions prior to their placement in the next issue or volume of our journal.

Furthermore, we welcome contributions for special issues on common themes, like the one on Human Security in our Winter 2015 issue. Association of EthnoGeoPolitics is willing to (re)publish through our new publishing house *EGxPress* special issues in book form—and publish monographs and other manuscripts in book form as well.

Research essays—particularly so-called 'Main Articles'—undergo rigorous peer-review from at least two peer-reviewers. Extensive (book) review essays that have undergone such review as well, are also considered Main Articles.

We welcome and publish open comments i.e. critical responses—particularly those of peer-reviewers—in order to encourage feedback and debate. These responses can be anonymous if their authors wish so. Still, we encourage them to publicise their names under their



contributions, as the latter will thus become better citable, referable and indexical as sources and publications.

Of course we at the Editorial Board decide whether or not to publish (excerpts from) peer-reviewers' comments, based on considerations of utility and usefulness for ongoing debate. Thus the absence of published peer-reviews and comments does not mean that these do not exist; thus some peer-reviews are not published because their comments have been addressed by the author in his or her contribution. To reiterate, Main Articles have undergone generally two or more peer-reviews.


The Editorial Board may publish some of the later comments on published contributions as critical responses (maximum 3,000 words) in one or more subsequent issues of the journal. Extensive critical responses with source references may be published as full-fledged, separate research articles.

The publication of all such manuscripts, ranging from peer-reviewed articles to opinion-pieces, do not necessarily mean that we approve everything that the contributors may say. They themselves are responsible and accountable for their statements.

For each submitted manuscript, please supply your full name, academic and/or other professional titles and affiliations, address(es) and other contact details, as well as your research specialisms and any major publications. Please submit these details with your manuscripts at www.ethnogeopolitics.org/contact-2, or to info@ethnogeopolitics.org.

See for more details on the submission process of main articles and other manuscripts www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications.

We thus welcome your contributions, ranging from articles to transparent reviews and comments on these articles.



Editorial—Developments in the field

State of the World and the Field—and Journal— of EthnoGeoPolitics


Caspar ten Dam

Situation of the world we are in

As we have discussed in preceding contributions of our journal—and as we do in some contributions in this much-delayed 2023 volume of our journal—we face endemic crises like continuous or recurrent domestic, discriminatory and/or ritual violence, (repressions of) non-violent, semi-violent and violent protests, low-intensity conflicts and full-scale wars in places like Iran, Gaza, Liberia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine (see e.g. Baghdasaryan 2019; Rezvani 2022; Rezvani & Ten Dam 2020b; Ten Dam & De Buck 2022; Dorsey 2020, 2021).

As I plan to discuss in a new major revisiting of my (once?) optimistic assessment of structurally declining armed conflicts across the globe both in frequency and severity (see Ten Dam 2015b, 2017), the question remains whether public and private violence are truly on the wane globally, or can ever be.

Many a conflict certainly is ongoing, with no (immediate) end in sight, like the Russian-Ukrainian War. As I and Ab de Buck will point out in a new opinion piece that should come out in our upcoming 2024 volume,



our initial optimism that Ukraine's "fierce Ukrainian resistance, helped by strong ... support from the West ... has stymied and even reversed the Russian invasion" of its country (Ten Dam 2022: 9 (quote); Ten Dam & De Buck 2022: esp. 205-206) has dimmed somewhat, given recent Russian (counter)offensives back into Ukrainian territory it had occupied before. This setback has been partially due to the—to our minds scandalous—half-year delay in new US military aid.

Still, we will argue that we remain hopeful that Ukraine will win the war and regain most or all of its territory currently occupied, especially with replenished ammunition and weaponry from its own armouries and those from abroad—unless a certain Mr. Trump will regain the US Presidency and decide and manage to scuttle US and other foreign aid to Ukraine.

Other conflicts have been or are being 'resolved' rather one-sidedly, violently, ruthlessly and even brutally—like the one in and about Nagorno-Karabakh. For many years this primarily Armenian enclave was the self-declared Republic of Artsakh that once had been the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Province and seven surrounding districts in the Republic of Azerbaijan, until Armenian armed forces and local separatists wrested it from the latter's grasp during and after the 1988-1994 Karabakh War (see Rezvani & Ten Dam 2020b; Dorsey 2020).

Yet after a decade(s)-long built-up of its military strength funded by its oil and gas revenues, Azerbaijan succeeded in wresting Karabakh back—first partially during the brief yet intense 'Second Karabakh War' in September-November 2020, and then fully during an even briefer 'Third Karabakh War' lasting just a few days (or just one day of intense




fighting) in late September 2023 after a long-lasting blockade had weakened the civilian population and the armed militias in what remained of Artsakh. We hope to have one or more contributions on this apparently definite Azeri victory in the Karabakh conflict in the next volume of our journal. ¹

Suffice to note here that this latest outcome will likely produce a new long-lasting trauma for the Armenian people at home and abroad—not just because the crushing defeat of their ‘brethren’ in Karabakh feels humiliating to them as well, but also because the tens of thousands of ethnic-Armenian refugees from Karabakh just before and after Artsakh’s surrender on 20 September 2023 are burdening Armenia’s already fragile society and economy for a long time to come. Indeed, the fortnightly digest *Karabakh Concise* noted in one of its articles some of the ripple-on effects the fall of the Artsakh Republic was already creating on the micro-sociological level as well:

.. after the initial shock and trauma of departure, each Karabakh Armenian is now left with a number of largely personal decisions. Should they aspire to go back [to] Karabakh, if at least a minimum of conditions for their safety and security is guaranteed? Should they move to a third country—Russia is an option for many, for others western countries can be reachable too; or should they, as the Chinese say, not cross the same river twice, and simply lay down their roots in Armenia, leaving Karabakh as a memory (Karabakh Concise 2023a). ²

Hopefully, the notably sincere attempts at reaching a durable peace agreement and normalising relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan after



the fall of Karabakh will go some way towards ameliorating such traumas among the Armenians—and Azeris (see e.g. Karabakh Concise 2023b).

However, the region may be destabilising (ethno)geopolitically to dangerous degrees on other levels due to the fall of Karabakh. Thus the “unprecedented level of anti-Russian feeling in Armenia at the moment, caused by what Yerevan sees as betrayal by Russia in not coming to its assistance” (Karabakh Concise 2024), may ossify into an ‘Anti Russianism’ and consequent pro-EU sentiment to the same extent as those present in Georgia especially since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

Russia—especially Putin’s Russia—may lash back even militarily against Armenia in the not too distant future, especially if the latter would definitely decide to move toward the West, and especially if the former would retain sufficient military strength irrespective of the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War. At any rate, future contributions on Nagorno-Karabakh in our journal should shed further, more definite light on the causes and consequences of Artsakh’s demise.

State of our journal

Despite these wars and other crises across the globe having affected or still affecting many members of our Editorial Board, we initially believed that we had finally “managed to partially overcome the structural backlog” in the production of volumes of our journal that had occurred over the years (Ten Dam 2022: 8-9 (incl. quote)). However, the very late outing of this 2023 volume attests to the fact that the following factors are still in play or even have returned with a vengeance:




First, few members of our Editorial Board have nowadays the time and opportunity to regularly contribute to our journal in each and every volume, often due to personal and security challenges given (some of) the crises and other conflicts mentioned in the preceding section. We even have difficulty maintaining regular contact with some editors and advisory-committee members; still we have decided to keep them on the board(s) given their major contributions in the past.

Only me, Rodolfo Valentino, Sheth Jerjis and James Dorsey are amongst those still able to regularly contribute—in the current volume with a major introduction on ritual violence in Liberia vis-à-vis my theory of and research on brutalisation (see esp. Ten Dam 2022), the first one in a major series to come out in this journal; an engaging follow-up conversation with an Extraterrestrial in English, German and Spanish on the dire yet not hopeless state of humanity; a main investigative article in English, Turkish and Arabic on the supposed education of Turkey's longtime and still incumbent political leader; and a searing exposition of the new and ongoing Gaza War.³

And we welcome Alden Pervan as a potentially regular contributor with his co-authored guest column on the ill-functioning electoral law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even so, much needs to be done to ensure the flow of contributions from active editors and other authors in the foreseeable future.

Second, few editorial-board members have time and opportunity nowadays to regularly approach prospective authors to contribute to our journal, due to said personal and security challenges (see delaying factor 1), let alone review any submitted manuscripts. So lately the task




of securing, reviewing and editing submissions have mainly fallen to me alone as executive editor, while previously these tasks have been evenly distributed between me, the editor-in-chief and some senior and assistant editors. Hopefully this even workload distribution can be restored in the near future. ⁴

Third, our (still active) editors, other contributors and (advisory) boardmembers have increasing difficulty to find and sustain a sufficient number of peer-reviewers for our main contributions. This is not so much reflective of any particular difficulties of our journal (see delaying factors 1 & 2), as rather of wider interrelated trends of increasing workloads among academics in general and resultant unwillingness to peer-review in particular. These trends are worsened by the fact that peer-reviews themselves still have a much lower impact factor and consequent status for scholars than peer-reviewed (!) and other contributions in academic journals, books and other publications.

As Prof. Rachel H. Ellaway at University of Calgary has noted, “we are facing an ever-growing struggle in securing sufficient peer reviewers for the papers we receive. This is not a problem that is exclusive to ... the field of health professions education; it is a problem for many academic fields and disciplines today” that has led most journal editors to describe “securing reviewers as the hardest part of their job” (Ellaway 2024: 1 (quotes); see esp. Vesper 2018).

Ellaway mentions and discusses challenges for peer-reviewers kindred and related to the ones we mentioned above, like “widespread faculty burnout, (particularly during and since COVID-19), a thinning academic workforce (reflected in a continuing fall in tenure track appointments),




and a growth in the number of journals that are seeking ever more reviewers from this shrinking and tired pool” (Ellaway 2024: 2 (quote); see esp. Flaherty 2022; see further Petrescu & Krishen 2022).⁵

Consequently, we need to spend ever more time and effort to find scholars and other analysts willing to peer-review our prospective Main Articles—and to convince those who do, to let (parts of) their peer-reviews to be published as Critical Responses adjacent to the Main articles either anonymously or openly with their names attached. One of our main reasons to adopt the Critical Response system has been to encourage prospective peer-reviewers to become actual ones, as especially non-anonymous published peer-reviews would at least modestly increase their name recognition and publication record.

As we have stressed in our regular ‘Call and Guidelines’ section in each issue a/o volume of our journal for years, “We welcome and publish open comments i.e. critical responses—particularly those of peer-reviewers—in order to encourage feedback and debate. These responses can be anonymous if their authors wish so. Still, we encourage them to publicise their names under their contributions, as the latter will thus become better citable, referable and indexical as sources and publications” (see pages 6-7 in this volume).

Even so, it seems that for many scholars and other analysts this (new) advantage of open peer-review insufficiently counteracts the (increasing) disadvantages of the still-present low impact status and the time-consuming manner of conducting any peer-review. Offered solutions by Ellaway, Flaherty and others range from simply reversing cutbacks and thereby workloads in academia to remunerations for




writing peer-reviews—though we insist that such measures would only work if these are introduced jointly and if *such reviews get published and get publication-record status close to or even equal to peer-reviewed articles themselves*.

Fortunately, despite these challenges (described in delaying factors 1 to 3), we have been able to secure significant contributors for this volume of our journal—albeit with a considerable delay—including a number of peer-reviewed Main Articles. However, as increasingly is the case, none of the peer-reviewers have been willing to publicise (parts of) their reviews as author-identified or even anonymous Critical Responses for a variety of reasons, some of those having been discussed above.

State of ‘our’ discipline of Ethnogeopolitics

Over the years, Ethnogeopolitics has established itself as a recognised composite concept—with a multidisciplinary field of studies on the (supra)state, semi-state and non-state politics i.e. political a/o politicised concerns, objectives and behaviours of sub-national, national and transnational groups with ethnic, religious, ethno-religious and other cultural identity traits (languages, non-religious beliefs, etc.)—particularly those living in “concentrated geographical areas” (Rezvani & Ten Dam 2020a: 14 (quote); see Rezvani 2019: esp. 30-31).

Ethnogeopolitics may still be a relatively new field among related ‘classic’ disciplines like geopolitics, ethnology and political geography—but it has caught the attention and warm support of scores (hundreds if not thousands) of readers and fellow-scholars across the world. Thus according to Jeffrey Kaplan “the importance of an ethnic component to




the study of Geopolitics globally is .. obvious based both on a daily perusal of the headlines and on developments in other fields”—including the recognition of ‘new tribalism’ as a vital phenomenon in terrorism studies (Kaplan 2019: 170 (incl. quote)).

Indeed, as I have argued repeatedly in many of my own publications, most violent conflicts have been “ethnic in nature to this day” and have had “ethnogeopolitical aspects and ramifications to boot” (Ten Dam 2022: 10 (quote); esp. Ten Dam 2015b, 2017). Consequently “the study of ethnogeopolitics, as a field of studies and ‘mixed’ discipline, involves the study of ethnogeopolitical conflict” and its frequent if not inherent brutalities (Ten Dam 2021: 25 (quote); Ten Dam 2022: 10 (incl. quote)).

Even so, the active study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) still remains rare beyond the confines of our own association and journal bearing the same name; as far as we have been able to determine, it has not yet become a regular discipline for students and scholars alike in faculties and other academic institutions, replete with course materials and research projects.

The slow spread of our ‘multidisciplinary discipline’ is perhaps due to a near-inherent conservatism within academia manifested by ingrained, singular and bounded disciplines and concurrent departments, often relegating interdisciplinary approaches and new (mixed) disciplines to short-lived specialty courses held by junior scholars at the beginning of their careers, thereby slowing the undeniable growth of interdisciplinary studies (Kaplan 2019: 172-173). Still, given the incontrovertible relevance and ubiquity of ethnic phenomena, even the most conservative halls of academia will ultimately fail to stop



Ethnogeopolitics “as an emerging field and discipline” with “a vital place in the social sciences and humanities in particular” (Ibid: 175).

Admittedly, our conscious decision from the start (i.e. over a decade ago) not to strictly define EGP as a concept and rigidly delineate EGP as a field of studies may have slowed its development and acceptance to some degree. Thus some scholars and analysts did and may still wonder what EGP is actually all about, and how they could fit it in ‘their’ fields, specialisms and research areas—and so whether one should more clearly circumscribe it after all. We have had good reasons for keeping the concept open-ended and the field interdisciplinary, accessible and evolving over time, recognising for one thing that ethnogeopolitical phenomena tend to be fluid anyway.

First of all, as our Editor-in-chief Babak Rezvani has put it in the maiden Editorial of our journal, “Ethnogeopolitics, like any other academic field, is dynamic and subject to change and conceptual and methodological development” (Rezvani 2013: 5). At least in its early development, EGP has been highly dependent on the *contested, varying, all-but universal and agreed-upon* definitions of geopolitics, ethnicity and other concepts in other fields bearing the names of these concepts (see e.g. Rezvani 2019: 27-32).

Of course, we could consider formulating a broad, formal circumscription of EGP so as to give some further clarity and guidance to the concept and the field—and help to gain it broader acceptance and application in the academic world. I for one, could try to apply my *action-actor-motive* conceptualisation triad for proposing a definition of EGP, as I have done for defining violence per se and its different variations and manifestations



(see esp. Ten Dam 2015a; see further section ‘Defining violence, conflict and brutality’ in my contribution on Liberia in the current volume).

Thus I would seek to circumscribe possible observable actions, actors and motives of EGP as primary, secondary and tertiary concepts respectively—or all of the above as a composite concept, though in that case it would be well-nigh impossible to maintain it as an unchanging, universally applicable one over time. After all, such a concept may easily, even unavoidably, overlook and fail to include currently ‘inconceivable’, ‘unfathomable’ ethnogeopolitical actions, actors and motives that may become conceivable, fathomable and existent in the future.⁶

Caspar ten Dam (MA political science at Leiden University) is Executive Editor of this journal. He is an experienced conflict analyst with his own research company based in Leiden, the Netherlands (www.ctdamconsultancy.com). He is specialised in (regional) conflict, terrorism and security studies, and has published multiple academic articles on topics within these fields, including in this journal. info@ctdamconsultancy.com

Endnotes

1. We would have liked to have gotten a high-quality contribution on the apparently definite Azeri victory in the Karabakh conflict, but unfortunately we could not secure one in time even for this much-delayed volume of our journal.
2. In this brief overview of recent developments in and on Karabakh, I only refer to *Karabakh Concise* (launched in March 2021), so as to alert it to interested scholars and other readers as a valuable, nuanced and



resolution-oriented source, which seems to be a little-known and underappreciated one to date. Alas, undoubtedly due to the fall of Karabakh, an Editorial Note of the Vol.4 No.10 issue of this digest announced on 14 June 2024 the following: “This is the last issue of this electronic newsletter Karabakh Concise. We will continue coverage of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations through our other newsletter Caucasus Concise, as well as through regular coverage on commonspace.eu [www.commonspace.eu/]. We thank our readers and subscribers for their continued support”. See further <https://karabakhspace.commonspace.eu/>.

3. We are grateful to James D. Dorsey for this high-quality contribution on the latest tragic phase of the apparently never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which compensates for the lack of timely contribution(s) on the apparently ‘resolved’ Karabakh conflict in this volume of our journal (see note 1).
4. Admittedly, I myself am partially responsible for the uneven workload distribution: I have increasingly tended to editorially review and proofread all submissions, as I have often found that I had to remind and ‘hound’ not just many a non-editor author to timely submit one’s manuscript for review—but also many an editor responsible for reviewing and editing such manuscripts to do so in a timely manner. The same I had to do quite often vis-à-vis fellow-editors who had promised to submit contributions themselves. Eventually I got tired of this multipronged task and decided to generally review and edit all submissions myself. This has made my task as executive editor much simpler and more efficient—but has done little to a) lighten my overall workload, b) overcome the backlog of volumes, and c) maintain regular contact with some fellow-editors and keep them actively engaged. Any advice—especially by members of our Recommendation and Advisory committee—to overcome these drawbacks and related challenges, are welcome.



5. Ellaway refers to this source incompletely: 'Flaherty, C. (2022). The peer-review crisis. Inside Higher Ed. June 12, 2022. *Online at: accessed April 26, 2024*' (Ellaway 2024; ; italics added). So I had to locate the full source myself.
6. Such a formal definition of EGP, based on my action-actor-motive conceptualisation triad, I may propose and present in a 'Developments-in-the-field' contribution in one of the next volumes of our journal, perhaps in collaboration with one or more co-authors.

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
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


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Main Article


Ritual violence in Liberia: 1. How to perceive, define and study it as a form of brutality—also beyond Liberia

Caspar ten Dam

Ritual violence in Liberia series—Abstract

Ritual violence—violence characterised and justified by rituals i.e. observable ceremonial and sequenced acts, often involving human sacrifice and the removal of organs to attain magical power—still is rife in many places and regions across the globe, including West Africa. This Ritual violence in Liberia series analyses lethal and non-lethal ritual violence in Liberia during its known history, but eventually focuses on the period from the Liberian Civil Wars of 1989-1997 and 1999-2003 to the time of brittle-and-violent ‘peace’ of today.

This series especially investigates the role of combatants in ritual violence during times of (major) internal war in Liberia. These combatants include child soldiers, their leaders and their victims—though forcibly recruited and indoctrinated child soldiers could be seen as victims as well. These may also include any other actors perpetrating such violence during times of (relative) peace in Liberia against any non-combatants and former combatants among families, larger kin groups and ethnicities—including former child soldiers.



Generally, the series seeks to uncover the saliency, prevalence and nature of ritual violence in Liberia, and the causes and consequences of such violence for both perpetrators and victims (opposing sides may be both perpetrators and victims vis-à-vis each other), for indigenous peoples, other citizens and foreign residents in the country. For this it makes use of the author's theory and empirical research on brutalisation i.e. increasing violation of local and/or international norms of violence.

Even though few systematic, comparative studies on ritual violence have been done to this day, a fair number of anecdotal reports and in-depth case studies on particular tribes, peoples and societies show that this phenomenon is widespread, endemic and ingrained in many parts of the world—including Liberia, as this series confirms.

Indeed, especially magic-ritual violence in both the private i.e. domestic and public i.e. political spheres is rife in Liberia to this day. There, perpetrators not just target individuals as perceived and actual (former) enemies in vendettas often originating from the civil wars—including Liberian migrants and asylum seekers living abroad or (in danger of) being deported back. They also frequently target peoples and entire communities at random, whereby they immediately attack victims or abduct them and torture, mutilate and murder them afterwards in rituals believed to bring magical, supernatural, otherworldly powers to the direct perpetrators and/or their benefactors who ordered these killings in the first place. Even Liberian migrants, deported asylum seekers and visitors could easily fall victim to this 'random' violence.




Introduction—Studying ritual violence in Liberia and beyond

Ritual or ‘ritualistic’¹ violence is often ghastly brutal, perhaps even more so than many other forms of extreme violence. Ritual violence—i.e. violence characterised or justified by rituals based on religious, spiritual and other ideological beliefs (or quite opportunistic, self-gratifying motives masquerading with those beliefs)—frequently surpasses a society’s until-then extant norms of what is considered defensible or even justified in such violence.

For reasons ranging from brutalised behaviour due to atrocious warfare and internecine fighting to endemic corruption, crime and (semi-) anarchy, ritual violence in both the private i.e. domestic and public i.e. political spheres has been and still is rife in many places, countries and regions across the world—including particularly in Liberia (see Map 1). West Africa specialist Fred van der Kraaij points this out eloquently and rather bluntly: “Ritual killings have probably taken place in the area that now forms the republic of Liberia as long as people have lived there. And the practice is not limited to this country; it also occurs in other African countries and on other continents. In traditional communities, there is a widespread belief that ritual human sacrifice is necessary to protect or advance the interests of the community” (Van der Kraaij 2015: 33).

Dr. Alan White, co-executive director of the Advocacy Foundation for Human Rights (AFHR)—and former chief investigator of the UN-backed Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) who helped to catch onetime Liberian warlord and president Charles Taylor²—is equally eloquent and blunt during his testimony to a U.S. Congress Foreign Affairs subcommittee in late 2023:




While serving as the Chief of Investigations [of SCSL] I witnessed and investigated some of the most horrific and unspeakable human rights violations no one could ever imagine that someone could inflict on another human being. The horrors of civil war are always tragic, however, to see those involved in the commission of killing and torturing another human being by engaging in ritualistic activities was something I had not seen before and quite frankly prepared to deal with (White 2023: 3).

Alan White continued to make many more trenchant remarks and give shocking examples of ritual violence during his testimony, stressing that it is “well documented that during the civil wars in Liberia [and Sierra Leone] that ritual killings were commonplace” (White 2023: 5) and still are in Liberia, Sierra Leone and elsewhere. And he points out that Liberia’s former and current administrations have done little to stop these killings, been actively involved and even perpetrating many of these for self-serving spiritual-political purposes (Ibid: esp. 6; see Kraaij 2023).³

Van der Kraaij and White are far from alone in their dark assessments on the prevalence of ritual violence in Liberia and beyond. Thus Fanuel Hadzizi, speaking on behalf of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), has observed that “ritual killings and human sacrifice happen in many, if not all countries in Africa. Cases have been reported in such countries as Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe” (Hadzizi 2011).

For reasons not yet fully understood, ritual killings have become especially virulent ever since Decolonisation. Thus in Nigeria such killings were



already on the rise in the 1970s: “Rumours circulated that penis thieves were on the prowl and were thought to collect male organs for obscure ritual purposes” (Atsenuwa apud Akinyele & Dietz 2019: 270). If one counts non-lethal instances of ritual violence as well—including such violence too limited in scope, tools and weaponry to be lethal, and failed attempts at such lethal violence even if scope, tools and weaponry were sufficient for it—then the phenomenon is even more widespread, indeed truly endemic.


Map 1 **Liberia, West Africa, Africa**



F. v.d. Kraaij, *Liberia: From the Love of Liberty to Paradise Lost* ASC Leiden 2015, p.xiv. ⁴

A closer look at the prevalence of ritual violence in Liberia and beyond

Ritual violence is a broader, more widespread, lesser-known and more worrying phenomenon than ‘just’ religiously-motivated violence by




fundamentalists and other fanatics which has caused so much alarm and (obsessive) concern across the globe since 9-11. The most destructive single terrorist act to this day took place on 11 September 2001, when a dozen members of Osama Bin Laden's Islamist-fundamentalist *Al Qaeda* (The Base) network hijacked airplanes and plunged them into the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, killing 2973 people, almost all civilians, 2749 of them in New York.

This unprecedented attack partially accounts for the subsequent "unprecedented international attention given to Liberia" already mired in civil war, brutality, criminality and anarchy, as places like Liberia were seen as "potential bases for terrorists" (Ellis 2007 (1999): xxiii). No wonder that the "Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A) in northern Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) promptly appeared on the United States' list of terrorist organisations, proscribed after September 11th" (Richards 2005: 2).

Yet American and other Western policymakers, analysts and ordinary citizens tended to conflate means (e.g. ritualism) with motives (e.g. jihadism) of violence. And African perspectives on terrorism conceptions, applications and policies (e.g. Olukoju & Falaiye 2008) were hardly listened to. This in part led to misconceived, misguided one-size-fits-all Development, Conflict Resolution and War-on-Terror policies in and imposed on West Africa and elsewhere (Ellis 2007: xxii-xxiv).


Arguably these one-size-fits-all policies from the West were and are applicable to Liberia least of all: its history, status and culture are markedly, perhaps uniquely different from the main body of newly established African states during the Decolonisation struggles of the second half of the twentieth century.



Liberia stands out as Africa's first and oldest independent republic, founded in 1847 by free-born and liberated African-American and Afro-Caribbean settlers whose enslaved ancestors often originated from elsewhere in Africa. Yet tragically these settlers generally adopted the often arrogant, racist and colonial attitudes of White Americans and Europeans i.e. their former masters, rather than truly behaving according to the tenets of equality and liberty they were so proud of—as expressed by the motto 'The Love Of Liberty Brought Us Here' on Liberia's national flag and other emblems.

Instead these “settlers, commonly referred to as Americo-Liberians, viewed the indigenous people as primitive and inferior. The Americo-Liberians were originally determined to impose the “civilized” customs they had acquired in the United States on the indigenous Africans” (Renda 1999: 63)—and annihilate native customs and beliefs, including native forms of ritual violence, in the process. Secular equalitarianism actually went hand in hand with Christian belief. Van der Kraaij:


The missionaries' motivation to disclose ritual malpractices concurred with the prevailing mentality of the Americo-Liberian colonists who were all Christians. It also explains the latter's feelings of superiority towards the native peoples They, the newly arrived from overseas, were christianized and civilized whereas the indigenous masses were barbaric, wild and uncivilized. In their eyes this justified their mission: to colonize this region and these peoples in order to bring civilization, prosperity and the Christian belief. Besides, wasn't this one of the main reasons behind the creation of the colonization societies in the United States of America? ⁵



Paradoxically their very ideology of equalitarian freedom—and Christianity—made the Americo-Liberians feel superior to the natives who supposedly lacked such consciousness, belief and aspiration. The former “often conceived of their return to Africa as a form of civilising mission, a divine plan whereby Africans, via the sojourn of a number of them as slaves in North America, would be transformed into civilised, fully Christian, people” (Ellis 2001a: 225).

Thus Liberia’s history “in many respects was comparable to that of colonies of settlement” by European whites elsewhere on the African continent and the globe, “with the major difference that the settlers were themselves ultimately of African origin” (Ellis 1995: 175). These settlers quickly formed the Americo-Liberian elite in the country with (near-)continuous support from the United States at the expense of the indigenous tribes. This support continued at least until the civil wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. At least in part these wars originated from grievances by the natives against the Americo-Liberians, who sought to subjugate and control them fully ever since the establishment of Indirect Rule through especially collaborating chiefs during the early twentieth century “in imitation of British colonial administrations elsewhere in West Africa” (Ellis 2001a: 231).

Actually one of the major threats facing Liberia’s development and very survival, ever since the arrival of the first Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean colonists in 1822 or even earlier, were the “clashes and conflicts between the settlers (and later their descendants) with the tribal population living in the area claimed by the republic, i.e. the coastal counties and the vast Hinterland”.⁶ Liberian analysist and onetime opposition activist Emmanuel T. Dolo puts it even more




bluntly: “The deportation of African Americans to Liberia was intended to achieve freedom. Instead, it brought about the repression of indigenous people by [these] settlers. As a result, tension, followed by bitter rivalry developed between indigenous peoples and settlers” (Dolo 1996: ix). Perhaps these ‘atypical’ features have led to unusual, even unique characteristics of political and ritual violence in Liberia and beyond. This possibility alone makes Liberia a crucial case-study in the analysis of patterns of ritual violence across the world.

Assessing ritual violence among Liberia’s tribes and other social (kin) groups

The Americo-Liberians, and the sixteen official tribes which overwhelmingly make up Liberia’s population (90-95%)—the Bassa, Dei, Gbande, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Sapu (southern Krahn), Kru, Loma, Mandingo, Mano, Mende and Vai (variants spellings, names: see Kraaij 2015: xvii-xviii)—are unevenly distributed across its fifteen counties (see Map 2 below); they mainly speak one of three main languages—Mande and Mel concentrated in the North-West and Kru in the South-East—(see Map 3 below) a/o one of a few dozen distinct native languages, while normally being fluent in English or its Liberian dialect (Ibid: 5 (note 3)).⁷


This ritual-violence-in-Liberia series seeks to determine the degrees in which the Americo-Liberians and any of the native tribes or indigenous peoples have opposed or collaborated with each other in times of peace and war, as entire communities or perhaps crosscutting subgroups.



Map 2 Political and administrative divisions (counties) in Liberia




F. v.d. Kraaij, *Liberia: From the Love of Liberty to Paradise Lost* ASC Leiden 2015, p.xv.⁸



Map 3 Language and ethnic groups (tribes) in Liberia




F. v.d. Kraaij, *Liberia: From the Love of Liberty to Paradise Lost* ASC Leiden 2015, p.xvi.⁹



As I am doing in my research on other peoples, one should seek to “ascertain whether each of the named tribes, clans, sub-clans, other kin groups or localised ethnic (sub) groups however defined” among the Liberians and any Liberian(-led) combat units during the recent or ongoing armed conflicts in Liberia or elsewhere:

- i) is correctly identified by the indicated name;
- ii) exists at least ‘formally’ in name (existent);
- iii) is really salient i.e. vibrant and culturally active today;
- iv) is or has been politically a/o military active;
- v) if so, has been active in identifiable political a/o military formations;
- vi) if so, has exhibited identifiable brutalisation a/o debrutalisation patterns;
- vii) if so, whether any particular norms, beliefs, customs and practices account for any brutalisation and/or debrutalisation patterns (Ten Dam 2020: 257-258 incl. quote).

This Ritual Violence in Liberia series will preliminarily investigate the very same aspects of relevant Liberian tribes, clans, sub-clans, other kin groups or localised ethnic (sub)groups involved in or victimised by ritual violence. More broadly, this series seeks to determine, for so far feasible at this stage, what kinds of ritual violence any (kin) groups and individual members of the sixteen official tribes and the Americo-Liberians (an effective 17th tribe in Liberia) have committed in the recent and more distant past—and against whom and how frequently and brutally. Of course this series can present only some preliminary findings on some particular traits and frequencies (if any) of ritual violence among such groups in Liberian society at home and abroad. In the foreseeable future one must conduct far more research on traits and frequencies of such violence in Liberia and elsewhere.




One must keep in mind that circumscriptions of and delineations between tribes, clans and other social (kinship) groups—as is generally the case with other terms and concepts, like ritual violence (see following section)—are either contested, constructed for political and ideological purposes, defined for the researcher’s particular case studies and purposes in mind only—or not explicitly or formally defined at all. Thus Stephen Ellis warns that what “exactly constitutes a Liberian ‘tribe’ is no simple matter to describe” or agree on (Ellis 2007: 31)—which appears to be one reason why he effectively applies the terms ‘tribe’/‘tribalism’, ‘ethnicity’/‘ethnic group’ interchangeably and quite broadly in his works (Ibid: 31-43; Ellis 1995, 2001a,b).

In my own works and analyses I argue, while adopting classic-anthropological kinship definitions, that “most traditional societies conform to a predominant religion state, emperor, nation, ethnicity, or to a predominant collection of *tribes* i.e. kin groups without residential unity (‘ethnic’ if with perceived common ancestry); *clans* i.e. kin groups with residential unity; multi-clan or other mixed groups with residential unity and self-identification in hamlets, villages, towns or other localities; and finally to *extended families* and *nuclear families* within or straddling across kin groups” (Ten Dam 2020: 213-214 (quote); as first argued in Ten Dam 2010: 343).

Louis Dupree asserts that the “key ... is kinship, that reciprocal set of rights and obligations which satisfies and .. limits an individual’s .. role” (Dupree 1997: 181; 183-92 on kinship typology (no clear ‘tribe’ definition)).

In this regard one must keep in mind that scholars generally discern the same kinship or other social units, but apply different terms (family, clan, tribe, etcetera) for these—whereby they generally conceptualise




‘tribes’ as larger social units incorporating clans, sub-clans and progressively smaller units within these in turn. Thus most but not all scholars researching social groups broadly define the concept of ‘clan’ as the multi-household group with actual or perceived common ancestry—though just a few of them nowadays apply Dupree’s classic-anthropological marker of residential unity or its absence to distinguish between ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’ (Ten Dam 2020: 213-214).

Only a few scholars, like J. Gus Liebenow, consider the term ‘clan’ to refer to “a territorial unit rather than a kinship grouping”, constituting a “largest political entity among the various ethnic groups” of a country like Liberia at best (Liebenow 1987: 41). Yet most scholars consider and circumscribe clans as being some sort of kinship groups, territorially concentrated or no.

Generally I prefer to apply residential unity and other classic-anthropological distinctions for the terms ‘tribe’ and ‘clan’ whereby the latter may be a larger social unit than the former in a certain country or region—even if these do not fit well the formal and informal distinctions between ‘tribes’, ‘clans’ and other, often smaller kin groups made in Liberia’s state and society. Van der Kraaij notes that in Liberia, “the term ‘tribe’ is used to refer to an ‘ethnic group’, by both official bodies and the general public. The terms have different meanings and, from a scientific perspective, the use of ‘tribe’ is controversial. However, .. Liberians themselves are more familiar with the term than with ‘ethnic group’ ” (Kraaij 2015: 3 (note 2)).

Many or all of Liberia’s sixteen official tribes may have been artificially constructed and distinguished from each other to some or full extent—and may be just partially based on the so-called ‘stateless societies’



formed by “clusters of lineage groups” in the past; yet even if a small tribe like the Kran or Krahn “hardly used that label” and “could hardly understand each other dialects” until well after the 1970s, it could still function nowadays as an overarching kin group without residential unity (Ellis 2007: 31-32 (quotes)).

An official tribe like the Kran or some of its constituent clans may still originate from a native ethnic group with perceived or actual common ancestry. If so, I disagree with Ellis’ assessment on the “inaccuracy of the use of the word Krahn as an ethnic category” (Ellis 2007: 32). I also disagree with Ellis’ apparent argument that any ‘genuine’ ethnic tribe must not just possess common kinship bonds, but also common dialects, customs and beliefs—and a “central locus of political authority” by chieftains, elders or other leaders and thus function as political units (Ibid: 33, 34 (incl. quote), 205 (common central authority)).

To me, a genuine tribe is residentially and geographically spread group in a certain region with actual and/or perceived primordial kinship bonds and ancestries—whether or not it has a common culture, language and/or a political(ly active) structure beyond kinship bonds. More generally I define *ethnicity* as “actual or perceived common ancestry” in both primordial and constructive kinship senses, rather than common culture, language, etcetera (Ten Dam 2015a: 14 (definition nationalism); Ten Dam & Polanski 2015: 227 (Ibid)).


These conceptualisations of mine also extend to any other non-recognised yet extant tribes Liberia may have to date or may have had in the past. Thus when the first African-Americans—ranging from former, liberated slaves to free-born citizens of the United States—



arrived there in the early nineteenth century with the support of the American government, the American Colonization Society and other such societies, the area then called the Grain, Pepper or Malagueta Coast and eventually to be known as Liberia was “already inhabited by some 20 different tribes” (Kraaij 2015: 3). Naturally, one should analyse any ritual violence among and by any ‘unofficial’ tribes in Liberia as well, for so far available knowledge and sources allow this.

As I have argued elsewhere, the provenance, delineation, saliency and extancy of tribes and other kin groups in past and present may be contested and uncertain given the “lack of up-to-date knowledge and lack of consensus on the rare out-of-date knowledge” on these groups (Ten Dam 2020: 221). Yet given my own analysis and findings on Chechens, Albanians and other peoples despite the grave gaps in uncontested knowledge on these peoples, I have grown skeptical of the tendency among so many analysts to “even question whether such clans [and other kin groups] have ever existed at all, or dismiss these and their supposed customs as “mythical social structures” (re)invented by political entrepreneurs” (Ibid: 223).

Irrespective of the conceptualisations one adopts, I deem it “high time” for analysts, practitioners and decisionmakers to “further research on the oft-neglected role of ethnic and kinship bonds in present-day societies—not just the self-professed traditional or tribal ones, but also and above all the so-called modern or developed ones” (Ten Dam 2019: 156). One could say the same for studying the oft-neglected role of ritual violence among such communities in both past and present-day societies.



The following section presents my analyses on adopted circumscriptions of ritual violence and its empirical variants vis-à-vis other concepts and theories of violence. Part 2 of my Ritual Violence in Liberia series in the next issue or volume of this journal will provide my overview of the (lack of) research on ritual violence in West Africa and other parts of the world. The subsequent parts of the series will present my (preliminary) research findings on ritual violence in Liberia's present and (recent) past, with a final concluding part summarising the main findings; these will appear in future bi-annual issues a/o annual volumes of this journal sometime in 2025 and beyond. These may constitute more advanced, updated and improved versions of equivalent chapters in my *Ritual violence in Liberia – Ritualised brutalities in Liberia prior to, during and after the Civil Wars* if this book were indeed to come out first.

Ritual violence vis-à-vis concepts and theories of violence, conflict and brutality

This research project investigates ritual violence in Liberia focused on the period from 1989 till the present day, not just because such violence appears to be especially rife or uniquely featured in that country. One must not forget the stark given that proponents of diverse conflict theories have used Liberia as a prime example of 'new barbarism', 'new war', 'new anarchy' and/or brutalised violence in both its ritual and non-ritual varieties since the end of the Cold War.

One thus needs to assess first of all whether these scholars have validly used Liberia as a showcase for their theories, before one can delve into more particular causes and dynamics of ritual violence in that country.



Furthermore, the ritual-violence-in-Liberia series seeks to analyse ritual violence in Liberia in particular through the prism of my own Brutalisation theory. Therefore I seek to uncover aspects of such violence typical in Liberia, West Africa and beyond that have not yet appeared prominent in my own theoretical and empirical research on *brutalisation* i.e. increasing violation of local and/or international norms of violence, as described in multiple publications on e.g. the Chechens and Albanians (see esp. Ten Dam 2022 for an overview).

Other theories have helped to shape my Brutalisation theory and its main variables—violence-values, violence-stresses and violence-motivations (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies or convictions)—such as contrasting *deprivation* and *depredation* theories which posit either ‘grievance’ or ‘greed’ as prime motivations of violence. Indeed, these variables together could constitute a new overall violence theory I may construct and test in the future—irrespective of whether these (f)actually are inherently brutalising factors. The following sections summarise these and other concepts and theories, and discuss how these (can) relate to ritual violence.

Defining violence, conflict and brutality

In my research and analysis, I define *violence* as such as “deliberate infliction of physical force perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end, which may be lethal and violate basic human rights in the broad sense” (Ten Dam 2015a: 14; Ten Dam & Polanski 2015: 228; see Ten Dam 2022: 14). If the latter is true, one should speak of brutal violence or *brutality*, which I define as “violation of international and/or local norms of justified violence and those norms



guarding the life, health and integrity of the person, particularly through ill-treatment, torture, killing, imprisonment and execution without trial or due process” (Ibid 2015a: 16; Ibid 2015: 230).

Brutality does not happen uniformly all the time however, or for uniform reasons; nor is it uniformly approved or disapproved. Randall Collins rightly observes that “Cruelty is variable; it does not happen every minute, even in social settings where it may be culturally approved; and at some moments it happens where it is not approved. ... Cruelty has both small local micro-dynamics and large macro-sociological conditions, and these together determine the fateful moments when cruelty will happen or does not happen” (Collins 2013: 9).

Regarding legitimate and illegitimate compulsion, force and violence, the disciplines of *law* and *anthropology*, the study by outside observers of humans in their natural and cultural habitats (still overly focused on ‘pre-modern’ societies), have more in common than their practitioners tend to recognise. Despite their differing preconceptions and terminologies (except the term ‘law’ in later anthropology), they both deal with norms circumscribing what coercion is allowed by whom under what reasons and conditions.


Despite the rise of a sub-discipline studying “violent confrontations” (Schmidt & Schröder 2001: 4-5), many anthropologists are reluctant to acknowledge that violence i.e. deliberate infliction of physical force (my definition) is central to human culture. Like jurists, they prefer to speak of ‘law and order’ rather than monopolised violence. Thus the pioneering anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), who found that “hypertrophy of rules rather than lawlessness” characterised “primitive



life”, rarely specified “compulsory obligations” involving *violent* enforcement and retribution because he believed civil rather than criminal law held primitive societies together (Malinowski 1966 (1926): 9, 12 (quotes)-15, 30-31). One could generally connect anthropological theories with local norms and judicial theories with international norms, though these fields intermingle both in theory and practice. Also, customs encapsulate both binding and non-binding established habits. I consider as *laws* all binding, enforceable customs involving both written and unwritten (‘customary’) norms and rules.

One must keep in mind that violence—whether brutal or not, lawful or not and customary or not—may be done by anyone for any conceivable reason. This is why I define *terrorism*, one form of brutal violence breaching international and/or local norms, as a primary concept of observable action irrespective of why and by whom, as follows: “sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever [non-private] purpose against (groups of) unarmed or weakly armed and thereby effectively defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty security personnel, soldiers and policemen, and other defenceless non-combatants” (Ten Dam 2015a: 16; Ten Dam & Polanski 2015: 230).¹⁰

There is no room to extensively defend my definition of terrorism here; other publications of mine extensively describe my evolving conceptualisations of terrorism and other concepts of violence (see e.g. Ten Dam 2007, 2010, 2015c, 2022). Suffice to say here that I consider ritual violence against defenceless people a form of terrorism. In contrast, ritual violence between armed people able to defend themselves I do not consider terrorism given my definition of it, though it may still be brutal.



Therefore violence per se, irrespective by whom and why, forms a primary concept of observable action in my *action-actor-motive* conceptualisation triad, whereby actors and motives constitute secondary and tertiary concepts i.e. variants of violence respectively, which are more difficult to discern than (violent) actions by themselves (see esp. Ten Dam 2015a). Thus violence by pro-regime paramilitaries seeking self-interest, self-protection or self-enrichment (greed), and violence by anti-regime rebels seeking change (revolution), redress (grievance) or self-enrichment (greed), represent many but far from all empirically fluctuating variations of violence at any point in history.

Actually, these phenomena of violence indicate certain actors which fall under the concepts of *conflict* and *armed conflict*. These I define respectively as “fundamental disagreement between one [two] or more actors due to opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances, which for some reason are or appear to be unsolvable or irreconcilable”, and “violent confrontation between one [two] or more armed actors with opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances that appear to be unsolvable or irreconcilable through non-violent means” (Ten Dam 2015a: 14; Ten Dam & Polanski 2015: 228).¹¹

Therefore conflict per se may constitute either violent or non-violent disagreements and confrontations, or both; in that sense it is a broader concept than violence. Yet *violent* conflict is a manifestation of violence indicating possible opposing actors and their motivations involved, actors who are armed and able to defend and/or attack. After all, violence can be utterly one-sided, whereby just one (type of) actor is armed and the other(s) utterly unarmed and defenceless—as is usually




(but not always) the case in ritual violence. In that sense violence is a broader concept than conflict.

Indeed quantitative studies of armed conflict logically do not—given their kindred circumscriptions of armed conflict—count “violence against (practically) unarmed, unprotected or otherwise defenceless civilians in places without organised resistance” (Ten Dam 2017: 46). Such “cases of *one-sided* violence with direct and deliberate attacks against civilians” (Ibid: 46) in communities unable to defend themselves, one cannot regard as or equate with armed conflicts between actors with kindred capabilities to inflict harm. Consequently, any overall violence datasets show much higher numbers of casualties over any period of time than datasets of armed conflicts only, especially violence datasets including genocides like the one in Rwanda during 1994 (see Ten Dam 2017: 46-47).

To be sure, during armed conflicts one or more warring parties all too often kill, maim or torture the unarmed non-combatants and disarmed combatants of especially their enemies; yet in these instances one-sided violence is normally temporary, as the armed combatants of their enemies have for some reason been momentarily unable to protect their own people. Normally however, the latter are able to retribute in kind against the other’s non-combatants eventually—or if they are willing and able to show restraint and respect the laws of war, against the other’s combatants only.

Defining ritual violence

Be that as it may, I broadly define *ritual violence*—at least for the current purposes of this paper—as lethal and non-lethal violence characterised or justified by rituals based on any religious, spiritual, ideological or



other conceivable belief or conviction (or self-serving motive hiding behind or manipulating such a belief or conviction) to achieve any imaginable objective(s) ranging from affirming ingroup loyalty to attaining otherworldly power at the expense of the 'other'.

To clarify, I preliminarily circumscribe the concept of *ritual* as any observable rite i.e. solemn, ceremonial act through one or more sequenced gestures, words, objects or (violent or non-violent) actions imbued with meaning, custom, intent and/or belief by the one performing it.¹² This circumscription is inspired and based on those of others, like M. Bourdillon's 'ritual' as being any action(s) "in some way prescribed and repeated, and which convey an element of symbolism" ranging "from a simple shaking of hands to an elaborate pageant, like independence day celebrations or a religious service" (Bourdillon 1991: 13).¹³

Often rituals involve rites or acts of *magic*, defined by W.J. Perry as the belief among humans that they "can influence each other, and also natural phenomena, for their own advantage" by "the aid of certain substances or objects, or by means of certain acts" (Perry 1923: 8).¹⁴ Perry thus defined magic from a zero-sum utilitarian view (not necessarily shared by him) that humans tend to further their own pleasures, interests and gains at the expense of other fellow-humans.


Still, one could define magic as the employment of apparent, seeming or believed-in supernatural powers for any conceivable end, ranging from self-serving, zero-sum advantages to the common good and wellbeing of others. The witch doctor or (any other kind of) magician is believed to possess the power to control and direct the supernatural forces contained in (any) objects and beings, thus belonging to the



“magical power-circle far removed from what any ordinary man can ever attain” (Junge 1950: 18 (own transl. from Dutch).

At any rate, many a violent ritual may account for and directly express and constitute the brutality or brutalities involved. In other words, most or practical all forms of ritual violence constitute brutalities—apart from those local norms embedded in the beliefs that apply and justify the rituals and the accompanying atrocities in such violence. As this paper and series will show, this kind of violence empirically manifest itself—mainly if not exclusively and exhaustively—in the following distinct types which may happen separately, jointly or at least simultaneously in the same incidents:

- a) Any *violent confrontation* in public spaces between—or against unarmed or disarmed—individuals a/o groups for all conceivable kinds of reasons and involving all conceivable kinds of rituals in bodily and verbal posturing and actual violence i.e. use of force. Such a confrontation, typically though not universally, occurs together with symbols and ornaments (amulets, embroideries, texts etc.) worn separately or on clothing, weaponry and other objects. Thus during Liberia’s civil wars fighters “from the various factions, sometimes very young and almost invariably sporting amulets supposed to make them bullet-proof”, often disemboweled “the bodies of their victims and eating their flesh or their internal organs, particularly the heart” believing that one could acquire magical power by it, according the widespread conviction that the “essence of a person[’s soul] is contained in the heart and the blood” (Ellis 2001a: 222). Actually such ritual violence can manifest itself in many forms, ranging from highly regulated combats to irregular riots, pogroms




and other disturbances between (armed) civilians, (armed) gangsters a/o regular and irregular combatants (e.g. Collins 2008, 2013; Petrus 2008; Petrus et al 2018). The confronting individuals a/o groups might be evenly or unevenly matched in size and weaponry, or may be fully one-sided with one side being virtually or utterly devoid of means to defend or protect themselves (see concept of 'one-sided violence' briefly discussed in the preceding section).

- b) Honour-based *blood-feud* expressed in religious, mystical or secular rituals with e.g. oath-taking on revenge for (blood-)brothers and against (blood-)enemies, often accompanied with (predatory) raids and perhaps curtailed by tribal, kin-based hospitality and mediation codes (e.g. Gluckman 1963 (1956): 1-26)—all conceptualised as typically tribal, kin-based violence-values in my Brutalisation research (e.g. Ten Dam 2010: 333-335; 2011: 265-266; 2012: 226 (note 2); 2015b: 578 (note 3); 2020: 218-2019).

One also needs to consider *ritualised feuds* as such motivated by and expressing retribution and revenge, yet not concerning blood-oaths and kinships as such. Still, revenge attacks during Liberia's civil wars not based on ethnic/tribal identities and enmities and any related rituals appear to have been few. Most atrocities occurred between tribes/ethnicities rather than within or irrespective of these—and often were retaliatory and atrocious in nature against the preceding (retaliatory) atrocities against them by the tribal/ethnic 'others' (e.g. Ellis 1995, 2001a, 2007).

In earlier, especially pre-republican times however, typically small-scale and seasonal raids "generally for purposes of plunder or revenge" (Ellis 2001a: 230)—or rather as tests of manhood, as among Chechens and Albanians in pre-industrial times (e.g. Ten




Dam 2020: 218-2019)—on villages or other localities occurred as much within Liberia's communities currently distinguished and ossified as separate tribes and ethnicities, as between them.

- c) Harmful, violent 'black' *magic*, sorcery or 'witchcraft' i.e. spells expressed in rituals with incantations, curses, potions, poisons, objects, spirit possessions or mediumships, organ removals etcetera. This magic intends to strengthen the 'black' sorcerer i.e. *witch* or the one who employs him or her, and to weaken, maim or kill the body or even soul of latter's actual, perceived or chosen enemy or victim out of revenge, opportunism or any other motive. Such magic one perceives as real and effective according to one's religious, mystical or even secular beliefs.

My circumscription of witchcraft per se resembles the one by Ellis, as concerning "techniques or objects believed to exert a mystic power, which could be employed for either defensive or offensive purposes, such as amulets designed to make their wearers invulnerable, or human flesh thought to make the fighters [and other violent actors] strong" (Ellis 2001a: 223). Priests, elders or even 'modern' leaders with priestly powers could employ sorcerers and approve their activities; yet they could (claim to) be sorcerers themselves. At any rate, Liberian warriors "most concerned to acquire appropriate spiritual powers to protect themselves and to harm their enemies"—through magical medicines, potions or other objects which often "contained human body parts" (Ibid: 230 (quotes))—had to receive these from their priests, elders, leaders or (other) sorcerers directly.

However, one should not consider witchcraft per se through for instance a *nye*, a potion, substance or object believed to contain spiritual or other




magical power (Ellis 2001a: 227), as immutably ‘black’, harmful or brutal—depending on one’s violence-values of course. Thus Evans-Pritchard’s “classic definition of sorcery and witchcraft” (Ibid: 224)—as “magic that is illicit or considered immoral” and thus ‘inherently malicious’ because “believed to cause injury” (Evans-Pritchard 1958 (1937): 9-10)—one should apply as a definition of ‘bad’ magic only.

Likewise, George Way Harley circumscribes witchcraft as the “controlled use of some substance, drug or poison, capable of producing an unusual effect, good or evil” (Harley 1970 (1941b): 27)—yet contradicts himself by first defining it as the “use of *nye* to produce evil effects”, and brand it as the “art of perverted medicine” (Ibid: 20) from a Christian standpoint. Harley’s ambivalent use of the term ‘witchcraft’ reflects its general (mis)use as a “catch-all term for any mystical belief judged to be unacceptable by orthodox Christian standards” (Ellis 2001a: 228).

Ellis rightly criticises the “conspicuously vague” and biased conceptualisation of ‘witchcraft’, among both Liberians and foreigners including secular and missionary ethnographers like Harley, all of whom tended to narrowly equate it with magical-ritual violence involving removing body parts from victims (Ellis 2001a: 229 (quote), 233).¹⁵ Rather, witchcraft or sorcery as such concerns the “manipulation of spiritual forces in association with the commission of violence *or, alternatively, of protection against violence*” (Ellis 2001a: 234; italics added).

Therefore, healing-oriented ‘white’ magicians i.e. ‘good’ witches or witch-doctors, mediums and their supporters may (seek to) counter perceived, potential or actual harmful practices within belief systems more loosely and incongruously called ‘voodoo’ or ‘African science’ in



Liberia and elsewhere (Ellis 2001a: 223, 229; esp. Youboty 1993: 342-343). They could do so even by forceful means such drugging, poisoning or even killing suspected 'black' magicians or their secret-society users, as Chief Dabapa and his witch doctor did in the mid-1940s (see further forthcoming part 3 in the Ritual violence in Liberia series).

Thus spiritual communications, mediumships and possessions might have harmful *or* beneficial purposes and outcomes, whereby the mediums and/or spirits appear to be malignant *or* beneficent (e.g. Firth 1959; Beattie & Middleton 1969). The same is believed to be true for utterances, objects or even (human) beings and (human) body parts containing *juju* or magical power, such as good(-luck) and bad(-luck) spells, medicines, amulets and magicians themselves.¹⁶

Arguably the most brutal or 'black' sorcery is found in the belief that "the power of the *juju* lies in 'harvesting' the organs and other body parts while the victim is still alive and then consuming them" (Kraaij 2015: 38). Sadly, so-called black magic, of human sacrifice and the lighter varieties of ill-willed spells and curses, seems to be as prevalent as white magic in many cultures and societies, if not more so.

The same is true for measures to combat supposed black magic that are equally brutal if not more so. Through much of human history hunting, torturing and killing of alleged witches seems to have ruled the day. The victims of such purges are mainly female 'evil' magicians or 'witches' according to its generally pejorative meaning—perpetrated by self-proclaimed, mainly male 'white' magicians, priests or (other) alleged victims of witchcraft. In the end both 'witchcraft' and 'witch-hunting' tend to ingrain a near-unstoppable cycle of violence—fueled through blood-



feuds and kindred tit-for-tat retributions—in typically tribal, kin-based communities (e.g. Gluckman 1963 (1956): 81-108; Levack 1987: esp. 4-10).

Ironically ‘genuine’ i.e. practicing witches are hardly caught at all. Even ‘true’ practitioners of black magic do not deserve such a fate, to be caught and butchered—one should rather prosecute them (if at all) under the principles of fair treatment, fair trial and due process.

The broadest type a) of ritual violence could have characteristics of types b) and c) as well, such as feud-based confrontations between youthful and adult gangsters applying witchcraft, satanic or other occult rituals. One could call these confrontations by these violent criminals ‘ritual crimes’ (Perlmutter 2004) or ‘occult-related crimes’ “ranging from Satanism-related crime to African witchcraft-related crime” (Petrus et al 2018: 168). At any rate, many ritualised confrontations by gangsters or other actors emanate from feuds—and many confrontations may involve *magical* rituals be these feud-based or not.

Type a) thus broadly covers my definition of ritual violence per se—though the latter also includes any violence involving rituals in private spaces like homes and other secluded places. This paper and the series focus on type b) i.e. violent magic or *magical-ritual violence*, because this type appears to be most prominent in Liberia. Still, ritualised (blood-)feuds and other confrontations have occurred and still do occur in Liberia as well.

Arguably if contestably, violent human behaviour and indeed all human behaviour appears to involve some kinds of rituals. If this is true, violence per se effectively equates (magical-)ritual violence per se. Some scholars



and other analysts appear to believe so. Thus Randall Collins—who actually applies the terms “ritual violence” and “ritual killings” too (Collins 2013: 12,14)—posits through his micro-sociological theory of violence that *all* violence is intrinsically ritual i.e. involves rituals, irrespective of whether it is or should be seen as brutal (Collins 2008, 2009, 2013).

I would not go that far however: conceivably some or even many manifestations of violence may be devoid of any notable or actual rituals at all. Of course one could quietly, mentally form and express certain rituals like prayers and other incantations in one’s head without orally or bodily expressing these openly. These ‘silent’ rituals might be detectable through tiny facial and other bodily expressions, but I deem any deductions any psychologists make from these highly interpretative and speculative. At any rate, to equate ritual violence per se with violence per se would make the concept of ritual a meaningless, empty catch-all term, designating all kinds of expressions, utterances, actions and hidden mental activities as ‘rituals’.

Ritual violence vis-a-vis convictions and other factors of brutalisation

Ritual violence through magic, feuding and any other ritualised confrontations may and often do constitute brutalities and brutalities i.e. increasing, worsening brutalities over (a certain period of) time. Think of “extreme ritual cruelty such as mutilating and hanging burned bodies” (Collins 2013: 13). Such brutality frequently, though not exclusively, involves one-sided, often terrorist violence against unarmed or practically defenceless civilians and other non-combatants (see my definition of terrorism in section ‘Defining violence, conflict and brutality’). Therefore



this paper and the entire series makes use of my theory and empirical research on *brutalisation* as described in multiple publications (see esp. Ten Dam 2022 with extensive references to these publications). Since early 2021 “I have broadened the theory and its variables to encapsulate all possible kinds of violence beyond armed conflict, by non-state and state actors, as follows ... :

a cycle or sequence of violence involving four main variables, whereby the first variable is most intimately tied to the concept of brutality: 1) *violence-values*, normative notions of proper and improper violence according to local and/or international norms; 2) *violence-inducing motivations*: grievances, ‘greeds’ or avarices, interests[, compulsions] and ideologies [convictions] that bring about violence; 3) *violence-stresses* like fear, fatigue, rage and group pressures among both combatants and non-combatants, among both perpetrators and victims, resulting from or leading to traumas and hypothetically to brutalities as well; and 4) *violence-induced motivations*: grievances, avarices, interests[, compulsions] and ideologies [convictions] that happen by, through and during the violent episode in question” (Ten Dam 2022: 12).

The Brutalisation theory will be continuously modified and improved however. Diagram I below depicts the latest and broadest model of the theory, including the latest formal description of it (see for a slightly older version Ten Dam 2022: 16-17). Thus I have decided to add *compulsions* as a distinct sub-variable to variables 2 and 4 to the Brutalisation model. After all, compulsions “in the sense of being forced to participate in fighting or other violence—most relevantly any brutal violence” may “especially



‘motivate’ the lower-rank rather than higher-rank participants and their leaderships” rather than any grievances, avarices or other motives (Ibid: 13).

Think of the child soldiers during Liberia’s recent civil wars, most of whom have been compelled and brain-washed—often by rituals—to participate in often atrocious violence. As this paper and series will show, some of them joined voluntarily and even eagerly out of greed, grievance or any other motive. Yet most of them only exhibited those motives through conditioning and indoctrination much later, after their “compulsory or even press-ganged mobilisation, whereby even close relatives may be held hostage, with the threat that ‘something bad’ would happen to them if the draftee does not comply” (Ten Dam 2022: 13).

Be that as it may, one can analyse ritual violence through the lenses of all the (sub-)variables or factors of this pessimistic Brutalisation theory—which I “seek to test i.e. falsify .. on as many cases as possible” (Ten Dam 2022: 15).¹⁷ Still, it appears to be most salient as a set of violence-values justifying such violence, and as a set ideologies or convictions legitimising the use and effectiveness of such violence.

Actually, my conceptualisation of ritual violence has made me decide to replace for future analysis and research the term ‘ideology’ in the theoretical circumscription of brutalisation—and thereby modify the constituent sub-variable—with the term *conviction*, as the latter better encapsulates any religious, spiritual, ideological or other conceivable beliefs. After all, an ideology just represents one type of belief or conviction—the doctrinal one. Originally, I defined ideology as a “belief system that contains a set of principles, convictions and objectives ... to achieve secular and/or religious goals” (Ten Dam 2015a: 17; Ten Dam & Polanski 2015: 231).





Diagram Brutalisation: Generic Violence Model



Formal description of the generic violence model of the Brutalisation theory


Fear, pain, desperation, humiliation, anger, disillusionment, trauma and other emotions and responses emanating from imagined, perceived or experienced sufferings like deprivations, devastations and depredations lead to a brutalisation



of means like 'terrorisation' and criminalisation, and a brutalisation of ends like radicalisation and 'extremisation', in each successive bout of violence of one against the other and the longer each violence-bout lasts (protraction). Traumas, grievances and other conditions may exist earlier, but in different form and context.

The cycle and sequence of violence runs as follows: intolerant, zero-sum, winner-takes-all *violence-values* (aggregate variable 1) that do *not* adhere to (once) recognised norms like honour, hospitality (including fair treatment of captured opponents), proportionality and non-combatant immunity, lead to *violence-inducing motivations* (aggregate variable 2) like grievances, 'greeds' or avarices, interests, compulsions—and convictions that may or may not be based on avarices, interests and grievances; the aggrieved, greedy, self-interested and/or ideologically driven take up arms, leading to *violence stress* (aggregate variable 3) through *stress-responses* like fear, fatigue and rage resulting from or leading to traumas, induced by innate aggression or eagerness to use violence as opposed to innate restraint or reluctance to use violence, and *social pressures* to carry out and condone atrocities; these violations engender *violence-induced motivations* (aggregate variable 4) like grievances about atrocities and other injustices suffered during the violence-cycle, typically leading to revenge attacks and tit-for-tat retributions, or opportunities to amass riches, power, status and privileges (avarices and interests) or realise sought-after end states (convictions) out of the violent confrontation, leading to more deprivations and devastations. In turn these violence-engendering and violence-engendered motivations, together with consequent brutalisations, negatively affect a group's or society's (violence) values after any temporary cessation or settlement of hostilities. This may lead to a new, even more brutal round of violence.


The countervailing variables are: A) *tolerance* and kindred values (pluralism, equality, democracy, etc.) respecting basic human and humanitarian rights and comparable local norms; B) *rectitude*, a morally virtuous approach involving professional codes and practices to uphold discipline, self-restraint and thereby basic norms like rules of proper and justified war; C) *intervention* by external



actors, ranging from mediation to military occupation, to stop and halt excessive violence, while at the same time respecting human rights, humanitarian and local norms—especially if the latter resemble, complement or even improve on international norms; and D) *justice* through measures ranging from reconciliation by e.g. truth commissions and prosecution by e.g. international tribunals to ameliorate traumas, resolve grievances, promote equitable interests, and respect secular and religious convictions—for so far these respect human rights, humanitarian norms and relevant local norms. Yet the theory holds that these positive variables are either non-existent or too weak to prevent, counter or impede overall brutalisation in any meaningful sense or significant degree.

Now I define ideology as any *doctrinal* conviction or unquestionable faith based on immutable, non-falsifiable, non-contestable and enforceable doctrines i.e. concepts, principles and objectives that any actual and potential adherent must follow and obey, whereby any transgressions may lead to punishments like eviction from the group (e.g. expulsion from a political party) and (extrajudicial) execution by the group (e.g. extermination by a religious sect).

In that regard, I preliminarily circumscribe *religion* as a doctrinal conviction or set of convictions—expressed and acted out in unquestioned precepts and rules, often but not necessarily as rites and rituals—about reality being not just the physical world, but also or mainly one or more metaphysical, supernatural worlds, usually but not necessarily peopled with supernatural beings ranging from one or more gods, spirits, angels, devils and deceased souls. I further define *spiritualism*—quite differently from most other thinkers and practitioners—as the nondoctrinal variant of religion, whereby



precepts and rules about supernatural worlds are flexible and debatable i.e. open to debate and different interpretations.

In Africa, religious and spiritual believers consider physical phenomena to be impregnated by metaphysical ones much further than most people on most other continents. Unlike in the West especially, Africans generally do not distinguish between animate and inanimate phenomena at all; they rather believe any or all beings and objects—which the physicalists, secularists and even religious people in the West presume to be lifeless or soulless—could be animated by spiritual beings and entities, often with *juju* i.e. magical forces and powers.

Like Africa specialists Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, I closely follow E. B. Taylor's definition of religion as 'the belief in Spiritual Beings', or more widely as "a belief in the existence of an invisible world, often thought to be inhabited by spirits that are believed to affect people's lives in the material world" (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 3 (quote), 14; see Taylor 1958 (1871): 8)—with a few major caveats:

First, I prefer to speak of a supernatural world rather than an invisible world—or even an overall, non-divided world with natural and supernatural properties "peopled and controlled by an *invisible* order of personalised spiritual beings which interact with humans" (Siegmann 1980: 90; italics added). To speak of supernatural forces "invisible to the naked eye" (Ellis 2007: 16) may actually be misleading and possibly even invalid. After all, many people in Africa and elsewhere holding religious—or looser, non- or less-doctrinal spiritual beliefs like those on reincarnation (see e.g. Bastide et al 1965)—often claim to directly *observe*



rather than just intuitively sense deceased human beings, supernatural beings and inanimate phenomena—or at least the effects the latter create. Physicalist-oriented scholars may claim that supernatural phenomena are invisible and thus unobservable and unverifiable even if true, I urge to withhold premature adoption of that supposition.

True, many people believe spirits “to be real, even though invisible” (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 23) and that one could communicate either directly or through mediums with “invisible powers or spirits” (Ellis 2001a: 227). Yet at the same time many people believe that they can detect, observe and even see deceased souls, deities and other supernatural beings and entities. They claim that their own paranormal abilities make these spirits visible, or the latter make themselves visible in the physical world even to those lacking paranormal abilities. Even if they cannot see or hear supernatural beings and entities directly, they still claim to communicate with them mentally or telepathically whereby they keep control of their own body, consciousness and willpower (*spirit communication*). Or they claim to act as channels for these spirits, who enter and use their bodies to communicate with them and any others present—whereby they remain consciously autonomous (*spirit mediumship*), barely so, or not at all (*spirit possession*). Even in such instances, according to them, the spirits are not truly ‘invisible’.

Thus while I generally agree with the observation that “Spirits—invisible beings that are widely perceived to exist and influence the material world—are central to the thinking of many millions of people in Africa” (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 7-8), I define spirits as supernatural beings rather than invisible ones.

Incidentally, the terms spirit communication, mediumship and possession are based on definitions and observations made by Raymond Firth (e.g. Firth 1959: 141; Firth, apud Beattie & Middleton 1969: ix-xiv; Beattie &



Middleton 1969: xvii). However, I do not follow all of Firth's particular distinctions between these terms. Thus I do not adopt his distinction between spirit possession as just a "bodily expression of spirit manifestation" in the human host, and spirit mediumship as a form of communication whereby the spirit seeks through the host to "convey any particular message to other people" i.e. audience in the physical world (Firth, apud Beattie & Middleton 1969: xi). Arguably, in spirit possession too the spirit may communicate i.e. "having something to say to an audience" (Ibid). Rather the main difference is as follows: in possession the spirit controls the host as a non- or semi-conscious, 'helpless' vessel, while in mediumship the relationship is equally autonomous or the other way round. So I do agree with Firth that "a person who ... acts a medium, must be more highly *controlled* than that of a person simply possessed" (Ibid).

Second, I prefer to circumscribe religion more widely as any belief in a supernatural world, irrespective of whether this supposedly affects the natural world or not, and irrespective of whether the supernatural world is believed to be distinct from the natural world or not.¹⁸ The tenets of mutual or one-directional effects and symbiosis between natural and supernatural worlds just present some types of religious beliefs, even if these types are quite predominant in Africa and elsewhere.

Ellis and Ter Haar, rather than adopting a classical-sociological definition focusing solely on "ritual expression at the expense of its ideological component", opt for an "operational" anthropological definition of religion to "accommodate the distinctive features of religion in Africa" (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 14 (quotes)), including the belief that "all power has its *ultimate* origin in the spirit world" (Ibid: 4).



But I prefer to start with a universal definition of religion as a primary concept of observable action irrespective of particular actors, beliefs and other motives according to my action-actor-motive conceptualisation triad (Ten Dam 2015a). In that regard Ellis & Ter Haar rightly view and conceptualise religion as “a field of action that believers occupy and may control” even or especially in the arena of politics, rather than a passive field of ‘signification’ that believers appear to follow (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 15; Marshall-Fratani & Péclard 2002: 8 (‘signification’)). More fundamentally, they rightly argue that the “most important ideas about how people can live together” can be “understood in terms of universal concepts” irrespective of cultural variations (Ibid 2004: 18).

Third, I propose more lucid and honest distinctions between conviction, religion and science. Ellis and Ter Haar seek to be non-judgment and non-biased in their analysis of religion and politics in Africa, emphasising that one should suspend judgment by “allowing believers (in this case Africans) the right to express matters they think appropriate” (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 18); one should “describe religion in ‘emic’ terms, that is those derived from the believers’ own point of view, before analysing it in ‘etic’, or more detached, terms that correspond more closely to a scientific approach” (Ibid: 17).


However, Ellis, Ter Haar and many other mostly Western analysts subtly do assume and thus judge religious and spiritual(ist) beliefs to be verifiably or plausibly untrue. They thus “take religious beliefs seriously” in a quite limited sense only, “in the sense of assuming that those who hold them trust them to be true” while not implying that “an analyst must share those beliefs” (Ellis 2007: 23). They neither investigate the veracity of these beliefs open-mindedly, let alone allow these to be



possibly true or ever become “scientifically validated explanations” (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 25). One can frequently locate their biases in their texts. Thus they equate the physical world as the ‘factual’ one and the metaphysical world as the “imaginary”, ‘non-factual’ one, when observing the African tendency to merge both worlds whereby “the real and the unreal become undistinguishable from each other” (Ibid 2004: 23).¹⁹ In stark contrast, I advise the reader to remain openminded and nonjudgmental to the full. One should consider accounts of magical powers and other paranormal phenomena to be just possibly, conceivably and even plausibly true—with stark implications for ultimately judging the frightening potential scope and destructiveness of ritual violence.

Indeed a conviction per se, especially a non-doctrinal one, may involve concepts, principles and objectives that are (allowed to be) falsifiable and contestable in open debate. Convictions in this openminded, relaxed, heterodox sense are especially found as theories and hypotheses in the world of science—or should be. After all, inquiry and inquisitiveness, but above all recurrent falsification i.e. ‘stress-testing’ of one’s suppositions and paradigms, are supposed to be the hallmarks of true science. In that sense religious and other doctrinal faith and scientific falsification are irreconcilable opposites to each other.

By the same token however, beliefs in phenomena otherworldly than the material one should subject to serious scientific enquiry—rather than presume to be untrue, invalid, unobservable, unprovable or ‘inexplicable’²⁰ simply because people happen to believe in such phenomena due to a religious or other doctrinal faiths. Faith may hit on one or more truths by pure accident, intuition or speculation after all.



Many a self-proclaimed scientist unquestionably following the paradigm of physicalism—i.e. the belief that the physical, directly observable world is the only world there is—commits this fundamental error of bias, of falsely equating physicalism with science per se. Such (self-proclaimed) scientists actually follow a faith rather than true science as a method of falsifying inquiry.

Therefore true science simply is a method of continuously stress-testing any theory, and is *not* just any single theory or paradigm on supposed reality; it concerns testing theories on any kind of reality—even if such reality may just conceivably encapsulate one or more not-directly or not-easily observable supernatural worlds or dimensions as well. At the very least one could or should ‘stress-test’ the plausibility and explanatory power of any such theory, even if one could never observe and incontrovertibly ‘proof’ any supernatural reality.

Ritual violence vis-à-vis other theories of identity, conflict and violence ²¹


In the forthcoming major work *Brutality and Violence*, I will extensively describe how the following, contrasting violence and/or identity theories have partially informed or shaped my Brutalisation theory and its constituent variables:

- *spiral-of-violence* (Camara 1969, 1971a,b);
- *frustration-aggression* (Dollard et al 1944 (1939); Miller 1941; Berkowitz 1962, 1969);
- *human motivation* or *hierarchy-of-needs* (Maslow 1941, 1943, 1987 (1954));
- primordial, instrumental a/o constructed (narrative) *identity formation* (Piaget 1959 (1923, 1926), 1967 (1929), 1969 (1961); Clastres



- 1998 (1972); Smith 1981, 1986, 1991, 2001; Anderson 2002 (1983); Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm apud Hobsbawm & Ranger 1999 (1983); Böss 2012; Bekee-Eberendu 2017);
- positivist, hermeneutic a/o interpretivist (linguistic) *identity manifestation* (Gadamer 1960, 1967 apud Linge 1976; Foucault 1971 apud Rabinow 1991; Habermas apud Bleicher 1980);
 - *absolute deprivation* (Hobsbawm 1959, 1969; Bourdieu 1961 apud Poupeau & Discepolo 2008; Fanon 1965, 1970; Bell 1971, 1976, 1978, 1998);
 - *relative deprivation* (Stouffer et al 1977 (1949); Hoffer 1951; Runciman 1972 (1966); Gurr 1968a,b, 1970, 1981, 2000);
 - *humiliation* (Lindner 2001a,b, 2006; Deutsch apud Lindner 2006);
 - *injustice* (Shklar 1990; Fricker 2007; Pogge 2008; Bufacchi 2005, 2012, 2018);
 - *depredation* ²² (Hechter 1995; Grossman 1999; Collier 2000a,b; Collier & Hoeffler 2002; Collier & Sambanis 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003);
 - *transformed irregular war* (Van Creveld 1991a,b);
 - *new predatory war* (Kaldor 1999; Mueller 2000, 2001; Makarenko 2002, 2003, 2005);
 - *conflict-of-interest* (Kitsuse & Spector 1973; Antonio & Ritzer 1975; Ross 1993; Marshall & Cole 2014).

Right here, I can state with near-certainty that the proponents of these contrasting theories have paid scant attention if any to ritual violence as a distinct, relevant phenomenon. Otherwise, I would have noted the phenomenon in my theoretical and empirical literary reviews and research projects much earlier than I eventually did. Of course there are some partial exceptions, particularly among those following spiral-of-violence, identity, depredation and transformed-war theories. Yet even they, as I will show in detail in my forthcoming 'magnum opus' *Brutality and Violence*, grasp ritual violence only imperfectly, erroneously or not at all. The other proponents




of such theories would undoubtedly have interpreted such violence through their preferred prisms if they had paid any attention to it, rather than seeking to falsify i.e. stress-test their theories with it. In short, the overall theoretical neglect of ritual violence as a topic of study in the academic community mirrors the empirical neglect of it in that community (see part 2 of Ritual Violence in Liberia series).

Bet that as it may, I generally prefer more nuanced theories and approaches which seek to pick the best, most valid parts of all these ‘determinist’ theories listed above—and discard their worst i.e. most invalidated parts concerning violence in general and ritual violence in particular. Thus I generally agree with Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper’s criticism of both ‘strong’ primordial and ‘weak’ constructivist conceptions of identity (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 6-8,10-11).

So I neither support nor reject a priori the premise that nations, ethnicities or smaller groups have ‘primordial’ i.e. true genetic, kinship, cultural or other roots. Some human groups appear to have such roots, others may just imagine or claim to have these, but most appear to have both real and imagined roots to some varying degrees. Therefore I concur with R. A. Schermerhorn’s observation that the ethnic group is a “collectivity within a larger society” having a “*real or putative* common ancestry” whereby many, most or practically all members are conscious of their common history and follow their common rules and customs (Schermerhorn 1970: 12 (*italics added*)).


Overall, the Brutalisation theory in its present form relies on the deprivation-and-thus-grievance rather than depredation-and-thus-greed premise, given the apparently broader validity of the ‘relative-



deprivationist' and especially (perhaps surprisingly) the classic 'absolute-deprivationist' theories.²³ Still, the influence of the 'depredationist' ²⁴ theories one can infer from the overall cycle of ends-and-means degeneration which the Brutalisation theory purports—and from the eventual inclusion of the sub-variables greed (avarice) and interest in its second and fourth variables. Criminalisation at least accompanies brutalisation in most if not all cases, as greed easily feeds on grievance in many if not all cases.

Moreover, I have some doubts and critiques on the supposed validities of particularly the classic *frustration-aggression* and *relative-deprivation* theories. To his credit, Leonard Berkowitz himself rightly did point out that frustration does not always lead to aggression, that imitation and other learning processes can engender aggression too, and that deprivation does not necessarily entail frustration and may actually lead to acquiescence and apathy—though others regard these as suppressed frustrations that eventually lead to aggression (Berkowitz 1969: esp. 4-5, 13-14, 35-36).


Nevertheless, Ted Robert Gurr's Relative Deprivation (RD) paradigm (partially based on Dollard et al's Frustration-Aggression paradigm)—the perceived discrepancy between resources one wants and resources one gets without resorting to violence—has been and still is highly influential, having shaped many new violence theories as well (Sandole apud Sandole & Van der Merwe 1993: 12-13).²⁵ Many adopted or tested Gurr's RD concept early on, expounded in his seminal *Why men rebel*, as the "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities" i.e. between resources one feels entitled to and resources one is capable to acquire and hold on to by peaceful means (Gurr 1970: 13).



Yet RD appears only valid for 'lesser' grievances due to 'lesser' socio-economic deprivations—supposing that such grievances ever engender rebellions or any other kinds of violence. Unfortunately the 'relative deprivationists' tend to overlook the obvious given that people are not merely 'disappointed', 'frustrated' or 'relatively deprived' when being tortured or massacred: they feel pain, panic, perhaps rage (a feeling of humiliation), and usually possess an instinct to survive. Such extreme deprivations or devastations spawn, necessitate and justify self-preservation through armed resistance or kindred violence beyond anything else, and go far beyond improving one's daily existence, satisfy heightened expectations or even redress a wrong.

So, one should revisit and generally reapply Abraham Maslow's broad-ranging *human motivation* or *hierarchy-of-needs* theory (Maslow 1941, 1943, 1987 (1954)). Like related theories propositioning what I call *absolute deprivation* (few actually apply this composite term: see e.g. Weede 1987), Maslow's theory rightly allows people to have grievances against objective realities—certainly those that endanger one's life, health and sanity by hunger, massacre, torture, rape and mutilation.


Rather than "deprivation" as such however, the terms annihilation and devastation better capture the "degree of harm the individual actually suffers or anticipates" (Berkowitz 1962: 45) in extreme deprivations ranging from mass murder and genocide to mass starvation and expulsion. Moreover, one should criticise the ideological biases of many 'absolute deprivationists', many of whom followed Marxist *Weltanschauungen* and even practised "people's war" and ideologically inspired state-building projects, like Mao Tse-Tung, Ché Guevara and Frantz Fanon (Mao Tse-Tung 1961 (1937); Guevara 2003 (1960); Fanon 1965, 1970).



Indeed, J. Bowyer Bell, Eric E. J. Hobsbawm, Frantz Fanon and other leftist deprivationists have been rather absolutist in their thinking—not just in their suppositions that both observers and victims could supposedly grasp deprivations without distorting any facts. They also assumed that their own beliefs, ideologies or supposedly scientific analyses—usually of the Marxist variety—could identify the most sophisticated, honourable, effective, drastic i.e. *revolutionary* ways one could resist and revolt against a repressive regime and society.

They have argued rather vehemently yet esoterically—just like anti-positivist hermeneutists like Hans-Georg Gadamer or post-hermeneutic interpretivists like Jürgen Habermas and Michael Foucault—that social science must be emancipating, must show the way forward to people who want to free themselves from domination and manipulation by peaceful or even violent means. Instead, they rather myopically argued with each other for being insufficiently penetrating towards hidden, distorted a/o manipulated meanings behind words as shaped by those in power (see Gadamer 1960, 1967 apud Linge 1976; Foucault 1971 apud Rabinow 1991; Habermas apud Bleicher 1980).

Generally however, I level my strongest critiques in my forthcoming *Brutality and Violence* against the ill-conceptualised presuppositions and non-corroborated validities of the depredation theories. Particularly Mary Kaldor's new-war and Martin van Creveld's transformed-war theories—very much variants of Paul Collier et al's overall depredation theory—were fixated on contemporary links between greed, usurpation and pillage, forgetting that wars always had involved such crimes.



Worse still, they erroneously distinguished between ‘sincere’ ideology-driven rebellions during and prior to the Cold War or since WWII (Van Creveld) and ‘fake’ crime- and terrorism-driven rebellions after the Cold War or WWII (Van Creveld), whereby each type supposedly represented a fundamentally different kind of war. Yet their analysis and theorisation suffered from a grave blind spot: “research on earlier wars tends to be disregarded” (Kalyvas 2001: 99), which revealed their “limited grasp of the history of warfare” (M.L.R. Smith 2003: 34).

Some other scholars, like anthropologist Paul Richards specialised in post-war challenges in Liberia and Sierra Leone, were more understanding of the considerations which led to ‘new war’ and kindred theses: after the Cold War, rather than a global peace dividend, “Africa, the Balkans and other parts of the former communist world experienced a rash of small wars. If some were unextinguished bushfires from the Cold War era, and others unfinished business from the colonial (or Soviet) era, a third group seemed new kinds of conflicts, apparently provoked by poverty, population pressure or the bizarre hatreds of international terrorists” (Richards 2005: 2).

Richards appreciated the “greater focus on process and practice when explaining war and peace” in the econometric analyses of Paul Collier and other depredationists (see Collier 2000a,b; Collier & Hoeffler 2002; Collier & Sambanis 2002), which accorded with his own ethnographic approach—even if he disagreed with their assumption that avaricious “economic factors necessarily predominate” causes and evolutions of wars (Richards 2005: 11 (quotes)).



Admittedly, Kaldor's and Van Creveld's analyses did lay bare the undeniable increase in the *number* of criminal(ised) non-state, semi-state and pro-state actors destabilising localities, countries and entire regions since the end of the Cold War if not earlier. Arguably as "state sponsorship has begun to dry up" after the Cold War, "extortion, kidnapping, robberies, or drug related activities easily fund small wars" to this day (Pratt 2002: 396).

Yet Stephen Ellis rightly stressed at the time that this still did "not provide evidence" for the "simplistic view" that "African wars especially are all about greed" (Ellis 2007: 28-29). Richards rejected such simplistic notions too. He thus criticised the contrasting 'all-about-grievance', 'all-about-culture' and 'all-about-environmental-degradation' theses that characterised some deprivationist and kindred accounts in the early 2000s: these explanations ignored or underestimated the role of 'political entrepreneurs' ranging from government to rebel leaders in activating and mobilising these background conditions: "war does not break out because conditions happen to be 'right', but because it is organised" (Richards 2005: 4).

Likewise, Robert Cribb argued that triggers or "dynamics of escalation" best explain mass violence, pointing to fractious societies not suffering from violence: "if there is dry grass everywhere, it becomes vital to look at the sparks" (Cribb apud Vlasblom 2008: 9).²⁶ According to Crib two *fatal discoveries* were primary triggers of mass violence: a feeling of betrayal by the other (a grievance—often an interest that the other is or appears to be violating) whom the elite often demonises through propaganda; and the realisation that one can get away with murder out of avarice or narrow self-interest.²⁷



All in all, one should applaud the sizable number of scholars, even some former depredationists (e.g. Sambanis 2004: 264-266), who early on in the greed-versus-grievance debate have refused to simplistically proposition or choose between either greed or grievance as primary or omnipresent motives supposedly accounting for most or all elite-instigated or any other kind of violence. Even some (former) new-war 'predationists' ²⁸ acknowledged early on that maybe one were "dealing not with a new kind of war, but with the residue—the dregs—of warfare" (Mueller 2001: 17-18). Instead, more nuanced theories and approaches have evolved beyond the simple greed-grievance divide, which arose in the field of conflict studies during the 1990s, peaked in the 2000s and has become muted ever since.

Thus a group of scholars led by Stathis N. Kalyvas focused instead on the "interaction between political and private identities and actions" i.e. private and public cleavages in violent conflict: "first, actions "on the ground" .. seem more related to local or private issues than to the war's driving (or "master") cleavage; second, individual and local actors take advantage of the war to settle local or private conflicts .. bearing little or no relation to the causes of the war or .. goals of the belligerents" (Kalyvas 2003: 475-476 (quotes); see Kalyvas 2006; Ross 1993: xiii, 9). ²⁹

However even (some of) these scholars somewhat implicitly—and thereby to my mind rather simplistically—link public cleavages to deprivations and grievances only, and private cleavages to depredations and avarices only. I wonder whether these links are really so clearcut in many or any cases—like in Liberia. More importantly, one needs to determine whether ritual violence in Liberia—or in any other country




studied—is prevalent in both the public and private spheres (whether motivated by greed, grievance or any other drive), in just one of these spheres, in times of either war or peace—or both.

Conclusion—Research and publications on ritual violence in Liberia and beyond

The longitudinal focus of the research project ‘Ritual violence in Liberia’ is on lethal and non-lethal violence with ritual characteristics in Liberia from the First Liberian Civil War of 1989-1997—initially mainly between Samuel Doe’s government and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel movement—and the Second Liberian Civil War of 1999-2003—mainly between Taylor’s government and the rebel groups Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—to the time of brittle-and-violent ‘peace’ of today.

The research project focuses on the role of combatants in ritual violence in both the private and public spheres during times of (major) internal war in Liberia—and on veterans and any other actors perpetrating ritual violence against any non-combatants and former combatants among families, larger kin groups and ethnicities during times of (relative) peace in Liberia. It particularly focuses on the role of (former) child soldiers, their leaders and their victims—though one could or should regard forcibly recruited and indoctrinated child soldiers to be victims as well. Generally, it seeks to uncover the prevalence and nature of ritual violence in Liberia, and the causes and consequences of such violence for both perpetrators and victims (opposing sides may be both



perpetrators and victims vis-à-vis each other), for indigenous peoples, other citizens and foreign residents in the country.

So as to better understand, combat and otherwise grapple with ritual violence in Liberia, West Africa and beyond, I already have been conducting research on this phenomenon since Spring 2023. This research project receives financial, facilitative and other support from the World House community center of the Protestant Diaconate in Amsterdam ³⁰; the African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL), to which I am an associate research fellow ³¹; the Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP), of which I and our Editor-in-Chief Dr. Babak Rezvani are co-founders; and the newly established Network of Sustainable Development and Education (NSDE), of which I and Babak Rezvani are co-founders too. ³²

Particularly Fred van de Kraaij and Alan White offer moral and advisory support, and (will) operate as effective peer-reviewers of this research undertaking of mine. This should ultimately lead to a full report and book (preliminarily) titled *Ritual violence in Liberia – Ritualised brutalities in Liberia prior to, during and after the Civil Wars: events, trends, causes and consequences*. Probably it will come out in ASCL's African Studies Collection sometime this year or next year—perhaps jointly published with Brill a/o *EGxPress*, EGP's publishing house. In the meantime it comes out as a series of articles in this journal—of which this current contribution is the first—in order to elicit more feedback and debate from scholars, analysts and other readers—and thus make (the chapters of the) eventual book publication all the better for it.




Caspar ten Dam (MA political science at Leiden University) is Executive Editor of this journal. He is a conflict analyst specialised in (regional) conflict, terrorism and security studies (see www.ctdamconsultancy.com). He has published multiple academic articles on topics within these fields, including in this journal. info@ctdamconsultancy.com

Endnotes

1. The term 'ritualistic' may better describe the phenomenon studied than the term 'ritual'—in the conceptual and phenomenological sense. Yet a frequent use of the former term would decrease the manuscript's readability.
2. See esp. <https://advocacyfoundationforhumanrights.org/board-of-directors/#Alan-White> (last acc. 27-11-2023).
3. From here on we refer to 'Kraaij' in short for easier readability—yet one seeks in the Bibliography for 'Van der Kraaij' i.e. the author's full surname.
4. The "clear and informative maps are the outstanding work of Nel de Vink (DeVink Mapdesign)" (Van der Kraaij 2015: xxvii). From here on the article frequently refers to 'Kraaij'—yet seek in Bibliography for Van der Kraaij.
5. Van der Kraaij, 'Ritual Killings – Past and Present: From Cultural Phenomenon To Political Instrument, Part I: Before 1950 – Concluding note on the sources of information' *Liberia: Past and Present* [2005]; <https://archives.liberiapastandpresent.org/RitualKillingsConclusion.htm>.
6. Fred Van der Kraaij, 'Liberia's perennial problems' *Liberia: Past and Present of Africa's Oldest Republic*; <https://archives.liberiapastandpresent.org/Perennial-Problems.htm>. Elsewhere, Kraaij (see endnotes 3 and 4 on use of his abbreviated surname) suggests that the first Afro-American colonists arrived at the 'Grain Coast', also called 'Pepper Coast' or 'Malagueta Coast', even earlier as they renamed it Liberia "in 1821" (Kraaij 2015: 3).



7. From here on we normally refer to Van der Kraaij as 'Kraaij' in short for easier readability—yet one should seek in the Bibliography for 'Van der Kraaij' i.e. the author's full surname (see notes 3 and 4).
8. Maps are the "outstanding work of Nel de Vink" (DeVink Mapdesign)" (Kraaij 2015: xxvii).
9. Ibid. English and "a local variant – Liberian pidgin English – are also spoken, nearly always as a second language besides the native language" (Kraaij 2015: xvii).
10. I am considering to add *non-private* to the 'whatever purpose' part of my terrorism definition in forthcoming research and publications. It would otherwise apply too broadly and counter-intuitively to all forms of violence against fully or practically defenceless people in the private sphere as well—like in one-sided domestic violence whereby one or more of the 'quarreling' family-members are unable to defend themselves.
11. Just recently, in the process of writing my 'magnus opus' *Brutality and Violence* (forthcoming), I noticed this error of 'one or more [armed] actors' in the definitions as formulated in the referred publications of mine (Ten Dam 2015a: Ten Dam & Polanski 2015). Logically, any conflict i.e. disagreement and confrontation concerns at least *two* opposing actors, be they individuals or groups of people in loose or organised forms—unless one includes in the overall concept of conflict any inner struggle a single actor may experience, ultimately within the mind and psyche of an individual.
At any rate, a conflict as currently defined already covers any internal disagreements and confrontations within a group of people, like a political party or an ethnic group—if one can discern and identify its factions, because then these are in effect the distinguishable actors involved. A conflict as such could be any disagreement and confrontation between two or more individuals, whereby each individual constitutes an actor.



12. Naturally, I will refine and improve if necessary my definitions of ritual(istic) violence after (peer-)reviews and other feedbacks on this article and in future publications—as I have done and still do for so many other definitions of (forms and variants of) violence, brutality and other phenomena in other research and publications (see preceding endnotes). For now I use the terms ‘rite’ and ‘ritual’ as interchangeable ones describing the same phenomena.
13. Bourdillon rightly observes that “since ritual is prescribed, its meaning is to some extent public and does *not necessarily* reflect the mental state of the actors. The action of shaking hands means cooperation, even if the persons concerned are being deceitful and have no intention of cooperating” (Bourdillon 1991: 13; italics added). This observation accords with the definitional element of my circumscription of ritual as any action being ‘imbued with meaning, custom, intent *and/or* belief by the one performing it’.
14. Oddly, Perry just implicitly refers to the belief in *supernatural* or *supernaturally charged* substances, objects and acts in his circumscription of magic—even though he explicitly describes many such activities in his book *The origin of Magic and Religion* (1923) which clearly are based on supernatural beliefs and consequent occult practices.
15. Ellis specifically deems Harley’s circumscriptions of witchcraft as “somewhat contradictory, for if a witch ... was someone who could produce an unusual effect which could be either good or evil, it was illogical then to describe witchcraft as something perverted, since this gave rise to the question of who should judge, and by what standard, whether an action was good or evil, proper or perverted” (Ellis 2001a: 227). These contradictions may be due to an ambivalence born by Harley’s high qualities as an ethnographer being hampered by his own “Christian ideas about what constituted morally correct behaviour” (Ibid: 228). Such culturally ‘inborn’ perspectives are especially



treacherous if one is unaware of these and neglects to specify and debate these oneself; then these become stultifying biases.

Incidentally, Ellis made a small error by quoting Harley's "perverted medicine" remark as being on page 21 rather than page 20 of the latter's *Native African Medicine* (1970 ed.) treatise (Ibid: 227, endnote 29).

16. The term *juju* (lit. 'plaything') originally referred to 'inanimate' objects believed to contain magical force or other properties. Gradually it came to refer to 'animate' beings purportedly containing such properties as well. In a broader sense it is a "word widely used in West Africa [and Central Africa] to designate any sort of mystical religious activity of indigenous origin" (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 84).
17. Indeed, I do not support my Brutalisation theory as such, i.e. assume it to be a given, fully corroborated reality in most or all cases. I actually do hope that brutalisation is "not as predominant as it may seem at first sight" (Ten Dam 2022: 15) in any case of war, armed conflict or any type of violence one studies.
18. Ellis and Ter Haar later circumscribe religion more extensively as "a belief in the existence of an invisible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, that is home to spiritual beings with effective powers over the physical world" (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 14). Yet some religions may claim that invisible or rather supernatural worlds are fully separate from the visible or rather natural ones.
19. Of course, one could just as well observe the tendency to mingle and merge imagined rumours and verified facts into so-called 'conspiracy theories' regarding the observable physical world only. But this is not what Ellis and Ter Haar mean to say, as evident from their subsequent remarks on "religious imagination" and "religious belief" being the "most influential" form of imagination (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 23 (quotes)).
20. The tendency among so many physicalists within and beyond 'mainstream science' to relegate apparently paranormal phenomena as "inexplicable events" and "inexplicable occurrences" (Ellis & Ter Haar



2004: 25, 26 (quotes)) is quite befuddling and irritating accordingly. After all, even religious-doctrinal explanations of such phenomena are *explanations*, even if implausible, unreliable and/or unverifiable ones.

21. This section is partially based on a draft sub-chapter titled 'Theories informing the Brutalisation theory' in my major work *Brutality and Violence* (forthcoming). The current paper presents and discusses these theories just succinctly and partially due to lack of space—and the need to keep its empirical focus on ritual violence in Liberia.
22. Apparently, I have been the first to use the term 'depredation' to denote a particular conflict theory, theoretical approach and school of thought that became prominent in the 'greed vs. grievance' debate among theorists, other scholars and analysts since the early 2000s.
23. Apparently, I have been the first to use the term '*deprivationism*' (italics added) in the context of the 'greed vs. grievance' debate. Just a few scholars in and beyond this debate have ever applied the term 'absolute deprivation'.
24. Ibid regarding the term '*depredationism*' (italics added).
25. Gurr was not the first one to coin, define and theorise on the term *relative deprivation*. In their immense WWII study *The American Soldier*, Samuel A. Stouffer and his co-researchers first coined 'relative deprivation' as a "social frame of reference" (Adams apud Berkowitz 1965: 268-272; Stouffer et al 1977 (1949): 122-125). Similarly Eric Hoffer described mass movements as interchangeable and transformable entities whose fanaticisms appealed to those wishing to escape their deprivations and old selves (Hoffer 1951: xi, 12-13, 16-17). Sociologists like Walter Garrison Runciman connected RD to the reference group with whom one compares one's situation (Runciman 1972: 3, 10, 12-14). Gurr just expanded and formalised RD as the precondition for "turmoil", "conspiracy" and "internal war", formulating numerous hypotheses with magnitude-variables of intensity, scope and duration of deprivation and violence (Gurr 1968a: 251-254, 257 note 38; 1968b: 1104-1124; 1970: ix-xi, 8-11, Appendix).



26. R. Cribb, in: Dirk Vlasblom, “Het is de vonk, niet het droge gras (It is the spark, not the dry grass)” *NRC Handelsblad* (New Rotterdam Courier-General Trades’ Paper) 17 April 2008, p.9; translated from Dutch.
27. Yet one should stress contrary to Cribb that pre-existing devastations, deprivations, disparities and tensions—including feelings of betrayal being conditions rather than mere triggers—still remain necessary conditions for the grass to turn tinder-dry. In that sense these conditions may constitute root causes of potential or actual violence, yet of different kinds and with variant trajectories and outcomes.
28. Ibid notes 23 and 24 regarding the term ‘predationism’ (italics added).
29. Kalyvas’ distinction between public and private cleavages is insightful, though it one-sidedly locates ‘political’ motives on the national or other supra-local level. At any rate this distinction appears to be largely based on the one between *psychocultural disposition* and *social organisation* as distinguished by Marc Howard Ross and others, whereby the former shapes “the overall level of conflict” while the latter “determines whether the targets of conflict and aggression are located within a society, outside it, or both” (Ross 1993: 9). In other words “Social structural conflict theory ... can primarily explain who one’s friends and foes will be ... , whereas psychocultural conflict theory best predicts a community’s overall level of conflict” (Ibid: xiii).
30. The World House (‘Wereldhuis’ in Dutch) in Amsterdam (www.wereldhuis.org) regularly helps asylum seekers in the Netherlands with their cases and daily lives—including those who have fled Liberia for fear of lethal violence directed against them in general, and becoming victims of ritual killing in particular. I have met some of them. For reasons of their personal safety and peace of mind, I have decided, after consulting them and their lawyers, to keep their identities confidential and anonymous—for as long they wish to remain so. Effectively helping their cases with my analysis and eventual report vis-à-vis Dutch immigration officials, politicians, analysts, reporters and



'ordinary' citizens sceptical of their 'wild tales' about ritual violence in Liberia or elsewhere, constitutes one of my main drives of embarking on and persisting in this major and arduous research project.

31. See www.ascleiden.nl/content/ASC-community/members/caspar-ten-dam.
32. See www.nsdesite.com.

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
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
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
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
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Feature: Second Interview with an Extraterrestrial

Rodolfo Valentino

*The two subsequent contributions in this volume of our journal concern German and Spanish texts of the same article translated by the author himself, who works for the European Institute for Migration and Social Inclusion (IEM) and Independent European Sociological Research Institute (EUROSOR). An earlier version of this contribution has been published via IEM in Spring 2024 (see www.linkedin.com/pulse/feature-second-interview-extraterrestrial-dr-rodolfo-valentino). **

Introduction

What would intelligent Extraterrestrials say about us humans? According to a Director of the European Institute for Migration and Social Inclusion (IEM), Rodolfo Valentino, his verdict would be devastating, because the image that “The United Planets of Humanoid Galaxies” receive from us is cruel and negative. In his opinion, we are still in the “homo mediocris” phase. There are some that have developed, but compared to the widespread ignorance, stupidity, mediocrity, social incompetence, barbarism, cruelty and actual self-destructive potential of most humans, they claim they can do nothing for us. But they speak of hope and a new opportunity that the “Great Council” gives us. Because the number of people who have genetically and psychologically developed in their direction is increasing. But



unfortunately they are not in power, their work is hindered or they are “parked” by the majority, who remain in the “homo mediocris” stage. Here you have the second visit of our “Extraterrestrial Homo Sapiens”.

Second Interview with an Extraterrestrial

Extraterrestrial: Hi!

Earthling: Hi! You again? Do you know that I have felt quite bad since the last time * and now I am much more committed to peace, solidarity and brotherhood? Do you want to blame me again?

Extraterrestrial: No. That was not my intention. We chose you because you understand and have developed. You realized early on that something was wrong with this planet and the ruling race on it. You are the last salvation for humanity. As I said, we will be watching you and will return from time to time until you are at the same level of evolution as us. Can you tell me what's happening now?

Earthling: Difficult for a human to explain, but I'll try. About two years ago, Russian ruler Putin launched a war of aggression against his peaceful neighbor Ukraine. Since then, around 10,000 civilians (including hundreds of children) have been killed and at least 18,000 injured.

Extraterrestrial: Tell me more...

Earthling: Wow, I don't know where to start or where to stop. All over the world people are threatened and even murdered for defending the rights of minorities, other people, the environment or the welfare of animals. Then we also find many activists who are guided by their own



ideology and, in turn, exclude and demean other interest groups. A human dilemma. Then, some months ago, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas launched a major massacre and genocide against Israel from the Gaza Strip. More than 1,400 people died. Hamas also kidnapped more than 240 people hostage. It was the time of sadists, of serial and mass murderers who left a long trail of blood of young people, children, women and men murdered, injured or tortured. Israel then responded with airstrikes and a ground offensive, in which many young people, children, women and men were and continue to be killed and wounded. They are now suspected of genocide.

Extraterrestrial: Why do you allow this?

Earthling: During your first visit * you said something about the “homo mediocris”, who only cares about himself, his family and his social group. I made that observation too. There are brilliant spirits who practice peace, solidarity and brotherhood and are partly successful, but at the same time we are overwhelmed by the dictates of survival in this mediocre society, we have to pay bills and taxes, we want our families to be financially well and secured. Many are threatened by wars and massacres. This leads us again and again to social selfishness, social racism and religious and political fanaticism. Many humans want to change something, but their hands are tied. I believe that humanity can no longer be saved. What do you think?

Extraterrestrial: Like everyone in the universe, you are responsible for yourselves, although the Grand Council of the United Planets of the Humanoid Galaxies is always surprised at how primitive most of you are. You surpass all peoples and all planetary inhabitants of the entire universe. You enslave, humiliate, torture and murder millions of people



of your own species, whether women, children or men, for religious, political, social, racist and selfish reasons. That's what makes you unique. You are as cruel as "beasts" and "viruses", but on the other hand you share a small part of self-reflection and empathy with us. For our council, you are just another planetary civilization. We have seen planets that collapsed for other reasons or that were organizationally more primitive and received help and support from the Great Council to regroup. Your case is different. You are mostly in the "homo mediocris" stage and, furthermore, this group always manages to gain control of the levers of power. Some of you have definitely evolved, but compared to the widespread ignorance, stupidity, mediocrity, social incompetence, barbarism, cruelty and actual self-destructive potential of most humans, there is nothing we can do for you. We have to wait ...

Earthling: Unique? Don't make me laugh ... singularly primitive and cruel!? What will become of us? Are we doomed or do we still have a way out?

Extraterrestrial: I'm not sure. Human communication is difficult and one-sided. I am afraid that this type of communication limits you and at the same time stimulates you, but it can also quickly lead to misunderstandings. We have noticed that you pay a lot of attention to body language and voice intonation and do not assimilate information in its pure form. People interpret a lot in advance depending on the respective context. In conversations I often pick up diffuse thoughts, as well as associations and factors that influence culturally and socially.

Earthling: Wow!? Tell me something about your communication...

Extraterrestrial: With pleasure, our communication is more total, transparent and natural. We use telepathy. In recent years you have



experienced great technological advances in the communication and information society. You have become a global village and you have all the opportunities and factors at your disposal to grow together as humanity. The reason why it still doesn't work seems to have more to do with your individual, social and political communication and thoughts, which probably also leads you to trust the representatives of "Homo Mediocris" more, to believe them more, to follow them, and to even commit atrocities for them with your own species.

Earthling: That's really interesting, but even I can't turn it off completely. You'd have to be superhuman for that, right?

Extraterrestrial: Not really, it is enough for you to use your possibilities and your resources to experience yourselves as a society and community of planetary unity to live in peace, solidarity and brotherhood.

Earthling: I see ... It was a pleasure to see you again and talk to you. That gives me hope ... Extraterrestrial, wait, now I forgot to ask you what your name is ...

Dr Rodolfo Valentino is a Director of the Independent European Sociological Research institute (EUROSOR; www.facebook.com/eurosor), and a Director of the Spanish branch based in Santander of the European Institute for Studies on Migration, Social Inclusion and Intercultural Learning (IEM), Bonn, Germany (<https://migrapolis.de/bim-e-v/>; <https://www.linkedin.com/in/drrodolfovalentino/>). He is also responsible for his and others' IEM publications on ResearchGate and Academia (e.g. <https://independent.academia.edu/RodolfoValentino>). eurosor.iem@gmail.com psciocura.valentino@gmail.com.



Note


*: See Rodolfo Valentino, 'Feature: Interview with an Extraterrestrial' *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* Vol.8 No.2, Winter 2020, pp.203-205.

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
Feuilleton: Zweites Interview mit einem Außerirdischen

Rodolfo Valentino

*The preceding contribution in this volume of our journal concerns the English text of the same article translated by the author himself, who works for the European Institute for Migration and Social Inclusion (IEM) and Independent European Sociological Research Institute (EUROSOR). An earlier version of this contribution has been published via IEM in Spring 2024 (www.linkedin.com/pulse/feuilleton-interview-mit-einem-außerirdischen-dr-rodolfo-valentino). **

Einführung

Was würden intelligente Außerirdische über uns Menschen sagen? Nach Meinung eines Direktors des Europäischen Instituts für Migration und soziale Inklusion (IEM), Rodolfo Valentino, wäre ihr Urteil verheerend, denn das Bild, dass „Die Vereinigten Planeten der Humanoiden Galaxien“ von uns erhalten, sei grausam und negativ. Ihrer Meinung nach sind wir immer noch im „homo mediocris“-Stadium. Es gebe zwar Einige, die sich weiterentwickelt hätten, aber verglichen mit der weit verbreiteten Ignoranz, Dummheit, Mittelmäßigkeit, sozialen Inkompetenz, Barbarei, Grausamkeit und dem realen Selbstzerstörungspotenzial der Mehrheit der Menschen, könnten sie nichts für uns tun. Sie sprechen aber von Hoffnung und von einer neuen Chance, die wir vom „Großen Rat“ bekommen hätten. Denn die



Menschen, die sich genetisch und psychologisch in ihre Richtung entwickelt hätten, nähmen zu. Aber leider seien sie nicht an der Macht, würden an Ihrer Arbeit behindert oder von der Mehrheit, die im „homo mediocris“-Stadium verweilen, „auf Eis gelegt“ werden. Hier der zweite Besuch unseres „Homo Sapiens Extraterrestrial“.


Das Zweite Interview mit einem Außerirdischen

Außerirdischer: Hallo!

Erdling: Hallo! Du schon wieder? Weißt Du, dass ich mich seit dem letzten Mal * ziemlich schlecht fühle und mich jetzt viel stärker für Frieden, Solidarität und Brüderlichkeit/Schwesterlichkeit engagiere. Willst du mir wieder Vorwürfe machen?

Außerirdischer: Nein. Das war nicht meine Absicht. Wir haben Dich ausgesucht, weil Du verstehst und Dich entwickelt hat. Du hast schon früh gemerkt, dass etwas mit diesem Planeten und der herrschenden Rasse auf ihm nicht stimmt. Du bist die letzte Rettung für die Menschheit. Wie ich schon sagte, wir werden Euch im Auge behalten und von Zeit zu Zeit zurückkehren, bis Ihr Euch auf gleichem Evolutionsniveau befindet wie wir. Kannst du mir erzählen, was nun wieder los ist?

Erdling: Schwierig für einen Menschen, aber ich werde es versuchen. Vor etwa zwei Jahren hat Russlands Machthaber Putin einen Angriffskrieg gegen seinen friedlichen Nachbarn Ukraine gestartet. Seitdem sind etwa 10.000 Zivilisten (darunter Hunderte von Kindern) getötet und mindestens 18.000 verletzt worden.




Außerirdischer: Erzähl mir noch etwas ...

Erdling: Schwierig. Ich weiß nicht, wo ich anfangen oder aufhören soll. Überall auf der Welt werden Menschen bedroht und sogar ermordet, weil sie für die Rechte von Minderheiten, anderen Menschen, der Umwelt oder des Tierschutzes eintreten. Dann finden wir auch unter den Aktivisten viele, die sich durch ihre eigene Ideologie leiten lassen und wiederum andere Interessengruppen ausschließen und degradieren. Ein menschliches Dilemma. Das ist noch was Aktuelles: Vor einigen Wochen hat die palästinensische Terrororganisation Hamas vom Gazastreifen aus einen Großmassaker und Genozid auf Israel gestartet. Dabei wurden mehr als 1.400 Menschen getötet. Außerdem verschleppte die Hamas mehr als 240 Menschen als Geiseln. Es war die Stunde von Sadisten, Serien- und Massenmördern, die eine lange Blutspur von ermordeten, verletzten oder gefolterten Jugendlichen, Kindern, Frauen und Männern hinterließ. Daraufhin reagierte Israel mit Luftangriffen und einer Bodenoffensive, bei der auch wieder viele Jugendliche, Kinder, Frauen und Männer getötet und verletzt wurden und immer noch werden. Sie werden nun des Genozids verdächtigt.

Außerirdischer: Warum lasst Ihr das zu?


Erdling: Du sagtest bei Deinem ersten Besuch * etwas über den „Homo mediocris“, der nur auf sich selbst und auf seine Familie und Sozialgruppe konzentriert ist. Die Beobachtung habe ich auch gemacht. Es gibt helle Geister, die sich in Frieden, Solidarität und Brüderlichkeit/Schwesterlichkeit üben und auch teilweise Erfolg haben, aber wir werden gleichzeitig durch das Diktat des Überlebens in dieser mittelmäßigen Gesellschaft drangsaliert, müssen Rechnungen und Steuern zahlen, wollen für unsere Familie sorgen und möchten auch eine gewisse



Sicherheit und Stabilität haben. Viele werden von Unruhen und Krieg bedroht. Das treibt uns immer wieder in den sozialen Egoismus, Sozialrassismus und den religiösen und politischen Fanatismus. Viele wollen etwas verändern, aber ihnen sind die Hände gebunden. Ich glaube, die Menschen sind nicht mehr zu retten. Was denkst Du?

Außerirdischer: Ihr seid, wie alle im Universum, selbst verantwortlich, allerdings überrascht den Große Rat der Vereinigten Planeten der Humanoiden Galaxien immer wieder, wie primitiv Ihr in der Mehrheit seid. Da übertrefft ihr jedes Volk und jeden Planetenbewohner im gesamten Universum. Ihr versklavt, erniedrigt, quält und ermordet Euresgleichen millionenfach, egal ob Frauen, Kinder oder Männer aus religiösen, politischen, sozialen, rassistischen und egoistischen Gründen. Das macht Euch einzigartig. Ihr seid so grausam wie „Bestien“ und „Viren“, die aber einen kleinen Teil Selbstreflexion und Empathie mit uns teilen. Für unseren Rat seid ihr eine Planeten-Zivilisation mehr.

Wir haben Planeten erlebt, die aus anderen Gründen kollabiert sind oder organisatorisch primitiveren Stand waren und vom Großen Rat Hilfe und Unterstützung erhalten haben, um sich neu zu formieren. Euer Fall ist anders. Ihr seid zum größten Teil im „homo mediocris“-Stadium und hinzu kommt, dass diese Gruppe es immer wieder schafft, an den Machthebeln zu sitzen. Einige von Euch sind definitiv weiterentwickelt, aber verglichen mit der weit verbreiteten Ignoranz, Dummheit, Mittelmäßigkeit, sozialen Inkompetenz, Barbarei, Grausamkeit und dem realen Selbstzerstörungspotenzial der Mehrheit der Menschen, können wir nichts für Euch tun. Wie müssen warten




Erdling: Einzigartig? Dass ich nicht lache ... einzigartig primitiv und grausam!? Wie geht es mit uns weiter? Sind wir dem Untergang geweiht oder haben wir noch eine Chance?

Außerirdischer: Ich bin mir nicht sicher. Die menschliche Kommunikation ist schwierig und einseitig. Ich befürchte, dass Euch diese Art der Kommunikation einschränkt und gleichzeitig stimuliert, aber auch schnell zu Missverständnissen führen kann. Wir haben gemerkt, dass ihr stark auf Körpersprache und Intonation der Stimme achtet und nicht die Information in ihrer Reinform aufnehmt. Die Menschen deuten sehr viel im Vorfeld aus dem jeweiligen Kontext heraus. Ich empfangen oft diffuse Gedanken bei Unterhaltungen, so wie kulturell und sozial geprägte Assoziationen und Einflussfaktoren.

Erdling: Wow!? Erzähl mir etwas über Eure Kommunikation ...

Außerirdischer: Gerne, unsere Kommunikation ist totaler, transparenter und natürlicher. Wir bedienen uns der Telepathie. Ihr habt in den letzten Jahren einen sehr großen technologischen Fortschritt in die totale Kommunikations- und Informationsgesellschaft erlebt. Ihr seid zu einem globalen Dorf zusammengeschumpft und euch stehen alle Möglichkeiten und Faktoren zur Verfügung, um als Menschheit zusammen zu wachsen. Warum es nicht trotzdem nicht funktioniert, scheint eher mit Eurer individuell, sozial und politisch geprägten Kommunikation und Gedankenwelt zu tun zu haben, die wahrscheinlich auch dazu führt, dass ihr den Vertretern des „Homo mediocris“ stärker vertraut, mehr Glauben schenkt, ihnen folgt und für sie auch Grausamkeiten verüben könnt.



Erdling: Das ist wirklich interessant, aber selbst ich kann es nicht ganz ausschalten. Dafür müsste man ein Übermensch sein, oder?

Außerirdischer: Nicht wirklich, es reicht, wenn eure Möglichkeiten und Ressourcen nutzen würdet, um Euch als Planeteneinheitsgesellschaft und -gemeinschaft zu erleben, um in Frieden, Solidarität und Brüderlichkeit/Schwesterlichkeit zu leben.


Erdling: Ich verstehe ... Es war schön, Dich wieder zu sehen und mit Dir zu sprechen. Das macht mir Hoffnung ... Außerirdischer, Außerirdischer, jetzt habe ich Dich wieder nicht gefragt, wie Du heißt ...

Dr Rodolfo Valentino is a Director of the Independent European Sociological Research institute (EUROSOR; www.facebook.com/eurosor), and a Director of the Spanish branch based in Santander of the European Institute for Studies on Migration, Social Inclusion and Intercultural Learning (IEM), Bonn, Germany (<https://migrapolis.de/bim-e-v/>; <https://www.linkedin.com/in/drrodolfovalentino/>). He is also responsible for his and others' IEM publications on ResearchGate and Academia (e.g. <https://independent.academia.edu/RodolfoValentino>). eurosor.iem@gmail.com psciocura.valentino@gmail.com.

Notiz

*: Siehe Rodolfo Valentino, 'Feuilleton: Interview mit einem Außerirdischen' *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* Vol.8 No.2, Winter 2020, pp.206-209.

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Folletín: Segunda Entrevista con un Extraterrestre

Rodolfo Valentino

*The preceding two contributions in this volume of our journal concern the English and German texts of the same article translated by the author himself, who works for the European Institute for Migration and Social Inclusion (IEM) and Independent European Sociological Research Institute (EUROSOR). An earlier version of this contribution has been published via IEM in Spring 2024 (www.linkedin.com/pulse/folletín-segunda-entrevista-con-un-extraterrestre-valentino). **

Introducción

¿Qué dirían los extraterrestres inteligentes sobre nosotros los humanos? Según el Director del Instituto Europeo para Migraciones e Inclusión Social (IEM), Rodolfo Valentino, su veredicto sería demoledor, porque la imagen que reciben de nosotros “Los Planetas Unidos de Galaxias Humanoides” es cruel y negativa. En su opinión, todavía nos encontramos en la fase del “homo mediocris”. Hay algunos que se han desarrollado, pero en comparación con la ignorancia generalizada, la estupidez, la mediocridad, la incompetencia social, la barbarie, la crueldad y el potencial autodestructivo real de la mayoría de los humanos, aseguran no pueden hacer nada por nosotros. Pero hablan de esperanza y de una nueva oportunidad que nos da el “Gran Consejo”. Porque está aumentando el número de personas que se han



desarrollado genética y psicológicamente en su dirección. Pero lamentablemente no están en el poder, su trabajo se ve obstaculizado o son “aparcados” por la mayoría, que permanece en la etapa de “homo mediocris”. Aquí tenéis la segunda visita de nuestro “Homo Sapiens Extraterrestre”.

Segunda Entrevista con un Extraterrestre

Extraterrestre: ¡Hola!


Terrícola: ¡Hola! ¿Tú otra vez? ¿Sabes que me he sentido bastante mal desde la última vez * y ahora estoy mucho más comprometido con la paz, la solidaridad y la hermandad? ¿Quieres culparme de nuevo?

Extraterrestre: No. Esa no era mi intención. Te elegimos porque entiendes y te has desarrollado. Te diste cuenta desde el principio de que algo andaba mal con este planeta y la raza gobernante en él. Eres la última salvación para la humanidad. Como dije, os estaremos vigilando y regresaremos de vez en cuando hasta que estéis al mismo nivel de evolución que nosotros. ¿Puedes decirme qué está pasando ahora?

Terrícola: Difícil de explicar para un humano, pero lo intentaré. Hace unos dos años, el gobernante ruso Putin lanzó una guerra de agresión contra su pacífica vecina Ucrania. Desde entonces, alrededor de 10.000 civiles (incluidos cientos de niños) han muerto y al menos 18.000 han resultado heridos.

Extraterrestre: Cuéntame más...

Terrícola: Buf, no sé por dónde empezar ni por dónde parar. En todo el mundo hay personas amenazadas e incluso asesinadas por defender los



derechos de las minorías, de otras personas, del medio ambiente o del bienestar de los animales. Luego también encontramos a muchos activistas que se guían por su propia ideología y, a su vez, excluyen y degradan a otros grupos de interés. Un dilema humano. Luego, hace unas semanas, la organización terrorista palestina Hamás lanzó una gran masacre y genocidio contra Israel desde la Franja de Gaza. Más de 1.400 personas murieron. Hamás también secuestró a más de 240 personas como rehenes. Era la hora de los sádicos, de los asesinos en serie y en masa que dejaron un largo rastro de sangre de jóvenes, niños, mujeres y hombres asesinados, heridos o torturados. Israel respondió entonces con ataques aéreos y una ofensiva terrestre, en la que muchos jóvenes, niños, mujeres y hombres fueron y siguen siendo asesinados y heridos. Ahora son sospechosos de genocidio.

Extraterrestre: ¿Por qué permitís esto?

Terrícola: Durante tu primera visita* dijiste algo sobre el “homo mediocris”, que sólo se preocupa por sí mismo, su familia y su grupo social. Yo también hice esa observación. Hay espíritus brillantes que practican la paz, la solidaridad y la hermandad y en parte tienen éxito, pero al mismo tiempo nos acosan los dictados de la supervivencia en esta sociedad mediocre, tenemos que pagar facturas e impuestos, queremos que nuestras familias estén económicamente bien y seguros. Muchos están amenazados por guerras y masacres. Esto nos lleva una y otra vez al egoísmo social, al racismo social y al fanatismo religioso y político. Muchos humanos quieren cambiar algo, pero tienen las manos atadas. Creo que la humanidad ya no puede salvarse. ¿Qué opinas tú?


Extraterrestre: Como todos en el universo, sois responsables de vosotros mismos, aunque el Gran Consejo de los Planetas Unidos de las Galaxias



Humanoides siempre se sorprende de lo primitivos que sois la mayoría de vosotros. Superáis a todos los pueblos y a todos los habitantes planetarios del universo entero. Esclavizáis, humilláis, torturáis y asesináis a millones de personas de vuestra propia especie, ya sean mujeres, niños u hombres, por razones religiosas, políticas, sociales, racistas y egoístas. Eso es lo que os hace únicos. Sois tan crueles como las “bestias” y los “virus”, pero por otro lado compartís una parte pequeña de autorreflexión y empatía con nosotros. Para nuestro consejo, sois una civilización planetaria más. Hemos visto planetas que colapsaron por otras razones o que eran organizativamente más primitivos y recibieron ayuda y apoyo del Gran Consejo para reagruparse. Vuestro caso es diferente. Estáis mayoritariamente en la etapa del “homo mediocris” y, además, este grupo siempre consigue hacerse con el control de las palancas del poder. Algunos de vosotros definitivamente han evolucionado, pero en comparación con la ignorancia generalizada, la estupidez, la mediocridad, la incompetencia social, la barbarie, la crueldad y el potencial autodestructivo real de la mayoría de los humanos, no hay nada que podamos hacer por vosotros. Tenemos que esperar

Terrícola: ¿Únicos? ¿Que no me hagas reír ... singularmente primitivos y crueles!? ¿Qué será de nosotros? ¿Estamos condenados o todavía tenemos una salida?

Extraterrestre: No estoy seguro. La comunicación humana es difícil y unilateral. Me temo que este tipo de comunicación os limita y al mismo tiempo os estimula, pero también puede dar lugar rápidamente a malentendidos. Hemos notado que prestáis mucha atención al lenguaje corporal y la entonación de la voz y no asimiláis la información en su forma pura. La gente interpreta mucho de antemano según el contexto



respectivo. En las conversaciones a menudo capto pensamientos difusos, así como asociaciones y factores que influyen cultural y socialmente.

Terrícola: ¿¡Vaya!?. Cuéntame algo sobre vuestra comunicación ...

Extraterrestre: Con mucho gusto, nuestra comunicación es más total, transparente y natural. Usamos la telepatía. En los últimos años habéis experimentado grandes avances tecnológicos en la sociedad de la comunicación y la información. Os habéis convertido a una aldea global y tenéis todas las oportunidades y los factores a vuestra disposición para crecer juntos como humanidad. El motivo por el que todavía no funciona parece tener más que ver con vuestra comunicación individual, social y política y con vuestros pensamientos, lo que probablemente también os lleve a confiar más en los representantes del "Homo Mediocris", a creerles más, a seguirlos, y a cometer incluso atrocidades por ellos con vuestra propia especie.

Terrícola: Eso es realmente interesante, pero ni siquiera yo puedo apagarlo por completo. Tendría que ser un superhumano para eso, ¿verdad?

Extraterrestre: En realidad no, basta con que utilicéis vuestras posibilidades y vuestros recursos para experimentaros como una sociedad y comunidad de unidad planetaria para vivir en paz, solidaridad y hermandad.

Terrícola: Ya veo ... Fue un placer verte de nuevo y hablar contigo. Eso me da esperanza ... Extraterrestre, espera, ahora se me ha vuelto a olvidar preguntarte cómo te llamas

Dr Rodolfo Valentino is a Director of the Independent European Sociological Research institute (EUROSOR; www.facebook.com/eurosor),



and a Director of the Spanish branch based in Santander of the European Institute for Studies on Migration, Social Inclusion and Intercultural Learning (IEM), Bonn, Germany (<https://migrapolis.de/bim-e-v/>; www.linkedin.com/in/drrodolfovalentino/). He is also responsible for his and others' IEM publications on ResearchGate and Academia (e.g. <https://independent.academia.edu/RodolfoValentino>).
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Nota

*: Ver Rodolfo Valentino, 'Folletín: Entrevista con un Extraterrestre' *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* Vol.8 No.2, Winter 2020, pp.210-212.

NB: do you have any comments on Valentino's article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org or through contactform at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.




(Advertisement)



In 2015 the Mayflower Bookshop in Leiden moved from Hogewoerd 107 to Breestraat 65 to expand its repository. In 2016 it moved to Breestraat 142. In early 2020 it opened an additional Book Outlet Leiden at Breestraat 70, which offers many books in Dutch and other non-English languages as well. In late 2021, the latter location became its sole

outlet. In 2022, it opened an additional 'Meibloem' (Dutch for Mayflower) bookshop adjacent to it, selling Dutch and other non-English books there since then (themayflowerbookshop.nl).



(Advertisement)

We would like to introduce you to Ms. Jessee Zhang*, a Chinese native who is passionate about world culture. She is an active member of the Pan-African Association for Youth Leadership and Training (APANAEFJ) and director of the World Culture Team at Lumumba Editions in DR Congo. She recruits volunteers who want to share their passion for culture of their society in the books she subsidises to publish for free (only books about culture). If you are interested, do not hesitate to contact her (of course, she speaks English).

*: Zhang Shi in Chinese; she is also editor Chinese section in this journal (see Editorial Board on page 2 of its more recent issues and volumes).


L'Afrique d'abord

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Main Article

The educational biography of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the populist psychology

Sheth Jerjis

Abstract Many populist attitudes and behaviours lead to the belief that the average populist lacks a full educational resume, especially a university education. Numerous publications have appeared questioning the possession of university degrees by many populists, including populist presidents such as Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, India's president Narendra Modi and even America's former president Donald Trump.

A very high number of articles has been published questioning Erdogan's entire educational biography, which include strange facts, not only in the contents of the published documents, but also in the interventions of higher academic authorities and state departments in Erdogan's defence. Despite the abundance of publications on Erdogan's educational biography and the documents published around it, to date there has been no article that exclusively includes all the aspects of the topic.

Today, Erdogan, who caused a stir regionally and globally, is considered one of the biggest populists. A detailed study of the large gaps in his claimed educational career will certainly help in understanding his populist personality.

In collecting information, we relied mainly on articles published on Turkish newspaper websites and on listening to Erdogan's speeches and various programs discussing Erdogan's policy on Turkish TV channels.



It is found that Erdogan's educational curriculum is full of contradictions, and that the published documents related to his certificates, particularly that of the university he supposedly attended, contain flagrant errors.

In terms of the populist personality, all of the Big Five personality traits, which are extraversion, agreeableness, degree of conscientiousness, level of openness and emotional stability, contrast with the personality traits of those who have achieved academic success (see Table 1). Low self-esteem also dominates the populist personality and the personality of those who fail academically. Hence it seems that low self-esteem plays an important role in explaining populist behaviour and approach.

In this article, Erdogan's educational history is discussed in detail and brief information on the psychology of the populist is provided.

Introduction

Since Erdogan's appearance on the Turkish political scene and his assumption of the mayorship of Istanbul in 1994, and then the prime minister and the presidency of the republic of Turkey with his landslide victories in many consecutive elections since 2002, he has caused an uproar in Turkey and in international circles with his personality, his reckless religious populist policies and his cunning.

Erdogan has peculiarities and behaviours that raise doubts about his completion of a full educational biography, especially university education, which is a condition for assuming the position of President of the Republic in Turkey. Erdogan is attacking opponents and



governments with harsh words unfamiliar to politicians, cursing the opposition, stirring up emotions in a naked and naive manner, constantly distorting topics to mislead the masses, making scandalous and false accusations to stir up feelings of hatred causing polarization among the people.

Erdogan also habitually makes abnormal, illogic statements, undermining the social values of consistency, straightforwardness and honesty. Typical are the following examples: “Legislature and judiciary are an ankle strap to me” (Ankut 2017: 23); “Democracy is a tram, we go where we go, then we get off there” (Köhne 2018); “Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the people. It is a great lie. ... Sovereignty materially and morally unconditionally belongs to God” (Hansanbarsan 2007); and “How is a joint stock company run, Turkey should be run a like” (Bedri Birdirbir 2015).

As for the abnormalities in Erdogan’s political mentality, these reaches sometimes the point of delirium. Thus, he says in one of his speeches in 1991 in the city of Geyve, Sakarya Province: “My dear brothers and sisters, the world is at a new crossroads, at this new crossroads. There are four channels that merge forming one channel in the future. Of these four separate channels, one is the Christian world, one is the Jewish world, one is the atheist world, and one is another, do you call it Shintoism, or ... whatever you say, there is another religion. They all unite in the future and together they form the crusader world. Who is against them, who is against them, who is against them is the Islamic world” (GeyveCom 2021).

Here are some other oddities in Erdogan’s mentality:



- Although has great difficulties in proving his secondary and university certificates and the serious errors found in his submitted documents, he constantly mentions in his speeches that he is an economist, even if he speaks to the international media (PBS TV 2017).
- It is known today that with Erdogan the regime in Turkey has shifted towards Islamism and authoritarianism (Altınors & Akcay 2022); the democracy has eroded, the human rights violations have increased and even the confidence in judiciary has severely declined (Orselli & Bilici 2021; Tai 2020). Despite the great clarity of these negatives during Erdogan's rule, which exceeds two decades, he repeatedly emphasises in his speeches on democratic development in Turkey. In one of his speeches, Erdogan describe himself by using a quote from Malcolm X: "I am for truth, no matter who tells it. I am for justice, no matter who it is for or against" (Oder 2021: 473).

Erdogan's supposed university degree, and even high school diploma, was and still is questionable in the Turkish press even before he assumed power in Turkey. He was unable to provide any credible proof of his university education and his high school diploma. In fact, all the documents related to his educational history that are circulated in media circles and state departments, and even those issued by the university, in which he claims to have studied, contain serious errors.

A populist can be defined as 'a politician who mobilises the masses to bring about radical changes in the administrative system'. This process needs two basic factors, namely the person with populist potential and the willingness of the masses. Thus, the populist process is or can be in



itself a legitimate process. However, for reasons having to do with the nature or tendency of populism in general, legitimacy (law) is violated in two areas, namely in the means of mobilising the masses and in bringing about change. At the end, the populist process becomes a negative process that undermines the stability of society. So, populism is a non-constructive political approach that is integrated in its means of using the masses, in its goals of controlling power (rule) and in its results in carrying out administrative changes.

Thus, populism is a socio-political phenomenon that depends on the psychology of the populist individual and society. The populist has a personality and psychological characteristics that give him (or her) such a huge momentum and a huge ability to achieve his or her objectives, regardless of whether the populist achievement is positive or negative. The populist masters the art of developing his or her ideas in the context of mobilising and directing the masses.

The transformation of pent-up feelings and thoughts into extraordinary energy can explain the populist impulse. Alfred Adler's theory provides one of the definitions for this hypothesis, which is that the feeling of low self-esteem turns into a sense of superiority and the individual's attempt to achieve this superiority. The 'substitution' of the psychological defence mechanism provides another explanation for the populist impulses, whereby a feeling of low self-esteem (inferiority complex) can be replaced by a search for a sense of higher self-esteem through achievement. In either case, since self-esteem is a semi-stable state in the individual, the feeling of low self-esteem requires the individual to continually search for a sense of superiority (high self-esteem), which at the same time implies continued achievement.



Educational history of Erdogan

Erdogan attended Piyalepasha primary school in Kasimpasha neighbourhood of Istanbul in 1960 and graduated in 1965. He joined the Istanbul Imam Khatip School (IH) in Fatih neighbourhood as a boarding student, completing the school in 1973.

The period of study in IH at that time was seven years, which was divided in to two stages. Four years as intermediate stage and three years as high school stage. In 1971, the four-year IH intermediate stage was abolished and the three-year IH high stage was increased to a four-years, shortening the years of IH study to four years. Erdogan completed his IH School in eight years (Celik 2016: 521). This means that Erdogan had at least a one-year failed class.

The diploma obtainable from the Imam Hatip School in Turkey at that time was not equivalent to the diploma of general high school. According to the official biography of Erdogan published on the electronic page of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, he passed exams for additional lessons in 1973 at Ayyub High School, which required the equivalence of the diploma taken from Imam Hatip with a diploma of general high school (Presidency website—see Bibliography).

According to Erdogan's official biography, which is published in both the Turkish and English versions on the Turkish Presidency's website, he had graduated at the University of Marmara in 1981. This means that Erdogan had completed his university study in eight years (Ibid).

There are many uncertainties in Erdogan's entire educational (school) biography, and there are prominent defects which clearly invalidate



documents that he has submitted for dissemination. The subject can be studied under the following headings:

- The inconsistencies in the educational history;
- The critics and complaints;
- The shortcomings and errors in the published documents.

The inconsistencies in the educational history

If Erdogan's claim is correct that he joined the Istanbul Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences, then according to the history of this academy published on the Marmara University webpage, Erdogan attended an institute and not a college. Because the Istanbul Academy opened institutes between 1972 and 1974, during which time Erdogan claims that he joined the university, and these institutes turned into colleges in the 1977-1978 academic stage (Marmara university 2022).

Interestingly, Erdogan did not talk about his university studies, only very little. He did not respond to the hundreds of criticisms directed at most of his education stages and published documents with the exception of a few of them with insufficient responses. Moreover, no one has any clear and reliable information about his undergraduate studies and exams to equivalence his certificate from the Imam Khatib School. According to some sources, Erdogan was not a bright student in IH (Cakir & Calmuk 2001: 19).

In Turkey, it is accustomed that every school keeps all notes, assessments and records of its students. The question which arise here is, why the



schools at which Erdogan studied have never published the documents related to him. It is well known that the schools, whose students become president of a country or take up another high position, will certainly proudly publish their reports, school notes and certificates of that student. But this have not happened in the case of Erdogan.

It is known from the published information about Erdogan's education that in 1973 he graduated from Imam al-Khatib School, studied to equalise his certificate and passed the exams, then studied for the university exams, passed the exams and joined the university in the same year, or the following year according to other sources. These stages require a lot of preparation, periods of formal study, and many exams that in fact cannot be completed in the same year or in one year. To match his Imam Hatip diploma to a general High School diploma, Erdogan should have studied extra lessons for one year in Eyup high School and should have passed the exams (Birgun 2021).

Moreover, according to the records of the Imam Al-Khatib School, Erdogan did not succeed in the lessons on the Arabic language and the Qur'an in the final exams, which required additional effort in that period (Dundar 2007). However, not a single document has been provided by Erdogan or by any other reliable source which proves that Erdogan had had a diploma of equivalency from Eyyup high school.

Erdogan had completed his alleged university study in eight years, while according to Article 54 of the University Law at that time the university student would be dismissed from college if he did not graduate in a period of one and half times the official period of the study. In the case of Erdogan, the study period in the Institute of Economics and



Commercial Sciences was three years; therefore, Erdogan should have been expelled from the faculty even if the study period was four years, as Erdogan claims (Sozcu 2016; Cumhuriyet 2015). One should note that when Erdogan obtained sufficient parliamentary power to change the Turkish Constitution, the article related to the university study of the presidential candidate was drafted by deleting the requirement of four years (Ileri Haber website 2016).

Erdogan claims to have graduated from the Aksaray Faculty of Commercial Science in 1981. However, there is no reliable evidence that Erdogan has ever joined and completed this study and the documents that were published about Erdogan's education stages are full of errors (see Photos 1-5 in the Appendix). Here are some notes that refute Erdogan's claims:

- No photo taken of Erdogan during his studies at the university was published, neither by Erdogan nor by his colleagues even though Turkish politicians and the Turkish press have challenged him to publish even a single photo that he supposedly took while studying at the university.
- There is no colleague of Erdogan who gave sufficient and reliable information about Erdogan's graduation from the Aksaray faculty of Commercial Sciences.
- Many students graduated from the same faculty and in the same academic period, and they did not know or get to know Erdogan during their studies (Colasan 2014).
- Erdogan talks about his primary school period and his studies in Imam Khatib High School in an enthusiastic manner in the audio-visual press, but he never talks about his university life. It is remarkable that



those who conduct interviews with him do not ask him about his university life on television programs, especially in the media loyal to him (Beyaz TV 2013).

- Erdogan, who has filed thousands of lawsuits for the simplest criticism directed at him, has not sued anyone who wrote or spoke about the falsity of his graduation certificates, and there are many.
- Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, a former head of the Turkish Higher Education Council (a government department at the level of a ministry) in which he served from December 11, 2007 until December 11, 2011, said that he had searched for Erdogan's university degree, when he was head of the council, but could not find it (Duvar 2023).
- According to the Refah Party's 1994 files, when Erdogan was candidate of the party and won the elections for the Mayor of Istanbul province, Erdogan attended university in the "1974-1975" period and graduated in 1979. Yet Erdogan now claims that he had graduated in 1981 (Odatv 2016).

Erdogan's insurance record shows that he has been working full-time for the Istanbul Electric, Tram and Tunnel Company during the years he claims he was studying at the faculty (Yalcin 2014: 57; Odatv 2015).

The English version of Erdogan's biography, published on the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, states that Erdogan graduated from the Faculty of Economics and *Administrative* Sciences (Presidency website in English), while the Turkish version on the same website mentions another specialisation, which is the faculty of Economics and *Commercial* Sciences (Presidency website in Turkish; see Photo 10).




The critics and complaints

Although the assessments of the educational stages, teachers' impressions, reports and grades obtained by Turkish presidents and prime ministers have been announced by themselves or by official or unofficial sources, these did not happen with Erdogan. Three documents related to Erdogan's alleged university degree were published (Photos 1, 2, 4), two of them endorsed by two rectors of Marmara University and another published by the Turkish press. All these documents contain obvious and serious errors.

Doubts about the legitimacy of Erdogan's educational certificates came every time with Erdogan's attempts to make changes in the Turkish Constitution. The first of them was in 2007, when Professor Ergun Ozbudun stated that he had prepared a special constitution for Erdogan (Odatv 2014). After that, the talk about changing the constitution stopped, and with it the debate about Erdogan not having a university degree.

With Erdogan announcing his candidacy for the Turkish presidential elections in 2014, discussions erupted again as to whether or not Erdogan had a university degree. This question is vital, because one of the basic conditions for running for the presidency of the Republic of Turkey is obtaining a four-year university degree.

Among the many complaints was a request for parliamentary interrogation submitted by MP Ali Ozturk to the Presidency of the Turkish Parliament, but it was left unanswered (Birgun 2016). In this regard, another MP, Barış Yarkadaş said: "I asked (Prime minister) Davutoglu and there was no answer. I applied to Marmara University to



obtain information. They told me that they had replied to Ali Riza Öztürk, who was a member of parliament for the previous term, and that the issue had become public. Unfortunately, the answer is rather vague. I applied to the supreme board of Information. I expect a response on the 12th or 15th of this month" (Hacaloglu 2016).

The first official response to discussions about Erdogan not having a university degree came from a source that has no responsibility to interfere in such matters. On April 24, 2014, the Rector of Marmara University, Zafer Gul, got involved in the matter and posted on his personal Twitter account a statement in response to politicians and media who claimed that Erdogan did not have a university degree. Gul published what he called Erdogan's temporary graduation document (Photo 1), which contains flaws and deficiencies that give a clear impression that it is forged. One should know that Rector Zafer Gul was appointed by the second authority in the Justice and Development Party (AKP—*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) after Erdogan, then president of Turkish republic Abdullah Gul (Firat 2016; Odatv 2015, 2014).

To prevent further investigations into Erdogan's university degree, the Fifth Anatolian Criminal Court in Istanbul decided on July 18, 2014 to block access to Marmara University's certificate archive (Birgun 2016).

Meanwhile, Professor Yusuf Halacoglu, the deputy head of the parliamentary group of the National Movement Party (*Milli Hareket Partisi*), of that time had published the temporary graduation document of Erdogan (Photo 1), which the rector Gul published, and a duplicate of Erdogan's certificate (Photo 2 & 3). He confirmed that the period of study at the Aksaray High School of Commercial Sciences was three



years, making Erdogan ineligible to become the President of the Republic of Turkey (Sozcu 2016B).

On September 17, 2015, investigative writer Ergun Poyraz, who wrote several articles and a book on Erdogan's life, published for the first time another duplicate of Erdogan (Photos 4, 5) explaining when, why, and where the three (Photo 1, 2, 4) published documents belonging to Erdogan were organised (Odatv 2015).

On June 10, 2016, this second duplicate (Photo 4) of Erdogan's alleged university degree was officially posted on the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) Twitter account with the following note: "*Upon our application, we share the notarized diploma sample sent by YSK*" (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*—Supreme Election Council)" (HDP 2016).

On September 28, 2015, the People's Liberation Party (HKP—*Halkın Kurtuluş Partisi*) submitted a request to the supreme election council demanding the dismissal of its president on the grounds that he had approved Erdogan's candidacy for the presidential elections based on Erdogan's forged university degree (Sozcu 2015).

None of the official and unofficial complaints submitted to government agencies concerned with obligating Erdogan to produce his university degree or verifying the authenticity of his documents, which contain errors that would render these invalids, have not been reasonably answered.

With Erdogan's accelerating steps towards imposing an Islamic character on the Turkish secular system and his relentless march



towards tyranny, he began preparations in 2016 to change the Turkish Constitution towards presidential dictatorship to greatly increase Erdogan's powers.

Debates broke out again in the Turkish media and among Turkish politicians and intellectuals about whether Erdogan had a university degree or not and about doubts about Erdogan's published documents submitted to government departments. Once again, complaints began to be submitted to the competent authorities, to demand confirmation of the legitimacy of Erdogan's documents, including complaints by members of Parliament to the Presidency of Parliament, as for example:

- In April 2016, a parliamentarian from Ankara, Ali Haydar Hakverdi, submitted a request to the administration of Marmara University to obtain information about Erdogan's university degree. In June 2016, Hakverdi submitted another request for parliamentary interrogation about the validity of Erdogan's university degree (Birgun 2016).
- In June 2016, a parliamentarian from Istanbul, Baris Yarkadas, submitted a request for parliamentary interrogation about the validity of Erdogan's university degree (Hacaloglu 2016).
- In June 2016, the former head of the Turkish Union of judges and prosecutors, Omer Faruk Eminagaoglu, submitted a request to the supreme election council to investigate the university degree which Erdogan had submitted to the council. The council rejected the request unanimously (Sozcu 2016C).
- In the same month, Eminagaoglu opened a lawsuit against the Rector of Marmara University, accusing him of illegal behaviour, failure to fulfil duty requirements and abuse of office (Cumhuriyet 2016).



- In July 2017, the People's Liberation Party brought the claim that President Erdogan's university certificate was forged to the Constitutional Court (HKP 2017). The party also submitted various requests to various authorities such as Marmara University, requesting information about Erdogan's university degree.
- On 10 October 2016, the deputy head of the Republican People's Party (RPP—*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), Tur Yildiz Bicer, submitted a parliamentary interpellation to the Presidency of the Turkish Parliament, asking: what is the diploma that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave to the Turkish army departments so that he could serve as a reserve officer? The Turkish parliament responded to the questioning by saying that the relevant documents had been destroyed (News site 2016; see Photo 6 in the Appendix).

All complaints remained without result, whether they were rejected from the outset or excuses were made that the matter could not be investigated. Then came the legal step to obstruct the scrutiny of Erdogan's diploma on April 30, 2018, when the supreme election council abolished the requirement to attest the university degree from a notary public for those who run for the presidential and parliamentary elections. This is because Erdogan does not have a legally documented university degree. On May 2, 2018, parliamentarian Mehmet Tum asked in a parliamentary debate, "Has this decision been taken by the supreme election council in Favor of President Erdogan?" (Ahval 2018; see Photo 7 in the Appendix).

Shortcomings and errors in the published documents of Erdogan

It seems that Erdogan did not need the graduation document except when absolutely necessary and in cases outside his specialisation. And



every time he provided a document other than the one that preceded it. The first time Erdogan needed a graduation document was when the time to perform his compulsory military service came. And in order to shorten the period and serve as a reserve officer, he prepared the first certificate, which was the temporary graduation document (Photo 1). Then Erdogan presented the graduation document on two other occasions. The first occasion was in 1994 when he ran for the position of mayor of Istanbul, as he prepared the first duplicate (Photo 2). The second occasion was when Erdogan planned to run for the presidency of the Republic of Turkey in 2014, so he provided the second duplicate then (Photo 4).

As for the published documents regarding Erdogan's graduation from the university, these are the following:

1. Temporary graduation document;
2. The first duplicate;
3. The second duplicate.

1. The Temporary Graduation Document (Photo 1)

This document was presented in April 2016 by Zafer Gul, the Rector of Marmara University, who claimed that it was Erdogan's temporary graduation document, even though it contained serious errors.

The Temporary Graduation Document is not a university diploma, but rather a document given to a graduate when he needs a certificate that has not yet been completed. According to the Marmara University, the Temporary Graduation Document is valid for six months (Marmara



University 2023, Marmara University 2018). It is usual for the entity to which the temporary graduation document is brought to require the original certificate when it is issued.

Before this document was published by Gul, no one knew about it. As for the original copy of this document, no one has seen it. In September 2015, National Party (*Ulusal Parti*) chairman and journalist Gokce Firat declared that Erdogan had possibly used this document to perform his military service as a reserve officer, as Erdogan claimed, otherwise he should have served as a regular soldier (Firat 2016). As mentioned above, the parliamentarian Bicer submitted a request to the Presidency of the Turkish Parliament asking to investigate which university degree Erdogan used for military service, which remained without reaching to a conclusion.

The Rector of Marmara University defended the authenticity of this document. One should note that it is not the responsibility of the university rector to defend the validity of such documents (certificates), especially those related to senior state officials such as the prime minister. As mentioned above, one of the former presidents of the Union of Judges and Prosecutors opened a lawsuit against the President of Marmara University in this context (Cumhuriyet 2016). Additionally, the document contains many serious errors. In addition, the Rector of the university did not provide any evidence to substantiate his claim. There are specialised departments in every country responsible for verifying the authenticity of official documents or detecting forgeries in documents.

Gul indicated that Erdogan studied at the university for four years, without referring to any source. In contrast, there are Turkish academic




authorities claiming that Erdogan studied at an institute where the study period was three years (Sozcu 2016B; Cumhuriyet 2016B).

Another Rector of Marmara University, Muhammad Emin Arat, who claims to be Erdogan's classmate in the same faculty, does not write in his autobiography that he graduated from Marmara University as Erdogan does, but rather writes that he graduated from the Istanbul Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences (Arat Biography, Marmara university website).

As for the major errors in this temporary graduation document of Erdogan, particularly when compared to another original document (Photo 8), these are:

- The design and title of the document is neither a design nor a title of a temporary graduation document, but rather a design and title of a regular graduation certificate. For a temporary graduation document, its title must be a temporary graduation document of another design (Zileli 2023).
- On this document is written in Erdogan's handwriting the phrase "I received by hand *the original of my temporary graduation document*" and this phrase is signed by Erdogan's signature. The writing of such phrases on any temporary graduation document by the document holder is illegal, and the content of the writing is wrong as well. There is no document called 'an original temporary graduation document'.
- There is no picture of the owner of the document (Erdogan), which is mandatory in such a document.
- There is no the stamp of the school that gave the document. This is also mandatory.
- The Dean's signature is forged.



In mid-2016, the pro-Erdogan press published a number of photos of Erdogan in the uniform of a reserve officer among a group of reserve officers, claiming that the photos were taken during Erdogan's military service. The purpose of publishing these photos of Erdogan was to convince the Turkish public that they are proof that Erdogan is a four-year university graduate (Kokdemir 2016).

To reiterate, Erdogan used the temporary graduation document when he joined the army (Firat 2016). According to Erdogan's provisional graduation document, he graduated from the Faculty of Economics and Commercial Sciences on April 3, 1981, and joined the military service in March of 1982 (Yalcin 2014: 86). This means that Erdogan's temporary graduation document was no longer valid when he joined the military. As mentioned above, the temporary graduation document is only valid for six months (Marmara University 2018).

Based on these facts, this temporary graduation document belonging to Erdogan is *invalid*, even false or forged.

2. The First duplicate (Photos 2, 3)

According to Marmara University, the definition of a duplicate is as follows: "If the original certificate is lost, torn, or damaged to the point of being unusable, a new design duplicate is issued in a new format. The original diploma number must be written on the duplicate. The applicants for a duplicate should attach two photos of the graduate and the damaged or torn certificate. The address, name, surname, and occupation of the signatories are written on the signature and approval



sections of the duplicate, as on the original certificate, but without the signatures” (Arat Biography, Marmara University 2018).


Although this duplicate appeared in 2014, investigative writer Ergun Poyraz posted it on his Facebook and Twitter accounts in September 2015, explaining when, why and where this duplicate was organised. According to Poyraz and various other sources, it was prepared in 1994 for use by Erdogan in the Istanbul mayoral elections, which he won (Poyraz 2015).

There are several major errors in this first duplicate related to Erdogan’s university degree, namely:

- Erdogan did graduate neither from Marmara University nor from the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences of Marmara University as it is written on the duplicate. Marmara University was not yet established in the year 1981, as is written on the invalid provisional graduation document.

Moreover, if Erdogan actually had graduated from a college as he claims, then he had graduated from the Faculty of Commercial Sciences, not Administrative Sciences—and not from Marmara University, but rather from the Istanbul Academy of Economics and Commercial Sciences, according to his invalid Temporary graduation document (Photo 1).

It seems that the position of mayor and the political field are areas of administrative competence, so the administration specialisation is more suitable for Erdogan; so the specialty of commerce had been replaced by the specialty of administration. Such changes in the essence of the testimony can only occur in forged documents and in a case full of large and prominent forgeries, as in the case of educational certificates related to Erdogan. As it is mentioned above, this error also



appears when comparing the biography of Erdogan published on the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, as it is written in the English section (administrative) and in the Turkish section (commercial). Erdogan's change of field of specialty from commercial to administrative with such ease indicates his willingness to manipulate and distort facts.

- In accordance with the conditions of Marmara University to grant a duplicate of the university degree to the graduate:

- o The original certificate must be lost, torn or damaged to the point of being unusable. In the first possibility, the news of the loss of the original certificate must be published at the time in a newspaper and in the second possibility, the damaged original certificate must be presented. In either case, there is no information about Erdogan providing the required evidence.

- o The original certificate number must be written on a duplicate. But Erdogan does not have an original certificate. Even the number on this duplicate is not the same as on the only error-riddled document Erdogan submitted about his alleged university studies, the invalid temporary graduation document.

- o There must be a photo of the owner of the certificate on a duplicate. There is no photo of Erdogan on this duplicate.

- o The address, name, surname and profession of the signatories, which are written on the signature and approval sections of the original certificate, should be written on a duplicate, but without the signatures. But:

- Erdogan does not have an original certificate which show an address, name, surname and profession of the signatories;



- The names of rector and the dean on this duplicate of Erdogan are not the same as the names on his invalid temporary graduation document, which Erdogan illegally uses as an original certificate.

3. The Second duplicate (Photo 4, 5)

It is not clear why Erdogan needed a second duplicate. The only two main differences between the first duplicate and this one is the difference in design and the presence of the signatures of the dean of the college and the rector of the university in this second copy. As it is mentioned above, according to Marmara University there should not be any signatures on the duplicate.

On June 3, 2016, the second rector of Marmara University, Mehmet Emin Arat, published on the university's website a four-page statement bearing his signature giving an almost complete educational biography of Erdogan, which included various discrepancies and inaccuracies. The statement supported the authenticity of documents related to Erdogan's alleged university diploma. According to Arat, this duplicate was issued on April 1, 2011 (Arat 2016).

It seems that Erdogan participated with the rector of Marmara University, Mehmet Emin Arat, in writing the latter's statement about Erdogan's educational career, because Erdogan was at Marmara University on the same day that Arat published his report on Erdogan and gave a speech there. In his speech, Erdogan spoke in a manner as if he was ordering the academic staff of the university to bring for him a university degree in any way. This is what Erdogan said:



“They started a discussion these days about whether he (Meaning himself) has a diploma or not. Extract it from the archive, will you publish it, what will you do? ... Maybe they will believe it if the rector declares” (T24 2016).

In addition, Erdogan gave in his speech some key points about his alleged university graduation, which the university president had included in his statement. The statement included detailed and minute information about Erdogan’s educational biography, as only people close to the person can know this information, or the person himself provided this information to the other directly (Ibid).

When this second duplicate of Erdogan’s university degree was prepared in 2011, the Rector of Marmara University was Zafer Gul, who published the first statement in April 2014 and supported the authenticity of Erdogan’s suspicious documents. Gul’s deputy at that time was Mehmet Emin Arat, who became rector of Marmara University in 2014 and published the second lengthy statement in June 2016 to support the authenticity of Erdogan’s alleged documents. Note that the appointments of university presidents were and still are made mainly by Erdogan.

The following are some comments on the statement of the President of Marmara University, Muhammad Amin Arat, about Erdogan’s alleged university degree:

- Arat described all criticisms of Erdogan’s education as baseless and contradictory to facts. As in the case of the statement of the former university rector, Zafer Gul, Arat did not provide any evidence to



support his claims or to prove the invalidity of the many serious criticisms of all of Erdogan's educational stages.

- Arat claimed that Erdogan graduated with a good grade from 41 lessons, which contradicts the fact that Erdogan completed his studies in eight years. Nor did Arat give any document to prove his claim, and there is no publication or neutral or independent source that supports such a claim.

- Arat indicated that Erdogan had graduated from the administrative department of the faculty and not from the commercial department, although according to the invalid temporary graduation document that Arat himself relies on, and on which all other documents related to Erdogan's university degree are based, it is written that Erdogan studied commercial sciences and not administrative sciences (Photo 1).

- As in the first duplicate, the names of the rector and dean mentioned in this duplicate also are not the same as the names in Erdogan's invalid temporary graduation document.

- It is known that Erdogan claims that Arat graduated from the same faculty as him. Arat defends the mentioning in Erdogan's educational biography that he had graduated from the faculty of economics and commercial sciences at *Marmara University*. But Arat himself writes in his own biography that he is a graduate of the Istanbul Academy of economic and commercial sciences (Arat biography).

- In 2011, when Marmara University issued this second duplicate of Erdogan's university diploma which contains a number of significant errors, Arat was the Vice Rector of the university (Ibid).

- In 2013, when Arat was the vice Rector of the university of Marmara, the university awarded Erdogan a honorary doctorate in political sciences.

- In 2014, Erdogan had appointed Arat as Rector of Marmara University (Ibid).



This second duplicate of Erdogan's certificate has been attested by a Notary, which cannot be achieved without seeing the original certificate. Because when attesting, it is necessary for the notary to see the original and to write on the back of the document that it is identical to the original certificate. However, without the original certificate, the notary attested the duplicate, writing on it "It is identical to the original".

The Turkish Notary Public Union has punished an employee of the notary office, who has certified this duplicate (the second), with a warning penalty. Erdogan submitted this duplicate, which is full of errors and illegally certified by a notary, to the supreme election council as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and was approved by the council. All complaints submitted to the supreme election council requesting the rejection of Erdogan's candidacy or investigation of the authenticity of his documents (Cumhuriyet 2019).

On the other hand, to certify any document with the notary, the owner of the document must either bring the document himself to the notary or give the mandate to another person to complete the transaction. There is no evidence that these two possibilities have been realised. The person who brought this duplicate of Erdogan's certificate to the notary for certification was Hasan Tukenmez, Erdogan's office director's driver, Hasan Dogan (Cumhuriyet 2019B).

It seems that the first duplicate (Photos 2, 3) of Erdogan's university certificate was illegally prepared outside Marmara University; otherwise, Marmara University would not have prepared a duplicate (Photos 4, 5) for the second time, or the rectors of Marmara University



who provided detailed information about Erdogan's education would have referred to it. Moreover, its design is not a design affiliated with Marmara University.

Another document (Photo 9)

The Alumni Directory of Istanbul Academy of Economics and Commercial Sciences, Faculty of Commercial Sciences for the year 1980-1981 (Odatv 2016B) contains detailed information about the student's university life, including full name, dates of study periods including date of entry to university and date of graduation, student number, student photos with short notes, and statements about their behaviour and personalities. The directory also includes the names of the members of the directory's preparation committee, the names of the rector, dean of the faculty, vice-rectors and lecturers.

Among the information that is given in the Alumni directory about a student is how his attendance at the faculty has been, for example: "He came to school occasionally", "He neglected school", "He came to school only on exam days" and "He continued school and work together". Erdogan constantly uses the chaotic years of the 1970s in Turkey as an excuse for that no one knows anything about his university life or no one has seen him at university.

In March 2016, Turkish newspapers published an alumni directory for the faculty from which Erdogan claims he had graduated, and for the same year of graduation, i.e. 1981. There was no information at all in it about Erdogan.



In the directory there are different pictures of students at different stages of study, inside and outside the school, with lecturers, on school trips and in sports teams. Erdogan is not present even in these photos. As Erdogan is known for his interest and professionalism in football, and his joining football teams in the Turkish League. However, he is not present even in the school's football team photos. Notably it is stated in the directory that no student has been excluded.

Populist psychology

A large number of populists emerged over the past two decades across the globe; some of them have strong populist behaviours, and they succeeded in winning power: some of them ruled for many years, and many are still ruling. They made radical changes to the systems of governing of their states, and sometimes turned it upside down.

Since years, the academic community and the global media are intensively discussing populism and populist leaders in their negative meanings. There are factors at the core of the populist approach that make it deviate from the usual way of conducting politics.

Populism is a political approach that relies mainly on a leader and the use of feelings, as one person plays the primary role in obtaining and maintaining the support of great masses. Relying exclusively on the leader and exploiting feelings (emotions) often leads to:

- Deviations in appealing to the masses

Having the support of so many masses make deviations in addressing the people inevitable, such as polarising communities (Roberts 2021)



and exploiting national, religious, patriotic sentiments, or the grievances of poverty of the economically disadvantaged.

- Abuse of the power

Maintaining the support of so many masses and making radical changes in the ruling system makes the abuse of power inevitable.

There are many other downsides to populist behaviour:

- Misleading statements and disinformation are at the heart of populist discourse (Heinrich 2017);
- The populist uses hate speech, profanity and arbitrary interpretations, and does not hesitate to tell lies (Dale 2021) (Endnote 1);
- The populists frequently use conspiracy theories, and they are good at creating enemies for the people, the state and the country, both internally and externally (Bergmann 2018);
- The demonisation of the opposition and the emotional pressure on the masses are among the main features of populism;
- Abusing democracy is considered one of the most serious negative aspects of the populist approach (Kyle & Mounk 2018) (Endnote 2) and they easily violate laws and legislation and even the constitution (Adamidis 2021; Kovalčík 2022).

Thus, the populist approach is a massive effort by almost always one individual and a challenge to large segments of society, such as the entire existing political system, the press, minorities and human rights defenders.

All these specifications reveal a typical personality with different yet mutually reinforcing characteristics. The foremost among these



characteristics are an unbridled desire for supremacy and domination, huge ability to work and persuade and the lack of hesitation in misusing rules, laws, and even moral and social values.

In this case, education, which today occupies a large part of the practices of a person's daily life, must have a role in influencing the populist's psychology and personality, and consequently on his behaviour and politics. The voters' lack of education, let alone higher education with a university degree, also plays important roles in the emergence of populism (Brewer 2020).

Although education is considered one of the basic functions of the state and society as a whole—and aims to educate people about values that benefit society, which is also one of the main goals of United Nations institutions concerned with education (Bergan & Damian 2010: 122-123) there nowadays are ethical failures and challenges in universities and other places of higher education at the global level, which require that ethics and values be placed at the centre of attention when searching for solutions (Prisacariu & Shah 2016: 152).

The emergence of populism, which has the unconstructive characteristics mentioned above, undermining the familiar political and social foundations, cannot be explained by the inadequacy of the education system alone. In trying to justify education or at least so one should not exclusively blame lack of proper, ethical education entirely for the rise of populism, it can be found that many seasoned populists lack a full educational biography.

As shown above, Erdogan lacks true milestones in his educational career, and his lack of university education is almost constant. Just as



there are many doubts about the educational biography of America's former President Donald Trump (Valania 2019; Elliott 2011), there are flaws in the story of university studies by India's prime minister Narendra Modi, and the doubts are still circulating in the media (Bhattacharya 2018). Regarding Bolivia's former president Evo Morales, even his high school education is questionable. Bulgaria's former prime minister Boyko Borisov began working as a firefighter after graduating from high school, which did not require a university education; then he graduated in the ranks of the Communist Party earning through there his university degrees. South Africa's former president and veteran populist Jacob Zuma never went to school.

An analysis of the relationship between the populist's Big Five personality traits, (academic) achievement or good performance and self-esteem, reveals crucial characteristics (Table 1):

- The five big personality traits data of the populist show a complete mismatch with the personality traits of (academic) performance and/or achievement;
- Low self-esteem dominates the personality of the populist, while genuine high self-esteem dominates the personality of an individual with high performance and/or good achievement in higher (academic) education (Infante & Marin 2008; Soufi, Damirchi & Sedghi 2014; Aryana 2010; Hearn 2019: 44; Kumar 2017);
- The fact is that the populist actually realises a very great achievement, which does not mean that this achievement is positive, contradicting the classic equation that low self-esteem generally leads to a low level of achievement or performance;



- Here, the role of extraversion appears as one of the five main personality traits of the populist, which has a positive relationship with high self-esteem (McCarthy 2017). Extreme extroversion is also one of the absolute necessities of populist behaviour. In other words, a populist must be extremely extroverted in order to attract the masses and win their support;
- It may be that the populist's extreme extroversion helps him realise great achievements as over-compensation for his generally state of low self-esteem, which is considered against achievement or good performance;
- The four non-constructive traits (low agreeableness, low degree of conscientiousness, low level of openness, and low emotional stability) of the Big Five personality traits of the populist that are all associated with low self-esteem, can explain the negative aspects of populist behaviour (personality);
- The individual's sense of self (self-esteem) is generally present at the age of five, will be relatively stable at the age of eleven, and then remains relatively constant throughout one's life (McElroy 2015; Ducharme 2018). Usually, personality traits begin to emerge after many years, in adolescence (Thill 2019). Since low self-esteem appears and settles before the appearance and establishment of personality traits, then what is the role of low self-esteem in building the personality traits of the populist? In other words, what is the role of feeling inferior (inferiority complex) in the emergence of populism? A subject that needs to be studied further.

The hypothesis is that the individual replaces his general state of (extreme) low self-esteem with (extreme) extraversion, which is a component of positive self-esteem (substitution), giving rise to the populist personality. In other words, the general condition of the populist's extremely low self-esteem excites and amplifies his extroverted state, creating the populist's tremendous ability to win over large masses and achieve and maintain supremacy and superiority.




Table 1 **Relation between the big five personality traits, academic achievement (performance) and self-esteem of the populist**

Populist	Self-esteem ⁴	Achievement (Academic)	Self-esteem ⁵
Extraversion ¹	Positive	Introvert	Negative
Low agreeableness ¹	Negative	High agreeableness	Positive
Low degree of conscientiousness ¹	Negative	High degree of conscientiousness	Positive
Low level of openness ²	Negative	High level of openness	Positive
Low emotional stability ³	Negative	High emotional stability	Positive

1. Nai & Martinez i Coma 2019; Nai 2019.
2. Nai 2019; Czikora 2015.
3. Nai & Martinez i Coma 2019.
4. Amirazodi 2011; Eswari, Kaur & Kavitha 2019.
5. Amirazodi 2011; Eswari, Kaur & Kavitha 2019; Infante & Marin 2008.

Conclusion

This study shows that the absence of the original university degree for Erdogan is the main reason for the failure of his attempts to prove that he obtained a university degree. All his attempts are based on what Erdogan calls a temporary graduation document (Photo 1), which contains errors that clearly make it invalid. The other problem with validating Erdogan's claim that he has a university degree, is that even the invalid provisional graduation document has not been investigated, and has not been seen—simply because it does not exist.

Two of the rectors of Marmara University were involved in defending Erdogan, that is, in defending the invalid temporary graduation document; they tried to justify its validity without providing evidence. They even issued a duplicate (Photo 4) of this document, which in turn contains major errors—even according to the conditions of Marmara University itself.



It is a fact that the individual's lack of any educational stage or degree does not necessarily reflect on his behaviour or personality. But naivety, contradictions, inconsistencies, the absence of boundaries in the individual's words and actions, and anomalies in his or her opinions can be clear indications of his or her low level of education. Not to mention that the populist often violates laws and the social values that are—or should be—among the primary aims of education. Many of these characteristics are evident in Erdogan's rhetoric and behaviour. Note that Erdogan made religious and national political rhetoric a passion of his, and took politics as a profession since his youth in high school, which made him improve and master the art of political rhetoric.

Despite the big and continuous uproar in the Turkish press about Erdogan's illegal graduation documents, especially about actually forging these, it was not taken into account by any relevant government departments—which indicates the extent of Erdogan's (or populist's) dominance over the state's executive and judicial departments and his or her control over the feelings of the masses who perpetuate their support for him or her.

The course of the story of discussions of Erdogan's certificates, which is the subject of this study, is a clear indication of Erdogan's imposition of falsehood on society. It indicates other primary characteristics of Erdogan and populists in general too, namely “misleading” and “unbridled desire” to obtain and maintain power as well insistently “violating laws”.

Many factors play a major role in how society accepts such impolite behaviour, perpetuates its support for the populist in question and keeps him or her in power, as in the case of Erdogan.



Among the main reasons for this phenomenon are:

- Daily needs occupy the attention of a large percentage of society, especially in developing countries such as Turkey;
- A large percentage of the society does not reach to news and for many reasons, including the lack of internet penetration in many remote regions in developing countries;
- The populist subjugates most of the media to him- or herself, which never publish news against the government; Erdogan is a typical example in this context;
- The populists are supported mainly by the less educated, “simple” people (Brewer 2020) who have a very low reading tradition. Note that the low reading tradition includes many other sections in a community.

There is a high possibility that Erdogan or any other populist is aware of these social characteristics, because it seems that influencing the masses is an instinctive state of the populist or he or she has mastered it later in life.

The other major factor accounting for the acceptance of such behaviour by a large proportion of society is the underlying ideology on which the populists rely on exploiting the sentiments of the masses. Adherence to Islamist behaviour by the country's leadership and administration prompts the Islamic(ised) masses to provide absolute support to any politician, here Erdogan.

In addition, Erdogan is exploiting the sentiments of nationalism and patriotism as well. Such ideologies are sacred to the hardliners, and they are sufficient to maintain the support of the masses and keep the populist in power despite all his or her negative behaviour patterns. Here the creation




of polarisation is a natural consequence of populism, because hardliners view others as enemies, especially their immediate opponents. This is very evident in the speeches of Erdogan and Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the National Movement party, which they present weekly in parliament.

One should bear in mind that religion or Islam plays an equally important role as ethnicity, perhaps even more so, in Turkish nationalism. Economic deprivation in itself or as a secondary factor is a powerful synergist with extremist ideologies in creating populism.

As regarding a typical populist, such as Erdogan, Orbán, and Morales, who is characterised by an unusual orientation and an extraordinary ability to mobilise large masses, challenge large social strata and continue to cling to power, indicate that the populist is characterised by strong psychological motive(s), which at the same time means strong desire(s). For example, an exaggerated sense of responsibility or excessive sensitivity to inequity and injustice or any other motive.

Since the feeling of low self-esteem, which at the same time means a feeling of inferiority or an inferiority complex, dominates the populist personality (Table 1), the question that arises here, is the inferiority complex the main motive in the formation of the populist personality, and thus the cause of its negative aspects?

Note that some of the most important factors causing low self-esteem are present in Erdogan's case, such as extreme poverty and extreme exposure to violence in childhood. Erdogan was a naughty and bad-mouthed child; therefore, he was subjected to constant punishments from his father. For instance, his father once tied Erdogan to a fan on the ceiling of a room. Also,



low self-esteem leads to academic failure, and academic failure in turn constitutes another cause of low self-esteem.

Note that the personality of the populist and the personality of the voter who votes for him or her has received a good share of attention of researchers hitherto. However, studying other psychological aspects of the populist individual may add crucial insights to our understanding of the populist phenomenon.

Two of the important factors explaining the emergence of populism and the increase in the number of populists are: first, the massive advances in the means of communication in recent decades that have allowed politicians to reach large audiences constantly and maintain communication easily. Secondly, the democratic developments and their spread that have made it possible for anyone to engage in politics. Moreover, the developments and spread of the principles of human rights expanded freedom of thought and expression and narrowed the scope of responsibility for speech, which opened the way for misuse of political discourse in particular. It seems that these two factors will continue to develop, which will logically lead to the development of populism and the increase of the number of populists. Consequently, it is of vital importance that populism becomes part of the curricula in schools and universities.


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Endnotes

Note 1 Some examples of the many inconsistencies in Erdogan's speeches.

- In 1994, Erdogan said: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation, it is a great lie". After taking power, Erdogan started to say the opposite. As on 5 September 2010, Erdogan said: "Because sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation, is there any doubt?"
- On 5 December 2013, Erdogan said: "There was no airport. It came to Muş with us". But the Airport of the province of Muş was opened to civil traffic in 1992, ten years before AKP came to power.
- On 1 June 2018, Erdogan said: "Was there an airport in the province of Adıyaman? We have built, we." The airport of Adıyaman was put in service four years before AKP came to power.
- On 26 December 2010, Erdogan said: "Dear Friends, the language of my nation is one, this is the Turkish nation". On 27 May 2011, he said: "I said neither one language nor one religion. Nowhere do I have made such a statement, because they are a lie machine".
- The following statement was made regarding the permission for the Blue Marmara operation, which concerns and is called after a passenger ship known for its participation in the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and the deadly confrontation by the Israeli army on 31 May 2010. On 17 July 2014, Erdogan said: "Who is the authority, are they the loved ones in the south? If we are the authority in Turkey, we have already given permission. But for them is Israel".
On 29 June 2016, Erdogan said, "Did you ask the prime minister of the day that you are bringing such humanitarian aid?"



Note 2 In this regard, there are Netanyahu's attempts to rein in the judiciary, Erdogan's relentless march towards dictatorship, constitutional changes, for Morales to preserve his presidency despite the laws and Trump's attempts to politicise America's judiciary system and influence the supreme court.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Appendix

Photo 1 Erdogan's Temporary Graduation document



Yusuf Halaçoğlu ✓
@yusufhalacoglu

Başbakanın mezuniyet belgesi. Ne dersiniz?

[Translate Tweet](#)



8:01 PM · Apr 24, 2014




Photo 2 The First duplicate of Erdogan



Yusuf Halaçoğlu 
@yusufhalacoglu

...

Bu diploma eksik olan imzalar.Üniversite 1982 temmuzda kuruldu.Mezuniyet 1981.

[Translate Tweet](#)



8:01 PM · Apr 24, 2014



Photo 3 The back of the first duplicate of Erdogan





İSTANBUL 15. NOTERLİĞİ
Atatürk Bulvarı No:150/3
Aksaray - İSTANBUL

ÖRNEK

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İKTİSADİ ve İDARİ BİLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ

Lisans Diploması

Doğum Yeri ve Tarihi: İstanbul-1954
Mezuniyet Tarihi: 1987
Diploma No: 8345

Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesinde dört yıl süreli
lisans öğrenimini tamamlayan ve ilgili yönetmelik hükümlerine göre
bütün sınavlarını başaran

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

kanunların verdiği hak ve yetkilerden yararlanmak üzere
bu diploması almıştır.


İSTANBUL 15. NOTERLİĞİ
MEHMET NECATİ ÖZEL
Yerine İmzaaya Yetkili Kurul
EMİNE SEVEN

Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Batırel

İSTANBUL 15. NOTERLİĞİ
İşbu örneğin dairesi ile aynı
ve izninin alınmasıdır.



Photo 5 The back of the second duplicate of Erdogan






Photo 6 A request for interrogation from parliamentarian Tur Yıldız Becer to the Turkish Parliament about which university diploma Erdogan had submitted to the Turkish military departments when he joined the compulsory military service

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T.C. CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI MİLLET MECLİSİ

ANA SAYFA MİLLETVEKİLLERİ YASAMA DENETİM TUTANAKLAR PARLAMENTOLARARASI İLİŞKİLER KURUMSAL YAYINLAR

Yazılı Soru Önergesi Bilgileri

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Dönemi ve Yasama Yılı	26/1
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Başkanlığa Geliş Tarihi	20/06/2016
Önerenin Özeti	Cumhurbaşkanı'nın askerlikte beyan ettiği diplomasına ilişkin
Önerenin Sahibi	CHP Manisa Milletvekili TUR YILDIZ BİÇER
Önerenin Muhatabı	Milli Savunma Bakanı Kocaali FİKRİ İŞİK
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Önerenin Son Durumu	Süresi Geçtikten Sonra Cevaplandı
Cevap Bildiriliş Tarihi	10/10/2016

Süresi Geçtikten Sonra Gelen Cevap

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Sosyal Ağlarda TEMM

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Sıkça Sorulan Sorular




Photo 7 The law abolishing the requirement to attest the university certificate, which is submitted to the supreme election council, by the public notary



TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ
"EGEMENLİK KAYITSIZ ŞARTSIZ MİLLETİNDİR"

ANASAYFA | BAŞKAN | MİLLETVEKİLLERİ | YASAMA | DENETİM | TUTANAKLAR | GÜNDEM | KURUMSAL | YAYINLAR

GENEL KURUL KONUŞMASI

Konu: Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun noter onaylı diploma koşulunu kaldırmasının gerekçesini ve AKP Genel Başkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın diplomasını kamuoyuyla paylaşıp paylaşmayacağını öğrenmek istediğine ilişkin açıklaması

Yasama Yılı: 3

Birleşim: 94

Tarih: 02.05.2018

MEHMET TÜM (Balıkesir) - Teşekkür ederim Sayın Başkan.

30 Nisan Pazartesi günü Resmi Gazete'de yayınlanan kararla, Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve milletvekilliği genel seçimlerinde adaylık başvurusu yapanların onaylı diploması ibraz etmelerine dair koşulu kaldırmıştır.

Hükümete soruyorum: Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun noter onaylı diploma koşulunu kaldırmasının gerekçesi nedir? Yüksek Seçim Kurulu bu kararla, 16 Nisanda mühürsüz oyları kabul ettiği gibi şimdi de mühürsüz diploma larını mı kabul edecektir? Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun bu kararının Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan için alındığı iddiaları doğru mudur? AKP Genel Başkanı Erdoğan, Yüksek Seçim Kuruluna başvurusunda ibraz edeceği diploması kamuoyuyla paylaşacak mıdır? Ülkemizin geleceği diplomasisi yöneticilere mi emanet edilecektir? (CHP sıralarından alkışlar)

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PARLAMENTOLAR ARASI İLİŞKİLER

KÜTUPHANE VE ARŞİV

ANAYASA VE İÇTÜZÜK SİTESİ

KANUN VE KARAR BİLGİ SİSTEMİ

E-DİLEKÇE

BİLGİ EDİNME

DUYURULAR

Genel Duyurular


Sınav Duyurusu

İnsan Kaynakları Staj Duyurusu

Sağlık Duyuruları



Photo 8 An original certificate belonging to another person who graduated from the same faculty that Erdogan claims to have graduated from






Photo 9 Alumni Directory of graduates of the Istanbul Academy of Economics and Commercial Sciences, Faculty of Commercial Sciences for the year 1980-1981, the faculty and university year that Erdogan claims to have graduated from

The whole book can be found on this link:
www.odatv4.com/siyaset/okul-yilliginda-da-erdogandan-iz-yok-1203161200-91089.




1980 - 1981

SON SINIF YILLIĞI



Photo 10 The English and Turkish versions of the CV of Erdoğan published on the webpages of the presidency of the Turkish republic






(Advertisement)

Turkey's Iraqi Turkmen Policy

Merciless Exploitation and Violation of International Law

By Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation (SOITM Foundation)



Publisher: SOITM Foundation
Published: January 2019
Language: English
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xxiii + 186 pp. a map

Please note that the price of shipping may vary depending on your country of residence

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About "Turkey's Iraqi Turkmen Policy"


The Turkmen in Iraq are of ethnic Turkic communities living in several countries neighboring Turkey.

The animosity and the hatred that had developed towards the Ottomans in the later decades of the Empire reflected onto those Turkic origin communities in the newly created countries after the Ottomans dismembered, which all were ruled by non-Turkish governments. The Turkic communities in the Balkans were exposed to massacres, in Greece they are still deprived of their ethnic rights, and in the Arabic countries, they are marginalized and exposed to serious assimilation policies, as in the cases of the Iraqi and Syrian Turkmen.

These suppressed communities had no other choice than to consider Turkey as their only rescuer and subjugate themselves to Turkey. At the same time, this has increased the animosity against them in their new countries and removed the possibility of getting help from any other national, regional or international powers.

On the other side, Turkey had neither ability nor intention to help these Turkic communities, in contrary, Turkey remain inattentive to their sufferings, even misused these communities benefiting from their blind obedience.

This book presents the history of 3 decades of the Turkish policy towards the Turkmen of Iraq, which can be considered a vivid view of the Turkish relation with Turkic communities in the neighboring countries.



Main Article

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın eğitim biyografisi ve popülist psikoloji


(The educational biography of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the populist psychology)

Sheth Jerjis

This article concerns the Turkish translation of the same English-language contribution in this 2023 volume of our journal, translated by the author himself.

Abstract Many populist attitudes and behaviours lead to the belief that the average populist lacks a full educational resume, especially a university education. Numerous publications have appeared questioning the possession of university degrees by many populists, including populist presidents such as Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, India's president Narendra Modi and even America's former president Donald Trump.

A very high number of articles has been published questioning Erdogan's entire educational biography, which include strange facts, not only in the contents of the published documents, but also in the interventions of higher academic authorities and state departments in Erdogan's defence. Despite the abundance of publications on Erdogan's educational biography and the documents published around it, to date there has been no article that exclusively includes all the aspects of the topic.



Today, Erdogan, who caused a stir regionally and globally, is considered one of the biggest populists. A detailed study of the large gaps in his claimed educational career will certainly help in understanding his populist personality.


In collecting information, we relied mainly on articles published on Turkish newspaper websites and on listening to Erdogan's speeches and various programs discussing Erdogan's policy on Turkish TV channels.

It is found that Erdogan's educational curriculum is full of contradictions, and that the published documents related to his certificates, particularly that of the university he supposedly attended, contain flagrant errors.

In terms of the populist personality, all of the Big Five personality traits, which are Extraversion, agreeableness, degree of conscientiousness, level of openness and emotional stability, contrast with the personality traits of those who have achieved academic success (see Table 1). Low self-esteem also dominates the populist personality and the personality of those who fail academically. Hence it seems that low self-esteem plays an important role in explaining populist behaviour and approach.

In this article, Erdogan's educational history is discussed in detail and brief information on the psychology of the populist is provided.

Özet Pek çok popülist tutum ve davranış, ortalama bir popülistin tam bir eğitim özgeçmişine, özellikle de üniversite eğitimine sahip olmadığı inancına yol açmaktadır. Türkiye cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hindistan cumhurbaşkanı Narendra Modi ve hatta Amerika'nın eski başkanı Donald Trump gibi popülist başkanlar da dahil olmak üzere pek



çok popülistin üniversite diplomasına sahip olup olmadığını sorgulayan çok sayıda yayın ortaya çıkmıştır.


Sadece yayınlanan belgelerin içeriğinde değil, aynı zamanda üst düzey akademik otoritelerin ve devlet dairelerinin Erdoğan'ın savunmasına müdahalelerinde de tuhaf gerçekler içeren, Erdoğan'ın tüm eğitim biyografisini sorgulayan çok sayıda makale yayınlandı. Erdoğan'ın eğitim biyografisine ilişkin yayınların ve bu biyografi etrafında yayımlanan belgelerin çokluğuna rağmen bugüne kadar konunun tüm yönlerini tek başına kapsayan bir makaleye rastlanmadı.

Bugün bölgesel ve küresel ölçekte ses getiren Erdoğan, en büyük popülistlerden biri olarak kabul ediliyor. Onun iddia ettiği eğitim kariyerindeki büyük boşlukların ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenmesi, onun popülist kişiliğini anlamamıza kesinlikle yardımcı olacaktır.

Bilgi toplarken Türk gazete sitelerinde yayınlanan makalelere baş vuruldu. Erdoğan'ın neredeyse günlük haline gelen konuşmaları dinlendi, Erdoğan'ın politikalarının tartışıldığı çeşitli programlar dinlendi, Erdoğan'ın icraatları takip edildi.

Erdoğan'ın eğitim müfredatının çelişkilerle dolu olduğu, başta mezun olduğu iddia edilen üniversite olmak üzere sertifikalarına ilişkin yayınlanan belgelerde bariz hatalar bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Popülist kişilik açısından bakıldığında, Beş Büyük kişilik özelliğinin tümü olan dışadönüklük, uyumluluk, sorumluluk, açıklık düzeyi ve duygusal istikrar, akademik başarı elde etmiş kişilerin kişilik özellikleriyle tezat oluşturmaktadır (bkz. Tablo 1). Düşük benlik saygısı popülist kişiliğine



aynı zamanda akademik açıdan başarısız olanların kişiliğine de hakimdir. Dolayısıyla düşük benlik saygısının popülist davranışı ve yaklaşımını açıklamada önemli bir rol oynadığı görülmektedir.


Bu makalede Erdoğan'ın eğitim tarihi detaylı bir şekilde ele alınmakta ve popülist psikolojisi hakkında kısa bilgiler verilmektedir.

Önsöz

Erdoğan'ın Türk siyaset sahnesine çıkması ve 1994'te İstanbul Belediye Başkanlığı'nı üstlenmesi, ardından 2002'den bu yana üst üste birçok seçimde ezici zaferlerle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin başbakanlığı ve cumhurbaşkanlığı görevini üstlenmesinden bu yana, Türkiye'de ve uluslararası çevrelerde kişiliğiyle, pervasız dinci popülist politikalarıyla ve kurnazlığıyla sansasyonlara neden olmuştur.

Erdoğan'ın, Türkiye'de Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamını üstlenmenin şartı olan üniversite eğitimi başta olmak üzere, tam bir eğitim biyografisini tamamlaması konusunda şüphe uyandıran özellikleri ve davranışları var. Bu özelliklerden, siyasilerin alışık olmadığı sert sözlerle hükümetlere saldırganlığı, muhalefete hakaret etmesi, çıplak ve naif bir şekilde duyguları kışkırtması, kitleleri yanıltmak için sürekli konuları çarpıtması ve insanları kutuplaştıracak nefret duygularını tahrik edecek çirkin ve asılsız suçlamalar yöneltmesi.

Erdoğan aynı zamanda tutarlılık, açık sözlülük ve dürüstlük gibi toplumsal değerleri baltalayan anormal, mantıksız açıklamalar yapma alışkanlığını da taşıyor. Tipik örnekler şunlardır: "Yasama ve yargı,




benim için ayak bağıdır” (Ankut 2017: 23), “Demokrasi bizim için bir tramvaydır, istediğimiz durağa gelince ineriz” (Köhne 2018); “Egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız milletindir. Bak yalan koskoca bir yalan ... Maddede ve manada egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız Allah’ındır” (Hasanbarsan 2007) ve “Anonim şirketi nasıl yönetiliyorsa, Türkiye de öyle yönetilmelidir” (Bedri Birdirbir 2015).

Erdoğan’ın siyasi zihniyetindeki anormallikler ise bazen hezeyan noktasına varıyor. Nitekim, 1991 yılında Sakarya’nın Geyve şehrinde yaptığı bir konuşmasında şöyle diyor: Değerli kardeşlerim, Dünya yeni bir yol ayrımında bu yeni yol ayrımında ... dört tane kanal var ki ileride bir tane kanalla birleşiyor, bu dört tane ayrı kanalın bir tanesinde Hristiyan alemi dünya var, bir tanesinde Yahudi dünyası var, bir tanesinde ateist dünya var bir tanesinde bir başka buna Şintoizm mi dersiniz bir başka isim mi bir başka din mi dersiniz ne dersiniz deyin bir başka din var ve hepsi ileride birleşiyor hep beraber haçlı dünyasını meydana getiriyorlar. Bunların karşısında ne var bunları karşısın de ne var bunların karşısında İslam dünyası var” (GeyveCom 2021).

İşte Erdoğan’ın zihniyetindeki bazı tuhaflıklar:

- Ortaokul ve üniversite diplomalarını kanıtlamakta büyük zorluklar yaşamasına ve sunduğu belgelerde ciddi hatalar bulunmasına rağmen, uluslararası medyaya konuşsa bile konuşmalarında sürekli olarak ekonomist olduğundan bahsetmektedir (PBS TV 2017).
- Bugün Erdoğan’la birlikte Türkiye’deki rejimin İslamcılığa ve otoriterliğe doğru kaydığı biliniyor (Altınörs & Akçay 2022); demokrasi aşındı, insan hakları ihlalleri arttı ve hatta yargıya olan güven ciddi şekilde azaldı (Örselli & Bilici 2021; Tai 2020). Erdoğan’ın yirmi yılı aşan




iktidarı sırasında bu olumsuzluklar son derece net olmasına rağmen, konuşmalarında Türkiye'de büyük demokratik kalkınma yaptıklarını devamlı vurgulamaktadır. Erdoğan, bir konuşmasında Malcolm X'ten bir alıntı yaparak kendisini şöyle tanımlıyor: “Kim söylerse söylesin ben hakikatten yanayım. Kimin lehine ya da aleyhine olursa olsun adaletten yanayım” (Oder 2021: 473).

Erdoğan'ın sözde üniversite diploması, hatta lise diploması, Türkiye'de iktidara gelmeden önce bile Türk basınında sorgulanıyordu ve hâlâ da sorgulanıyor. Üniversite eğitimi ve lise diplomasına dair güvenilir bir kanıt sunamadı. Aslında eğitim geçmişiyle ilgili medya çevrelerinde ve devlet dairelerinde dolaşan tüm belgeler, hatta eğitim gördüğünü iddia ettiği üniversitenin yayınladığı belgeler bile ciddi hatalar içeriyor.

Popülist, 'yönetim sisteminde radikal değişiklikler yaratmak için kitleleri harekete geçiren politikacı' olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu süreç iki temel faktöre ihtiyaç duyuyor; popülist potansiyele sahip kişi ve kitlelerin istekliliği. Dolayısıyla popülist süreç başlı başına meşru bir süreçtir veya olabilir. Ancak genel olarak popülizmin doğası veya eğilimi ile ilgili nedenlerden dolayı meşruiyet (hukuk) iki alanda ihlal edilmektedir. Birincisi kitleleri harekete geçirecek araçlarda, ikincisi ise değişimin gerçekleştirilmesinde. Sonuçta popülist süreç toplumun istikrarını bozan olumsuz bir süreç haline geliyor. Yani popülizm, kitleleri kullanma araçlarıyla, iktidarı kontrol etme hedefleriyle ve rejim değişikliği gerçekleştirme sonuçlarıyla bütünleşmiş, yapıcı olmayan bir siyasi yaklaşım oluyor.

Dolayısıyla popülizm, popülist bireyin ve toplumun psikolojisine bağlı sosyo-politik bir olgudur. Tipik bir popülist, popülist erişimlerin olumlu




ya da olumsuz olmasına bakılmaksızın, kendisine büyük bir ivme ve hedeflerine ulaşma konusunda büyük bir yetenek kazandıran bir kişiliğe ve psikolojik özelliklere sahiptir. Popülist, kitleleri harekete geçirme ve yönlendirme bağlamında kendi fikirlerini geliştirme sanatında ustadır.

Bastırılmış duygu ve düşüncelerin olağanüstü enerjiye dönüşmesi popülist dürtüyü açıklayabilir. Alfred Adler'in teorisi bu hipotezin tanımlarından birini sağlar; bu, düşük benlik saygısının üstünlük duygusuna dönüşmesi ve bireyin bu üstünlüğü elde etme çabasına dönüşmesidir. Psikolojik savunmanın 'ikame' (Yerine koyma) mekanizması, popülist dürtüler için başka bir açıklama sağlar; böylece düşük özsaygı hissinin (aşağılık kompleksi), kazanma yoluyla daha yüksek özsaygı duygusu arayışıyla yer değiştirebilir. Her iki durumda da, benlik saygısı (özsaygı) bireyde hemen hemen sabit bir durum olduğundan, düşük benlik saygısı hissi, bireyin sürekli olarak bir üstünlük duygusu (yüksek benlik saygısı) aramasını gerektirir; bu aynı zamanda kazanımın sürekliliği olması anlamına da gelir.

Erdoğan'ın eğitim tarihi

Erdoğan, 1960 yılında İstanbul'un Kasımpaşa semtindeki Piyalepaşa I lkokuluna gitti ve 1965'te mezun oldu. Fatih semtindeki İstanbul İmam Hatip Okulu'na (İH) yatılı olarak girdi ve okulu 1973'te tamamladı.

O dönemde İH'de eğitim süresi yedi yıldır ve bu süre iki aşamaya bölünmüştü; dört yıl orta aşama, üç yıl ise lise aşaması. 1971 yılında dört yıllık İH orta aşaması kaldırılarak üç yıllık İH yüksek aşaması dört yıla



çıkarılarak İH eğitiminin süresi dört yıla indirildi. Erdoğan İH okulunu sekiz yılda tamamladı (Çelik 2016: 521). Bu, Erdoğan'ın en az bir yıl başarısız olduğu anlamına geliyor.

O dönemde Türkiye'de İmam Hatip Okulu'ndan alınan diploma, genel lise diplomasına denk değildi. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı elektronik sayfasında yayınlanan resmi biyografisine göre Erdoğan, 1973 yılında Eyyub Lisesi'nde İmam Hatip'ten alınan diplomanın genel diplomaya denkleştirilmesini gerektiren ek ders sınavlarını geçmişti. (Başkanlık web sitesi—bkz. Referanslara).


Cumhurbaşkanlığı internet sitesinde hem Türkçe hem de İngilizce olarak yayınlanan Erdoğan'ın resmi biyografisine göre, 1981 yılında Marmara Üniversitesi'nden mezun olmuştur. Bu, Erdoğan'ın üniversite eğitimini sekiz yılda tamamladığı anlamına gelmektedir (Aynı kaynak).

Erdoğan'ın eğitim (okul) biyografisinin tamamında pek çok belirsizlik var ve dağıtılmak üzere sunduğu belgeleri açıkça geçersiz kılan belirgin kusurlar vardır. Konu şu başlıklar altında incelenebilir:

- Eğitim tarihindeki tutarsızlıklar;
- Eleştiriler ve şikayetler;
- Yayımlanan belgelerdeki eksiklikler ve hatalar.

Eğitim tarihindeki tutarsızlıklar

Eğer Erdoğan'ın İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi'ne girdiği yönündeki iddiası doğruysa, bu akademinin Marmara Üniversitesi'nin




internet sayfasında yayınlanan geçmişine göre Erdoğan bir fakülte değil, bir enstitüde okumuş. Çünkü İstanbul Akademisi, Erdoğan'ın üniversiteye katıldığını iddia ettiği 1972-1974 yılları arasında enstitüler açmış ve bu enstitüler 1977-1978 akademik aşamasında fakültelere dönüşmüştür (Marmara Üniversitesi 2022).

İlginçtir ki Erdoğan üniversite eğitimi hakkında çok az konuştu. Eğitiminin büyük bir kısmına ve yayınladığı belgelere yöneltilen yüzlerce eleştiriye cevap vermemiştir, birkaçına yeterli olmayan verdiği cevaplar dışında. Üstelik İmam Hatip Okulu'ndan aldığı diplomaya denk olacak lisans eğitimi ve sınavları hakkında da net ve güvenilir bir bilgi yok. Bazı kaynaklara göre Erdoğan İmam Hatip okulunda da parlak bir öğrenci değildi (Çakır ve Calmuk 2001: 19).

Türkiye'de her okulun öğrencilerinin tüm notlarını, değerlendirmelerini ve kayıtlarını saklaması alışılmış bir durumdur. Burada ortaya çıkan soru, Erdoğan'ın eğitim gördüğü okulların neden kendisiyle ilgili belgeleri hiç yayınlamadığıdır. Öğrencileri bir ülkenin başkanı olan veya başka bir yüksek görev üstlenen okulların, o öğrencinin karnelerini, okul notlarını, sertifikalarını büyük bir gururla yayınlayacağı bilinmektedir. Bunun diğer Türk siyasetçilerle bunun olmasına rağmen Erdoğan'la bu gerçekleşmedi.

Erdoğan'ın eğitimiyle ilgili yayımlanan bilgilerden 1973 yılında İmam Hatip Okulu'ndan mezun olduğu, diplomasını denkleştirmek için çalışıp sınavları geçtiği, ardından üniversite sınavlarına çalıştığı, sınavları geçip aynı yıl diğer kaynaklara göre ertesi yıl üniversiteye girdi. Bu aşamalar çok fazla hazırlık, resmi çalışma süresi ve aslında aynı yıl veya bir yılda tamamlanamayacak birçok sınav gerektirir. İmam Hatip




diplomasının genel lise diplomasına eşleştirilmesi için Erdoğan'ın Eyüp Lisesi'nde bir yıl daha ders alması ve sınavları geçmesi gerekiyordu. Dolayısıyla 1973 hatta 1974 yılında Erdoğan'ın üniversiteye girmesi mümkün değildir (Birgün 2021).


Üstelik İmam Hatip Okulu kayıtlarına göre Erdoğan, o dönemde Arapça ve Kur'an derslerinde final sınavlarında başarılı olamamıştı, bu da o dönemde ek süre gerektiriyordu (Dundar 2007). Ancak ne Erdoğan tarafından ne de başka bir güvenilir kaynaktan Erdoğan'ın Eyyüp Lisesi'nden denklik diploması aldığını kanıtlayan tek bir belge sunulmadı.

Erdoğan iddia ettiği üniversite eğitimini sekiz yılda tamamlamışken, o zamanki Üniversite Kanunu'nun 54. maddesine göre üniversite öğrencisi, resmi eğitim süresinin bir buçuk katı sürede mezun olmazsa üniversiteyle ilişkisi kesiliyordu. İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Enstitüsü'ndeki öğrenim süresi üç yıldır ve hatta Erdoğan'ın iddia ettiği gibi eğitim süresi dört yıl olsa bile Erdoğan'ın fakülteden ihraç edilmesi gerekirdi (Sözcü 2016; Cumhuriyet 2015). Erdoğan'ın Türkiye Anayasasını değiştirmek için yeterli parlamento yetkisini elde etmesi üzerine cumhurbaşkanı adayının üniversite eğitimine ilişkin maddenin dört yıl şartı kaldırılarak değiştirildiğini belirtmek gerekir (İleri Haber sitesi 2016).

Erdoğan, Aksaray Ticari İlimler Fakültesi'nden 1981 yılında mezun olduğunu iddia ediyor. Ancak Erdoğan'ın bu çalışmaya katılıp tamamladığı konusunda güvenilir bir kanıt bulunmuyor ve Erdoğan'ın eğitim aşamaları hakkında yayımlanan belgeler hatalarla dolu (Ekte Fotoğraf 1-5). İşte Erdoğan'ın iddialarını çürüten bazı notlar:



- Türk siyasetçileri ve Türk basını, üniversitede okurken çektiği iddia edilen tek bir fotoğrafı bile yayınlaması için Erdoğan'a meydan okumasına rağmen ne Erdoğan ne de okul arkadaşları tarafından üniversitedeyken çekilmiş hiçbir fotoğrafı yayınlanmadı.
- Erdoğan'ın Aksaray Ticari İlimler Fakültesi'nden mezun olmasıyla ilgili yeterli ve güvenilir bilgi veren Erdoğan'ın bir okul arşadaı yoktur.
- Birçok öğrenci aynı fakülteden ve aynı akademik dönemde mezun oldu ve öğrenimleri sırasında Erdoğan'ı tanımadıklarını söylüyorlar (Çolasan 2014).
- Erdoğan görsel-işitsel basında ilkökul dönemini ve İmam Hatip Lisesi'ndeki eğitimini coşkulu bir şekilde anlatıyor ancak üniversite hayatından hiç bahsetmiyor. Özellikle kendisine bağılı medyada yer alan televizyon programlarında kendisiyle röportaj yapanların, ilk ve orta okul aşamalarını ele almalarına rağmen üniversite hayatıyla ilgili kendisine soru sormamaları dikkat çekicidir (Beyaz TV 2013).
- Kendisine yöneltilen en basit eleştiriden dolayı binlerce dava açan Erdoğan, mezuniyet belgelerinin sahte olduğunu yazan, söyleyen çok sayıda olan hiç kimseye dava açmadı.
- 11 Aralık 2007'den 11 Aralık 2011'e kadar görev yaptığı Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu'nun eski başkanı Yusuf Ziya Özcan, Konseyin başkanırken Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasını aradığını ama bulamadığını söyledi (Duvar 2023).
- Refah Partisi'nin 1994 dosyalarına göre, Erdoğan partinin adayı olup İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı seçimini kazandığında, Erdoğan "1974-1975" döneminde üniversiteye gittiği ve 1979'da mezun olmdüğü belirtilmektedir. Ancak Erdoğan 1981'de mezun olduğunu iddia ediyor. (Odatv 2016).




Erdoğan'ın sigorta kayıtları fakültede okuduğunu iddia ettiği yıllarda İstanbul Elektrik Tramvay ve Tünel İşletmeleri'nde (IETT) tam zamanlı çalıştığını gösteriyor (Yalçın 2014: 57; Odatv 2015).

Cumhurbaşkanlığı internet sitesinde yayınlanan Erdoğan'ın biyografisinin İngilizce versiyonunda Erdoğan'ın İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi'nden mezun olduğu belirtilirken (Cumhurbaşkanlığı internet sitesi İngilizcedir), aynı sitedeki Türkçe versiyonunda ise İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi olan başka bir uzmanlıktan bahsedilmektedir (Cumhurbaşkanlığı web sitesi Türkçe; bkz. Fotoğraf 10).

Eleştiriler ve şikayetler

Cumhurbaşkanları ve başbakanların eğitim aşamalarına ilişkin değerlendirmeleri, öğretmenlerin izlenimleri, raporları ve aldıkları notlar kendileri tarafından ya da resmi ya da gayri resmi kaynaklar tarafından açıklanmış olsa da Erdoğan'da bunlar olmadı. Erdoğan'ın iddia edilen üniversite diplomasına ilişkin üç belge yayımlandı (Fotoğraf 1, 2, 4), bunlardan ikisi Marmara Üniversitesi'nin iki rektörü tarafından onaylandı, diğeri ise Türk basınında yayınlandı. Bütün bu belgeler bariz ve ciddi hatalar içermektedir.

Erdoğan'ın eğitim sertifikalarının meşruluğuna ilişkin şüpheler, Erdoğan'ın Türk Anayasasında değişiklik yapma girişimleriyle ve kendisini cumhurbaşkanı adayı ilan ettiğinde her zaman gündeme geldi. Bunlardan ilki 2007 yılında Profesör Ergun Özbudun'un Erdoğan'a özel bir anayasa hazırladığını açıklamasıydı (Odatv 2014). Bu




açıklamadan sonra anayasa değişikliği konuşmaları durduğunda onunla birlikte Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına sahip olmadığı tartışması da sona erdi.

2014 yılında Erdoğan'ın cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimine adaylığını açıklamasıyla birlikte Erdoğan'ın üniversite mezunu olup olmadığı tartışmaları yeniden alevlendi. Bu sorunun önemli olmasının nedenise, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığına aday olmanın temel şartlarından biri dört yıllık üniversite mezunu olmaktır.

Çok sayıda şikâyet arasında yanıtız kalan Milletvekili Ali Öztürk'ün TBMM Başkanlığı'na sunduğu meclis sorgusu talebiydi (Birgün 2016). Bir diğer Milletvekili Barış Yarkadaş ise konuyla ilgili şunları söyledi: “Davutoğlu'na (Başbakan) sordum yanıt gelmedi. Marmara Üniversitesi'ne bilgi edinme için başvurdum. Bana bu konuda bir önceki dönem milletvekili olan Ali Rıza Öztürk'e yanıt verdiklerini ve konunun alenileştiğini söylediler. Ama maalesef yanıt gayet muğlak. Bilgi Edinme Üst Kurulu'na başvurdum. Bu ayın 12'si ya da 15'inde yanıt gelmesini bekliyorum” (Hacaloğlu 2016).

Erdoğan'ın üniversite mezunu olup olmadığı yönündeki tartışmalara ilk resmi yanıt, bu tür konulara müdahale etme sorumluluğu olmayan bir kaynaktan geldi. 24 Nisan 2014'te konuya müdahale eden Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Zafer Gül, Erdoğan'ın üniversite mezunu olmadığını iddia eden siyasilere ve medyaya tepki olarak kişisel Twitter hesabından bir açıklama yaptı. Gül, Erdoğan'ın geçici mezuniyet belgesi adını verdiği, sahte olduğu konusunda net izlenim veren kusur ve eksiklikler içeren belgeyi (Fotoğraf 1) yayınladı. Bilinmelidir ki Rektör Zafer Gül, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AKP) Erdoğan'dan sonra



ikinci otoritesi ve dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül tarafından atanmıştır. (Fırat 2016; Odatv 2014, 2015).


İstanbul Beşinci Anadolu Ceza Mahkemesi, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına ilişkin daha fazla soruşturma yapılmasını önlemek amacıyla 18 Temmuz 2014'te Marmara Üniversitesi'nin sertifika arşivine erişimin engellenmesine karar verdi (Birgun 2016).

Bu arada, dönemin Milli Hareket Partisi Meclis Grup Başkanvekili Profesör Yusuf Halaçoğlu, rektör Gül'ün yayınladığı Erdoğan'ın geçici mezuniyet belgesini (Fotoğraf 1) ve Erdoğan'ın diplomasının bir duplikatasını yayınladı (Fotoğraf 2 ve 3). Aksaray İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi, Ticari Bilimler enstitüsünde eğitim süresinin üç yıl olduğunu ve bu durumun Erdoğan'ı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı olmaya uygun hale getirmediğini vurguladı (Sözcü 2016B).

Erdoğan'ın hayatıyla ilgili çeşitli makaleler ve bir kitap yazar araştırmacı yazar Ergün Poyraz, 17 Eylül 2015'te ilk kez Erdoğan'ın diplomasının başka bir duplikatasını (Fotoğraf 4, 5) yayınladı ve Erdoğan'a ait yayınlanan her üç belgenin (Photo 1, 2, 4) ne zaman, neden ve nasıl düzenlendiklerini anlattı (Odatv 2015).

10 Haziran 2016'da Erdoğan'ın iddia edilen üniversite diplomasının bu ikinci duplikatası (Foto 4) Halkların Demokratik Partisi'nin (HDP) Twitter hesabında şu notla yayınlandı: "Başvurumuz üzerine, YSK tarafından iletilen noter onaylı diploma örneğini paylaşıyoruz" (HDP 2016).

Halkın Kurtuluş Partisi, 28 Eylül 2015'te yüksek seçim kuruluna, Erdoğan'ın sahte üniversite diplomasına dayanarak Erdoğan'ın cumhurbaşkanlığı




seimlerine adaylıđını onayladıđı gerekesiyle cumhurbaşkanının görevden alınmasını talep eden bir başvuru yaptı. (Sözcü 2015).

Erdoğan'a üniversite diplomasını ibraz etme zorunluluđu ve geçersiz kılabacak hatalar içeren belgelerinin doğruluğunun kanıtlanması konusunda devlet kurumlarına iletilen resmi ve gayri resmi şikâyetlerin hiçbirini makul bir şekilde yanıtlanmadı.

Erdoğan'ın, Türkiye'nin laik sistemine İslami bir zihniyetin dayatmaya yönelik adımlarını hızlandırması ve despotluđa doğru sabit yürüyüşüyle birlikte, 2016 yılında Erdoğan kendi yetkilerini büyük ölçüde artırmak amacıyla Türk Anayasasını başkanlık diktatörlüğüne doğru deđiştirme hazırlıklarına başladı.

Türk medyasında ve Türk siyasetiler ve aydınlar arasında Erdoğan'ın üniversite diploması olup olmadığı ve Erdoğan'ın yayınlanmış ve devlet dairelerine sunduđu belgelere ilişkin şüpheler yeniden alevlendi. Bir kez daha, milletvekillerinin Meclis Başkanlığı'na yaptığı şikâyetler de dahil olmak üzere, Erdoğan'ın belgelerinin meşruluğunun teyit edilmesi için yetkili makamlara şikâyetler iletilmeye başlandı; örneđin:


- Nisan 2016'da Ankara Milletvekili Ali Haydar Hakverdi, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına ilişkin bilgi almak için Marmara Üniversitesi yönetimine talepte bulundu. Haziran 2016'da Hakverdi, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasının geçerliliđine ilişkin yeniden meclis soruşturması talebinde bulundu (Birgun 2016).
- Haziran 2016'da İstanbul milletvekili Barış Yarkadaş, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasının geçerliliđine ilişkin meclis soruşturması talebinde bulundu (Hacalođlu 2016).



- Haziran 2016'da Türkiye Hakimler ve Savcılar Birliği eski başkanı Ömer Faruk Eminağaoğlu, Erdoğan'ın konseye sunduğu üniversite diplomasının araştırılması için yüksek seçim kuruluna talepte bulundu. Kurul oybirliğiyle talebi reddetti (Sözcü 2016C).
- Aynı ay Eminağaoğlu, Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü'ne yasa dışı davranış, görev gereklerini yerine getirmeme ve görevi kötüye kullanma suçlamasıyla dava açtı (Cumhuriyet 2016).
- Temmuz 2017'de Halkın Kurtuluş Partisi, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın üniversite belgesinde sahtecilik yapıldığı iddiasını Anayasa Mahkemesi'ne taşıdı (HKP 2017). Parti ayrıca, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına ilişkin bilgi almak üzere, başta Marmara Üniversitesi olmak üzere çeşitli makamlara çeşitli taleplerde bulundu.

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Tur Yıldız Biçer, 10 Ekim 2016'da Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı'na gensoru sundu ve şu soruyu sordu: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın yedek subay olarak görev yapapması için Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ne sunduğu diploma nedir? Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı soruyla ilgili belgelerin imha edildiği yanıtını verdi (Haber sitesi 2016; bkz. Ekteki Fotoğraf 6).

Ya hemen reddedildi ya da konunun soruşturulamayacağına dair mazeretler sunularak, tüm şikayetler sonuçsuz kaldı. Ardından, 30 Nisan 2018'de Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, cumhurbaşkanlığı ve parlamento seçimlerine aday olanların üniversite diplomasını noterden tasdik etme zorunluluğunu kaldırdığında, Erdoğan'ın diplomasının incelenmesini engelleyen yasal adım geldi. Çünkü Erdoğan'ın yasal olarak belgelenmiş bir üniversite diploması yoktu. 2 Mayıs 2018'de milletvekili Mehmet Tüm, meclis tartışmasında şu soruyu sordu "Yüksek Seçim Kurulu'nun



bu kararı Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan lehine mi alındı?” (Ahval 2018; bkz. Ekteki Fotoğraf 7).

Erdoğan'ın yayınlanan belgelerindeki eksiklikler ve hatalar


Görünen o ki Erdoğan'ın çok gerekli olmadıkça ve uzmanlık alanı dışında olmadıkça mezuniyet belgesine ihtiyacı yoktu ve her defasında bir önceki belgeden başka bir belge sunmuştur. Ayrıca Erdoğan'ın zorunlu askerlik zamanı geldiğinde ilk kez mezuniyet belgesine ihtiyaç duyduğu, askerlik süresini kısaltmak ve yedek subay olabilmek için sözde geçici mezuniyet belgesi getirdiği de görülüyor (Foto 1). Daha sonra Erdoğan iki kez daha mezuniyet belgesi getirmiştir. İlki 1994 yılında İstanbul belediye başkanlığına aday olduğunda ve ilk duplikatayı getirdi (Fotoğraf 2). İkincisi ise Erdoğan'ın 2014 yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti cumhurbaşkanlığına aday olmayı planladığı zamandı ve o zaman ikinci duplikatayı getirdi (Foto 4).

Erdoğan'ın üniversiteden mezun olmasına ilişkin yayımlanan belgeler şunlar:

1. Geçici mezuniyet belgesi;
2. İlk duplikata;
3. İkinci duplikata.

1. Geçici Mezuniyet Belgesi (Fotoğraf 1)


Bu belge, Nisan 2016'da ciddi hatalar içermesine rağmen Erdoğan'ın geçici mezuniyet belgesi olduğunu iddia eden Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Zafer Gül tarafından sunuldu.



Geçici Mezuniyet Belgesi bir üniversite diploması değildir, daha doğrusu orijinal diploması henüz tamamlanmamış bir sertifikaya ihtiyacı olan mezuna verilen bir belgedir. Geçici Mezuniyet Belgesi, Marmara Üniversitesi'ne göre altı ay süreyle geçerlidir (Marmara Üniversitesi 2023, Marmara Üniversitesi 2018). Geçici mezuniyet belgesinin verildiği kurumun, verildiğinde belgenin aslını talep etmesi olağandır.

Bu belge rektör Gül tarafından yayımlanmadan önce kimsenin bundan haberi yoktu. Bu belgenin orijinal kopyasına gelince, onu kimse görmedi. Eylül 2015'te Ulusal Parti genel başkanı ve gazeteci Gökçe Fırat, Erdoğan'ın bu belgeyi yedek subay olarak askerlik görevini yerine getirmek için kullanmış olabileceğini yazmıştı, aksi halde muvazzaf asker olarak görev yapması gerekiyordu (Fırat 2016). Yukarıda da belirttiğimiz gibi Milletvekili Bicer, TBMM Başkanlığı'na Erdoğan'ın askerlik için hangi üniversite diplomasını kullandığının araştırılması yönünde talepte bulunmuş, ancak bu talepten bir sonuca varılamamıştı.

Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü bu belgenin gerçekliğini savundu. Bu tür belgelerin (sertifikaların), özellikle de başbakan gibi üst düzey devlet görevlilerine ilişkin belgelerin geçerliliğini savunmanın üniversite rektörünün sorumluluğunda olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Her ülkede, resmî belgelerin gerçekliğini doğrulamaktan veya belgelerdeki sahtekarlıkları tespit etmekten sorumlu uzmanlaşmış kurumlar bulunmaktadır. Yukarıda da değinildiği üzere Hakimler ve Savcılar Birliği'nin eski başkanlarından biri bu bağlamda Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü'ne dava açmıştı (Cumhuriyet 2016). Ayrıca belgede birçok ciddi




hata bulunmaktadır ve üniversite rektörü iddiasını doğrulayacak herhangi bir kanıt sunmadı.

Gül, herhangi bir kaynağa başvurmadan Erdoğan'ın üniversitede 4 yıl okuduğunu belirtti. Buna karşın Türk akademik otoriteleri Erdoğan'ın eğitim süresinin üç yıl olduğu bir enstitüde eğitim gördüğünü iddia ediyor (Sözcü 2016B; Cumhuriyet 2016B).

Erdoğan'ın aynı fakültede sınıf arkadaşı olduğunu iddia eden bir diğer Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Muhammed Emin Arat ise otobiyografisinde Erdoğan gibi Marmara Üniversitesi'nden mezun olduğunu değil, İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi'nden mezun olduğunu yazıyor. (Arat Biyografi, Marmara Üniversitesi web sitesi).

Erdoğan'ın bu geçici mezuniyet belgesindeki önemli hatalara gelince, özellikle başka bir orijinal belgeyle karşılaştırıldığında (Foto 8):

- Belgenin tasarımı ve başlığı, geçici mezuniyet belgesinin tasarımı veya başlığı değil, normal mezuniyet belgesinin tasarımı ve başlığıdır. Geçici mezuniyet belgesinin geçici mezuniyet belgesi başlığıyla ve başka bir tasarımla olması gerekmektedir (Zileli 2023).
- Bu belgenin üzerinde Erdoğan'ın el yazısıyla "Geçici mezuniyet belgemin aslını elden aldım" ibaresi yer alıyor ve bu ibare Erdoğan'ın imzasıyla imzalanıyor. Belge sahibinin herhangi bir geçici mezuniyet belgesine bu tür ifadeler yazması hukuka aykırı olduğu gibi, yazının içeriği de yanlıştır. 'Geçici mezuniyet belgesinin aslı' diye bir belge yoktur.
- Böyle bir belgede zorunlu olan belgenin sahibinin (Erdoğan) fotoğrafı bulunmamaktadır.



- Belgeyi veren okulun damgası bulunmamaktadır. Bu aynı zamanda zorunludur.
- Dekanın imzası sahtedir.


2016 yılının ortalarında Erdoğan yanlısı basın, Erdoğan'ın askerliği sırasında çekildiğini iddia ederek, bir grup yedek subay arasında yedek subay üniformasıyla çekilmiş bir dizi fotoğraf yayınladı. Erdoğan'ın bu fotoğraflarını yayınlamanın amacı, Türk kamuoyunu bunların Erdoğan'ın dört yıllık üniversite mezunu olduğunun kanıtı olduğuna inandırmaktı (Gökdemir 2016).

Tekrarlamak gerekirse Erdoğan askere gittiğinde geçici mezuniyet belgesini kullanmıştı (Fırat 2016). Erdoğan'ın geçici mezuniyet belgesine göre, İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Fakültesi'nden 3 Nisan 1981'de mezun olmuş, 1982 yılının Mart ayında askere gitmiştir (Yalçın 2014: 86). Bu, Erdoğan'ın askere gittiğinde geçici mezuniyet belgesinin artık geçerli olmadığı anlamına geliyor. Yukarıda belirtildiği gibi geçici mezuniyet belgesi yalnızca altı ay geçerlidir (Marmara Üniversitesi 2018).

Yukarıda sunulan gerçeklere göre Erdoğan'a ait olan bu geçici mezuniyet belgesi geçersizdir ve sahtedir.

2. İlk duplikata (Fotoğraf 2, 3)

Marmara Üniversitesi'ne göre duplikata tanımı şu şekildedir: "Asıl sertifikanın kaybolması, yırtılması veya kullanılamaz hale gelecek derecede hasar görmesi halinde, yeni bir formatta yeni tasarımda duplikata düzenlenir. Diploma numarasının aslının kopyanın üzerine yazılması



gerekmektedir. Duplikata başvurusunda bulunacak adayların, mezunlara ait iki adet fotoğraf ve hasar görmüş veya yırtılmış sertifikalarını eklemeleri gerekmektedir. Duplikata'nın imza ve onay kısmına imza sahiplerinin adresi, adı, soyadı ve mesleği, asıl belgede olduğu gibi imzasız olarak yazılır" (Arat Biyografi, Marmara Üniversitesi 2018).


Bu duplikata 2014'te ortaya çıkmış, araştırmacı yazar Ergun Poyraz Eylül 2015'te Facebook ve Twitter hesaplarında bu duplikatayı yayınlayarak ne zaman ve neden düzenlendiğini açıkladı. Poyraz'a ve çeşitli kaynaklara göre 1994 yılında Erdoğan'ın kazandığı İstanbul belediye başkanlığı seçimlerinde kullanılmak üzere bu duplikata hazırlanmıştır (Poyraz 2015).

Erdoğan'ın bu ilk üniversite diploma duplikatasında birkaç önemli hatalar vardır:

- Erdoğan, bu duplikatada yazıldığı gibi ne Marmara Üniversitesi'nden ne de Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi'nden mezun olmuştur. Erdoğan'ın geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesinde yazılan 1981'de, Marmara Üniversitesi kurulmamıştı.

Üstelik Erdoğan iddia ettiği gibi gerçekten bir fakülteden mezun olmuşsa, kendi sunduğu geçersiz Geçici mezuniyet belgesine göre, İdari Bilimler Fakültesi'nden değil, Marmara Üniversitesi'nden değil, İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi ticari bilimler fakültesi'nden mezun olmuştur (Fotoğraf 1).

Görünen o ki, Belediye başkanlığı ve siyasi alan idarecilik alanları olduğu için, idarecilik uzmanlığı Erdoğan'a daha uygun görülmüştür; böylece ticaret uzmanlığının yerini idarecilik uzmanlığı konulmuştur.




- Mezunlara, Marmara Üniversitesi şartları uyarınca üniversite diplomasının duplikatasının verilmesi:

- o Orijinal sertifikanın kaybolması, yırtılması veya kullanılmaz hale gelecek kadar hasar görmüş olması gerekmektedir. Birinci ihtimalde belge aslının kaybolduğu haberinin o tarihte bir gazetede yayımlanması, ikinci ihtimalde ise zarar görmüş belge aslının ibraz edilmesi gerekmektedir. Her iki durumda da Erdoğan'ın gerekli delilleri sağladığına dair bir bilgi yok.
- o Orijinal sertifika numarasının duplikatada yazılması gerekmektedir. Ama Erdoğan'ın orijinal belgesi yok. Hatta bu duplikatadaki numara bile Erdoğan'ın üniversite eğitimi aldığı iddiasıyla sunduğu tek belge olan geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesindeki numarayla aynı değil.
- o Sertifika sahibinin duplikatada fotoğrafı bulunmalıdır. Bu duplikatada Erdoğan'ın fotoğrafı yok.
- o Orijinal belgenin imza ve onay bölümlerine imza sahiplerinin adresi, adı, soyadı ve mesleği imzasız olarak duplikatada yazılmalıdır. Ancak:
 - İmzacıların adresini, adını, soyadını ve mesleğini gösteren orijinal bir belgenin Erdoğan'da bulunmamaktadır;
 - Erdoğan'ın bu duplikatasındaki rektör ve dekanın isimleri, Erdoğan'ın kanuna aykırı bir şekilde orijinal belgesi olarak kullandığı geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesindeki isimlerle aynı değildir.

3. İkinci duplikata (Fotoğraf 4, 5)

Erdoğan'ın neden ikinci bir duplikataya ihtiyaç duyduğu belli değil. İlk duplikata ile bu duplikata arasındaki yalnız iki temel fark vardır, tasarım




farkı ve bu ikinci duplikatada fakülte dekanı ve üniversite rektörünün imzalarının bulunmasıdır. Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi, Marmara Üniversitesi'ne göre duplikata üzerinde imza bulunmaması gerekmektedir.

3 Haziran 2016'da Marmara Üniversitesi İkinci Rektörü Mehmet Emin Arat, üniversitenin internet sitesinde kendi imzasını taşıyan dört sayfalık bir bildiri yayınlayarak Erdoğan'ın neredeyse eksiksiz, birçok çelişki ve yanlışlık içeren eğitim biyografisini sundu. Açıklamada Erdoğan'ın iddia edilen üniversite diplomasına ilişkin belgelerin gerçekliği Arat tarafından desteklendi. Arat'a göre bu kopya 1 Nisan 2011'de (Arat 2016) verilmiştir.

Erdoğan'ın eğitim kariyerine ilişkin bu kapsamlı raporun yazımına, Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Mehmet Emin Arat'la birlikte Erdoğan'ın da katıldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Çünkü Arat, Erdoğan hakkındaki raporunu yayınladığında, Erdoğan Marmara Üniversitesi'ndeydi ve orada konuşma yaptı. Erdoğan konuşmasında sanki üniversitenin akademik kadrosuna her ne şekilde olursa olsun kendisine üniversite diploması hazırlamalarını emrediyormuş gibi konuştu. Erdoğan'ın söyledikleri şöyle: "Bugünlerde diploması var mı yok mu diye tartışma başlattılar. Arşivden çıkartın şunları, yayınlayacak mısınız ne yapacaksınız yapın da zaten benim söylediklerime inanmıyorlar. Belki rektör çıkarsa yayınlarlar. Okulumuz zaten gereken açıklamayı yaptı" (T24 2016).

Ayrıca üniversite rektörü (Arat), açıklamasında Erdoğan'ın üniversite mezuniyeti iddiasıyla ilgili verdiği bazı spesifik bilgilere de yer verdi. Açıklamada, Erdoğan'ın eğitim biyografisine ilişkin birçok ayrıntılı ve özel bilgilere de yer verildi; zira bu bilgiler yalnızca kişinin yakınları




tarafından bilinebilir ya da bizzat kişi bu bilgiyi doğrudan diğerine verir (Aynı kaynak).

Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasının bu ikinci duplikatası 2011 yılında hazırlandığında, Nisan 2014'te ilk açıklamayı yayınlayan ve Erdoğan'ın şüpheli belgelerinin doğruluğunu destekleyen Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Zafer Gül'dü. Gül'ün o dönemdeki vekili, 2014 yılında Marmara Üniversitesi rektörü atanan ve Erdoğan'ın iddia edilen belgelerinin gerçekliğini destekleyen ikinci uzun açıklamayı Haziran 2016'da yayınlayan Mehmet Emin Arat'tı. Üniversite rektörlerinin atamalarının ağırlıklı olarak Erdoğan tarafından yapıldığını ve halen de yapılmakta olduğunu unutulmamalıdır.

Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Muhammed Emin Arat'ın, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına sahip olduğu iddiasıyla ilgili açıklamasına ilişkin bazı yorumlar şöyle:

- Arat, Erdoğan'ın eğitime yönelik tüm eleştirileri asılsız ve gerçeklerle çelişkili olarak nitelendirdi. Arat, eski üniversite rektörü Zafer Gül'ün açıklamasında olduğu gibi iddialarını destekleyecek veya Erdoğan'ın tüm eğitim aşamalarına yönelik çok sayıda ciddi eleştirinin geçersizliğini kanıtlayacak hiçbir kanıt sunmadı.
- Arat, Erdoğan'ın 41 dersten iyi bir notla mezun olduğunu iddia etti. Bu durum, Erdoğan'ın eğitimini sekiz yılda tamamladığı gerçeğiyle çelişiyor. Arat, iddiasını kanıtlayacak herhangi bir belge de vermedi ve böyle bir iddiayı destekleyen hiçbir yayın, tarafsız ya da bağımsız bir kaynak da yok.
- Arat, Erdoğan'ın ticari bölümden değil, idari bölümden mezun olduğunu söylüyor. Bu doğru değil. Arat'ın bizzat dayandığı ve



Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına ilişkin diğer tüm belgelerin dayandığı geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesine göre Erdoğan'ın Ticari İlimler Bölümü'nden mezun olduğu kanıtlanıyor (Foto 1).

- İlk duplikatada olduğu gibi bu duplikatada adı geçen rektör ve dekan isimleri, Erdoğan'ın geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesindeki isimlerle aynı değildir.


- Erdoğan'ın Arat'ın kendisiyle aynı fakülteden mezun olduğunu iddia ettiği biliniyor. Arat, Erdoğan'ın eğitim biyografisinde Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi'nden mezun olduğunun belirtilmesini savunuyor. Ancak Arat'ın kendisi kendi biyografisinde İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi mezunu olduğunu yazıyor (Arat biyografisi).

- 2011 yılında, Marmara Üniversitesi, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasının bir takım önemli hatalar içeren bu ikinci duplikatasını verdiğinde, Arat üniversitenin Rektör Yardımcısıydı (Aynı kaynak).

- Arat'ın 2013 yılında Marmara Üniversitesi'nde Rektör Yardımcısı olduğu dönemde, üniversite Erdoğan'a siyasal bilimler alanında fahri doktora unvanı vermişti.

- Erdoğan, 2014 yılında Arat'ı Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü olarak atadı (Aynı kaynak).

Erdoğan'ın bu ikinci duplikatası, noter tarafından tasdik edildi. Ancak bu tasdik, orijinal belge görünmeden yapılamaz. Çünkü tasdik ederken noterin asıl belgeyi görmesi ve tasdik belgesinin arkasına asıl belge ile aynı olduğunu yazması gerekiyor. Ancak asıl belge olmadan noter, tasdik belgesinin üzerine "Aslının aynısı gibidir" yazarak duplikatayı tasdik etmiştir.




Türkiye Noterler Birliği, bu ikinci duplikatayı tasdik eden noterlik çalışanına uyarı cezası verdi. Erdoğan, hatalarla dolu ve hukuka aykırı olarak noter tarafından tasdik edilen bu duplikatayı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı adayı olarak yüksek seçim kuruluna sundu ve kurul tarafından kabuledildi. Erdoğan'ın adaylığının reddedilmesi veya belgelerinin gerçekliğinin araştırılması talebiyle yüksek seçim kuruluna sunulan tüm şikâyetler yanıtsız kalmıştır (Cumhuriyet 2019).

Öte yandan herhangi bir belgenin noterde tasdik edilmesi için belge sahibinin ya belgeyi notere kendisinin götürmesi ya da işlemi tamamlaması için vekaletini başka bir kişiye vermesi gerekir. Bu iki olasılığın gerçekleştiğine dair hiçbir kanıt yoktur. Erdoğan'ın belgesinin bu duplikatasını tasdik etmek için notere götüren kişi ise Erdoğan'ın makam müdürü şoförü Hasan Doğan'dı (Cumhuriyet 2019B).

Erdoğan'ın üniversite belgesinin ilk duplikatasının (Fotoğraf 2, 3) Marmara Üniversitesi dışında hukuka aykırı olarak hazırlandığı anlaşılıyor; aksi takdirde, Marmara Üniversitesi ikinci kez duplikata (Fotoğraf 4, 5) hazırlamazdı ya da Erdoğan'ın eğitimi hakkında detaylı bilgi veren Marmara Üniversitesi rektörleri bu duplikataya atıfta bulunurdu. Üstelik ilk duplikatanın tasarımı Marmara Üniversitesi duplikata tasarımı değildir.

Başka bir belge (Fotoğraf 9)

İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Ticari İlimler Fakültesi 1980-1981 yılı mezunları rehberi (Oda TV 2016b).




Mezunlar Rehberi, öğrencinin üniversite hayatına ilişkin tam adı, öğrenim dönemleri tarihleri, üniversiteye giriş tarihi ve mezuniyet tarihi, öğrenci sayısı, kısa notlarla birlikte öğrenci fotoğrafları, davranış ve kişiliklerine ilişkin açıklamalar gibi detaylı bilgileri içermektedir. Rehberde ayrıca rehber hazırlama komitesi üyelerinin isimleri, rektör, fakülte dekanı, rektör yardımcıları ve öğretim elemanlarının isimleri de yer alıyor.

Erdoğan, üniversite hayatını kimsenin bilmemesinin ve kendisini üniversitede görmemesinin nedeni olarak Türkiye'nin 1970'lerdeki kaotik durumunu bahane olarak kullanmıştır. Ancak, mezunlar rehberinde bir öğrencinin fakülteye devamlılığının nasıl olduğu gibi bilgiler arasında; "Okula ara sıra geldi", "Okulu ihmal etti", "Okula sadece sınav günlerinde geldi" ve "Okula ve çalışmaya birlikte devam etti" gibi bilgiler yer alıyor.

Mart 2016'da Türk gazeteleri, Erdoğan'ın mezun olduğunu iddia ettiği fakültenin ve mezun olduğu yıl olan 1981'in mezunlar rehberini yayınladı. İçinde Erdoğan hakkında hiçbir bilgi yoktu.

Rehberde, okul içinde ve dışında, öğretim görevlileriyle birlikte, okul gezilerinde ve spor takımlarında farklı eğitim aşamalarındaki öğrencilerin farklı resimleri bulunmaktadır. Erdoğan bu fotoğraflarda bile yok. Erdoğan futbola olan ilgisi, profesyonelliği ve Türkiye ikinci Ligi'ndeki futbol takımlarına katılmasıyla tanınıyor. Ancak okulun futbol takımı fotoğraflarında bile yok. Rehberde özellikle hiçbir öğrencinin dışarıda bırakılmadığı belirtiliyor.



Popülist psikoloji

Son yirmi yılda dünya genelinde çok sayıda popülist ortaya çıktı; Bazıları güçlü popülist davranışlara sahip ve iktidara gelmeyi başardılar; bazıları uzun yıllar iktidarda kaldı, birçoğu da hâlâ iktidarda. Ülkelerinin yönetim sistemlerinde radikal değişiklikler yaptılar, bazen de alt üst ettiler.

Yıllardan beri akademik camia ve küresel medya yoğun bir şekilde popülizmi ve popülist liderleri olumsuz anlamlarıyla tartışıyor. Popülist yaklaşımın temelinde onu alışlagelmiş siyaset yapma tarzından saptıran faktörler var.


Popülizm, esas olarak bir lidere ve duyguların kullanılmasına dayanan bir siyasal yaklaşımdır. Popülizmde büyük kitlelerin desteğinin sağlanmasında ve sürdürülmesinde tek kişi birincil rolü oynuyor. Tek lidere güvenmek ve duyguları istismar etmek çoğu zaman şu sonuçlara yol açar:

- Kitlelere hitap etmedeki sapmalar

Bu kadar büyük kitlelerin desteğine sahip olmak halka hitap etmekte sapmaları kaçınılmaz kılıyor, örneğin toplulukları kutuplaştırmak (Roberts 2021) ve ulusal, dini, vatansever duyguları veya ekonomik açıdan dezavantajlı olanların yoksulluktan kaynaklanan şikâyetlerini istismar etmek.

- Yetkinin kötüye kullanılması

Bu kadar çok kitlelerin desteğini sürdürmek ve ülkenin siyasi sisteminde köklü değişiklikler yapmak, gücün kötüye kullanılmasını kaçınılmaz kılıyor.




Popülist davranışın başka birçok olumsuzlukları da vardır:

- Yanıltıcı ifadeler ve dezenformasyon popülist söylemin merkezinde yer almaktadır (Heinrich 2017);
- Popülist, nefret söylemi, küfür ve keyfi yorumlar kullanır ve yalan söylemekten çekinmez (Dale 2021) (Dipnot 1);
- Popülist komplo teorilerini sıklıkla kullanır ve halka, devlete ve ülkeye hem içeride hem de dışarıda düşman yaratma konusunda yeteneklidir (Bergmann 2018);
- Muhalefetin şeytanlaştırılması ve kitleler üzerinde duygusal baskı kurulması popülizmin temel özelliklerindendir;
- Demokrasiyi kötüye kullanmak, popülist yaklaşımın en ciddi olumsuz yönlerinden biri olarak kabul edilir (Kyle ve Mounk 2018) ve yasaları ve hatta anayasayı kolayca ihlal ederler (Adamidis 2021; Kovalcık 2022) (Dipnot 2).

Dolayısıyla popülist yaklaşım neredeyse her zaman tek bir kişinin yoğun çabası ve mevcut siyasi sistemin tamamı, basın, azınlıklar ve insan hakları savunucuları gibi toplumun geniş kesimlerine yönelik bir meydan okumadır.

Tüm bu özellikler, farklı ancak birbirini güçlendiren özelliklere sahip tipik bir kişiliği ortaya koymaktadır. Bu özelliklerin başında dizginsiz bir üstünlük ve tahakküm arzusu, üstün çalışma ve ikna kabiliyeti, kuralları, kanunları, hatta ahlaki ve toplumsal değerleri kötüye kullanmaktan çekinmemek gelir.




Bu durumda günümüzde insanın günlük yaşamındaki uygulamaların büyük bir kısmını kaplayan eğitimin, popülistlerin psikolojisini ve kişiliğini, dolayısıyla davranışlarını ve siyasetini etkilemede rol oynaması gerekmektedir. Popülizmin ortaya çıkmasında seçmenin eğitimsizliği ve üniversite diplomasının olmaması da önemli rol oynamaktadır (Brewer 2020).

Her ne kadar eğitim, devletin ve bir bütün olarak toplumun temel işlevlerinden biri olarak kabul edilse ve insanları topluma fayda sağlayan değerler konusunda eğitmeyi amaçlasa da, ve bu aynı zamanda Birleşmiş Milletler'in eğitimle ilgili kurumlarının da temel hedeflerinden biri olsada (Bergan ve Damian 2010: 122-123) günümüzde küresel düzeyde üniversitelerde ve diğer yüksek öğretim kurumlarında, çözüm ararken etiklerin ve değerlerin ilgi odağına yerleştirilmesini gerektiren ahlaki başarısızlıklar ve zorluklar yaşanmaktadır (Priscariu & Shah 2016: 152).

Yukarıda belirtilen yapıcı olmayan özelliklere sahip olan ve bilinen siyasi ve toplumsal temelleri baltalayan popülizmin ortaya çıkışı, tek başına eğitim sisteminin yetersizliği ile açıklanamaz. Eğitimi haklı kılmak için ya da en azından popülizmin yükselişinden sadece eğitimi sorumlu tutmamak için, pek çok deneyimli popülistin tam bir eğitimsel özgeçmişe sahip olmadığı görülebilir.


Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi, Erdoğan'ın eğitim kariyerinde önermli eksiklikler vardır ve üniversite eğitiminin olmadığı neredeyse kesindir. Amerika'nın eski Başkanı Donald Trump'ın eğitim biyografisi hakkında da pek çok şüphelerin olduğu da yazıldı (Valania 2019; Elliott 2011), Hindistan başbakanı Narendra Modi'nin üniversite eğitimine ilişkin



hikayesinde de kusurlar var ve şüpheler medyada hala yazılıyor (Bhattacharya 2018). Bolivya'nın eski başkanı Evo Morales'in lise eğitimi bile şüpheli. Bulgaristan'ın eski başbakanı Boyko Borisov, üniversite eğitimi gerektirmeyen liseyi bitirdikten sonra itfaiyeci olarak çalışmaya başladı; daha sonra Komünist Parti yuvalarından mezun oldu ve orada üniversite diplomasını aldı. Güney Afrika'nın eski başkanı ve kıdemli popülist Jacob Zuma hiç okula gitmedi.

Popülistlerin Beş Büyük kişilik özelliği, (akademik) başarı veya iyi performans ile özsaygı arasındaki ilişkinin analizi önemli özellikleri ortaya koymaktadır (Tablo 1):

- Popülist'in Beş Büyük kişilik özelliği verileri, (akademik) performans veya başarı gösterenin kişilik özellikleriyle tam bir uyumsuzluk göstermektedir;
- Düşük benlik saygısı popülistin kişiliğine hâkim olurken, yüksek benlik saygısı yüksek performansa ve/veya yüksek (akademik) eğitimde iyi başarıya sahip bireyin kişiliğine hâkim olmaktadır (Infante ve Marin 2008; Soufi, Damirchi ve Sedghi 2014; Aryana 2010; Hearn 2019: 44; Kumar 2017);
- Gerçek şu ki, popülist aslında çok büyük başarılar elde etmektedir; bu, bu başarının olumlu olduğu anlamına gelmez; buda, düşük özsaygının genellikle düşük düzeyde başarı veya performansa yol açtığı şeklindeki klasik denklemle çelişir;
- Burada yüksek benlik saygısı ile pozitif ilişik olan popülistin beş temel kişilik özelliğinden biri olan dışadönüklüğün rolü ortaya çıkmaktadır (McCarthy 2017). Aşırı dışa dönüklük aynı zamanda popülist davranışın da bir ön koşuludur; bu da bir popülistin geniş izleyici kitlelerini kendine çekmek ve onların desteğini kazanmak için




oldukça dışa dönük olması gerektiği anlamına gelir. Buradaki hipotez, popülistin dört kişilik özelliğinden kaynaklanan düşük öz saygının, popülistin kişilik özelliklerinden yalnızca biri olan aşırı dışadönüklükten kaynaklanan çok yüksek özsaygı ile dengelendiğidir.

- Belki de popülistin büyük başarılarına yardımcı olan aşırı dışa dönüklüğüdür; bu da başarıya veya iyi performansa karşı sayılan düşük özgüveninin aşırı telafisi olarak görülebilir;

- Popülistlerin beş büyük kişilik özelliğinden hepsi de düşük özsaygı ile ilişkilendirilen yapıcı olmayan dört özellik (düşük uyumluluk, düşük derecede vicdanlılık, düşük düzeyde açıklık ve düşük duygusal istikrar), popülistlerin düşük özsaygı ile ilişkili olumsuz yönlerini davranışlarını açıklayabilir;

- Bireyin özsaygısı genellikle beş yaşında mevcuttur, on bir yaşına kadar nispeten sabit kalır ve daha sonra kişinin yaşamı boyunca nispeten sabit kalır (McElroy 2015; Ducharme 2018). Bireyin kişilik özellikleri genellikle yıllar sonra ergenlik döneminde ortaya çıkmaya başlar (Thill 2019). Bireyin düşük benlik saygısı, kişilik özelliklerinin ortaya çıkmasından ve oluşmasından önce ortaya çıkıp yerleştiğine göre, düşük benlik saygısının popülistin kişilik özelliklerini oluşturmada rolü nedir? Başka bir deyişle popülizmin ortaya çıkışında aşağılık duygusunun (aşağılık kompleksinin) rolü nedir? Daha fazla çalışılması gereken bir konu olmalı.

Hipotez, bireyin genel aşırı düşük özsaygısı, aşırı pozitif özsaygısının bir bileşeni olan dışadönüklük ile değiştirerek (ikame) popülist kişiliğe yol açmasıdır. Başka bir deyişle, popülistin aşırı düşük özgüveninin genel durumu, onun aşırı dışa dönüklüğünü uyandırır ve güçlendirir, popülistin geniş kitleleri kazanma ve üstünlük ve üstünlüğü sürdürme konusundaki muazzam yeteneğini yaratır.



Tablo 1 Popülistin beş büyük kişilik özelliği, akademik başarı (performansı) ve özsaygı arasındaki ilişki


Popülist	Özsaygı ⁴	Başarı (Akademik)	Özsaygı ⁵
Dışa Dönüklük ¹	Olumlu	İçe dönüklük	Olumsuzuz
Düşük uyumluluk ¹	Olumsuzuz	Yüksek uyumluluk	Olumlu
Düşük derecede vicdanlılık ¹	Olumsuzuz	Yüksek derecede vicdanlılık	Olumlu
Düşük düzeyde açıklık ²	Olumsuzuz	Yüksek düzeyde açıklık	Olumlu
Düşük duygusal istikrar ³	Olumsuzuz	Yüksek duygusal istikrar	Olumlu

1. Nai & Martinez i Coma 2019; Nai 2019. 2. Nai 2019; Czíkora 2015.
3. Nai & Martinez i Coma 2019. 4. Amirazodi 2011; Eswari, Kaur & Kavitha 2019.
5. Amirazodi 2011; Eswari, Kaur & Kavitha 2019; Infante & Marin 2008.

Sonuç

Bu çalışma, Erdoğan'ın üniversite diploması aldığını kanıtlama girişimlerinin başarısız olmasının temel nedeninin Erdoğan'ın orijinal üniversite diplomasının olmaması olduğunu gösteriyor. Tüm girişimleri, Erdoğan'ın geçici mezuniyet belgesi olarak adlandırdığı (Foto 1) ve onu açıkça geçersiz kılacak hatalar içeren bir belgeye dayanıyor. Erdoğan'ın üniversite diplomasına sahip olduğu iddiasını doğrulamanın bir diğer sorunu da, geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesinin dahi araştırılmamış ve görülememiş olmasıdır.

Erdoğan'ın sunduğu geçici mezuniyet belgesinden Ticaret Bölümü'nden mezun olduğu anlaşılmaktadır ancak CV'sinde ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı internet sitesi gibi önemli bir mevkiden özellikle İngilizce versiyonunda uzmanlık alqana idare Bölümü ile değiştirilmiştir. Her iki duplikatada da aynı idari bölümden mezun




olduğu belirtilmektedir ve bu durum Marmara Üniversitesi Rektörü Arat tarafından da meşrulaştırılmıştır.

Üniversite diploması gibi önemli belgelerin özündeki bu tür değişiklikler ancak sahte belgelerde ve Erdoğan'ın vakasındaki gibi önemli ve bariz çarpıklıklarla dolu vakalarda gerçekleşebilir, ki bu da popülistlerin gerçekleri büyük bir kolaylıkla manipüle etme ve çarpıtma konusundaki istekliliğini gösterir. Bu, özellikle Türkiye gibi iyi oturmamış demokrasilerde, popülistin en kutsal devlet kurumlarını ve tarafsız dürüst adil olması gereken otoriteleri ne kadar kolay suiistimal ettiğini göstermektedir.

Erdoğan'ın geçersiz geçici mezuniyet belgesinin savunmasında, Marmara Üniversitesi rektörlerinden ikisi yer aldı; kanıt sunmadan geçerliliğini haklı çıkarmaya çalıştılar. Hatta, bu belgenin bir kopyasını (Foto 4) bile yayınladılar; bu belge de Marmara Üniversitesi'nin şartlarına göre bile, büyük hatalar içeriyor.

Bireyin eğitim düzeyinin ya da diplomasının olmayışının mutlaka davranışlarına ya da kişiliğine yansımayacağı bir gerçektir. Ancak saflık, çelişkiler, tutarsızlıklar, bireyin söz ve eylemlerinde sınır bulunmaması, görüşlerindeki anormallikler onun eğitim düzeyinin düşük olduğunun açık göstergeleri olabilir. Popülistlerin sıklıkla eğitimin temel amaçları arasında yer alan veya olması gereken yasaları ve toplumsal değerleri ihlal ettikleri bir yana. Bu özelliklerin birçoğu Erdoğan'ın söylem ve davranışlarında açıkça görülüyor. Erdoğan'ın lise yıllarından itibaren dinci ve millî siyasi söylemi tutku haline getirmiş ve siyaseti meslek edinmiş olması, siyasi söylem sanatını geliştirmesini ve ustalaşmasını sağlamıştır.




Türk basınında Erdoğan'ın yasadışı mezuniyet belgeleri ve özellikle bunların sahteciliği konusunda çıkan büyük ve sürekli kargaşaya rağmen, bu durum ilgili hükümet birimleri yargı birimleri ve kendisine desteklerini sürdüren kitleler tarafından dikkate alınmadı. Bu da Erdoğan'ın (ya da popülistlerin) devletin yürütme ve yargı organları üzerindeki hakimiyetinin ve kendisine desteğini sürdüren kitlelerin duyguları üzerindeki kontrolünün boyutu göstermektedir.

Bu çalışmaya konu olan Erdoğan'ın sertifikalarına ilişkin tartışmaların hikâyesinin bu seyri, Erdoğan'ın topluma yalanı dayattığının açık bir göstergesidir. Bu da Erdoğan'ın ve genel olarak popülistlerin diğer temel özelliklerine de işaret etmektedir: “Yanıltmak” ve iktidarı ele geçirme ve sürdürme konusunda “dizginsiz arzu” ve ısrarla “yasaları ihlal etme”.

Toplumun bu tür kaba davranışları kabul etmesi, söz konusu popülistlere desteğini sürdürmesi ve Erdoğan örneğinde olduğu gibi onu iktidarda tutmasında pek çok faktör büyük rol oynamaktadır.

Bu fenomenin ana nedenleri arasında şunlar yer almaktadır:

- Özellikle Türkiye gibi gelişmekte olan ülkelerde günlük ihtiyaçlar toplumun büyük bir kısmını meşgul etmektedir ilgisini çekmektedir zamanını almaktadır;
- Toplumun büyük bir yüzdesi pek çok nedenden dolayı haberlere ulaşamıyor, örneğin gelişmekte olan ülkelerde birçok uzak bölgede internet yaygınlığının olmaması;




- Popülist, hiçbir zaman hükümet aleyhine haber yayınlamayan medyanın çoğunu kendine tabi kılıyor; Erdoğan bu bağlamda tipik bir örnektir;
- Popülistler çoğunlukla okuma geleneği çok düşük olan daha az eğitilmiş, “basit” insanlar tarafından destekleniyor. (Brewer 2020, Marques 2019)
- Okuma geleneğinin toplumların birçok kesiminde düşük olduğu ve genel olarak birçok toplumda okuma geleneğinin yaygın olduğu unutulmamalıdır.

Erdoğan'ın ya da başka bir popülistin bu toplumsal özelliklerin farkında olma ihtimali yüksek çünkü kitleleri etkilemek popülistlerin içgüdüsel bir hali ya da sonradan bu konuda ustalaşmış gibi görünüyor.

Bu tür davranışların toplumun büyük bir kısmı tarafından kabul görmesine neden olan diğer önemli faktör ise popülistlerin kitlelerin duygularını istismar etmeye dayandıkları temel ideolojidir. Türkiye'nin Erdoğan'ı gibi ülkeye liderlik yaparken ve yönetirken İslami kuralları benimseyen herhangi bir siyasetçi, Müslüman kitlelerin mutlak ve sürekli desteğini sağlar.

Ayrıca Erdoğan milli ve vatanseverlik duygularını da istismar ediyor. Bu tür ideolojiler radikaller için kutsaldır ve kitlelerin desteğini sürdürmek ve popülistleri tüm olumsuz davranışlarına rağmen iktidarda tutmak için yeterlidir. Burada kutuplaşmanın yaratılması popülizmin doğal bir sonucudur, çünkü katı görüşlüler rakiplerini düşman olarak görüyorlar. Erdoğan ve aşırı Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi lideri Devlet Bahçeli'nin her hafta parlamentoda sundukları konuşmalarında bu çok açık bir şekilde görülüyor.




Türk milliyetçiliğinde dinin veya İslam'ın etnisite kadar, hatta belki daha da önemli bir rol oynadığı unutulmamalıdır. Ekonomik yoksunluk, kendi başına veya ikincil bir faktör olarak, popülizmin yaratılmasında aşırı ideolojilerle güçlü bir sinerjistir.

Alışılmadık bir yönelim ve geniş kitleleri harekete geçirme, geniş toplumsal katmanlara meydan okuma ve iktidara tutunmaya devam etme konusunda olağanüstü bir yetenek ile karakterize edilen Erdoğan, Orbán ve Morales gibi tipik bir popüliste gelince, popülistin güçlü psikolojik güdü(ler) ile karakterize edildiğini gösterir, bu aynı zamanda güçlü arzu(lar) anlamına da gelir. Örneğin abartılı bir sorumluluk duygusu veya eşitsizliğe, adaletsizliğe veya başka herhangi bir yönelik aşırı duyarlılık.

Aynı zamanda aşağılık duygusu ya da aşağılık kompleksi anlamına da gelen düşük benlik duygusu popülist kişiliğe hâkim olduğunu dikkata aldığımızda (Tablo 1), şu soru ortaya çıkıyor, popülist kişiliğin oluşmasındaki temel etken aşağılık kompleksi midir ve dolayısıyla olumsuz yönlerinin nedeni midir?


Aşırı yoksulluk ve çocuklukta aşırı şiddete maruz kalma gibi özsaygı eksikliğine neden olabilen en önemli faktörlerden bazılarının Erdoğan'ın durumunda mevcut olduğu unutulmamalıdır. Erdoğan yaramaz ve kötü ağızlı bir çocuktur; bu nedenle babasından sürekli cezalara maruz kaldı. Mesela babası bir defasında Erdoğan'ı bir odanın tavanındaki vantilatöre bağlamıştı. Ayrıca düşük benlik saygısı akademik başarısızlığa yol açmakta ve akademik başarısızlık da düşük benlik saygısının bir başka nedenini oluşturmaktadır.



Popülistin kişiliğinin ve ona oy veren seçmenin kişiliğinin şimdiye kadar araştırmacıların büyük bir ilgi odağı olduğu bilinmektedir. Ancak popülist bireyin diğer psikolojik yönlerini incelemek, popülist fenomeni anlamamıza çok önemli bilgiler katabilir.

Popülizmin ortaya çıkışını ve popülistlerin sayısının artışıını açıklayan önemli faktörlerden ikisi şunlardır: Birincisi, son yıllarda iletişim araçlarında yaşanan ve politikacıların geniş kitlelere sürekli ulaşmasını ve iletişimi kolaylıkla sürdürmesini sağlayan büyük ilerlemelerdir. İkincisi, herkesin siyasetle uğraşmasını mümkün kılan demokratik gelişmeler ve bunların yaygınlaşmasıdır. Ayrıca insan hakları ilkelerinin gelişmesi ve yaygınlaşması, düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğünü genişleterek ifade sorumluluğunun kapsamını daraltmış, bu da özellikle siyasi söylemin kötüye kullanılmasının önünü açmıştır. Görünen o ki bu iki faktör gelişmeye devam edecek ve bu da mantıksal olarak popülizmin gelişmesine ve popülistlerin sayısının artmasına yol açacak. Dolayısıyla popülizmin okullarda ve üniversitelerde müfredata alınması hayati önem taşıyor. Aynı zamanda, popülist olmayan bir politikacı kitlelerle doğrudan ve devamlı temas halinde kalması ve onları gerçeklere ikna etmesi, popülizmle mücadele etmenin bir yolu olabilir.

Sheth Jerjis, merkezi Hollanda'nın Nijmegen kentinde bulunan Irak Türkmen İnsan Hakları Araştırma Vakfı'nın (Hollandaca Stichting Onderzoekscentrum Iraaks Turkmeense Mensenrechten (SOITM) Başkanı'dır. s.jerjis@kpnmail.nl soitm@turkmen.nl



Dipnotlar

Not 1 Erdoğan'ın konuşmalarındaki birçok tutarsızlığa dair bazı örnekler.

- 1994 yılında Erdoğan şöyle demişti: "Egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız milletindir, yalan, koskoca bir yalan".

Erdoğan iktidara geldikten sonra tam tersini söylemeye başladı.

Erdoğan, 5 Eylül 2010'da yaptığı konuşmada, "Çünkü kayıtsız şartsız egemenlik milletindir, bunun tartışması olurmu?".

- 5 Aralık 2013'te Erdoğan şunları söyledi: "Havalimanı yoktu, bizimle geldi Muş'a". Ancak Muş Havalimanı, AKP'nin iktidara gelmesinden on yıl önce, 1992 yılında sivil trafiğe açıldı.

- 1 Haziran 2018'de Erdoğan şunları söyledi: "Adıyaman'da havalimanı var mıydı? Biz yaptık biz". Adıyaman Havalimanı AKP iktidara gelmeden 4 yıl önce hizmete açılmıştı.

- 26 Aralık 2010'da Erdoğan şöyle dedi: "Değerli arkadaşlarım, benim milletimin dili tektir, bu Türk milletidir".


27 Mayıs 2011'de Erdoğan şunları söyledi: "Ben ne tek dil dedim ne tek din. Hiçbir yerde benim böyle bir ifadem yoktur. Çünkü onlar yalan makinesi".

Erdoğan tarafından Mavi Marmara operasyonuna verilen izinle ilgili şu açıklamaları yaptı:

17 Temmuz 2014'te Erdoğan, "Ne diyordu, otoriteden izin alman lazım. Otorite kim? Güneydeki sevdikleri mi, yoksa biz mi? Eğer otorite Türkiye' de bizsek, biz zaten izni verdik".

29 Haziran 2016'da Erdoğan, "Böyle bir insani yardımı götürmek için günün başbakanına mı sordunuz?".

Not 2 Bu bağlamda Netanyahu'nun yargıyı dizginleme çabaları, Erdoğan'ın amansız diktatörlük yürüyüşü ve anayasa değişiklikleri,



Morales'in yasalara rağmen başkanlığını koruma çabaları ve Trump'ın Amerika'nın yargı sistemini siyasallaştırıp yüksek mahkemeyi etkileme çabaları var.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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NB: do you have any comments on the Turkish version of Sheth Jerjis' article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitic.org or by contactform at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



Ekler

Fotoğraf 1

Erdoğan'ın Geçici Mezuniyet Belgesi




Yusuf Halaçoğlu ✓
@yusufhalacoglu

Başbakanın mezuniyet belgesi. Ne dersiniz?
[Translate Tweet](#)



8:01 PM · Apr 24, 2014



Fotoğraf 2

Erdoğan'ın ilk duplikatısı



Yusuf Halaçoğlu 
@yusufhalaoglu

...

Bu diploma eksik olan imzalar.Üniversite 1982 temmuzda kuruldu.Mezuniyet 1981.

[Translate Tweet](#)



8:01 PM · Apr 24, 2014



Fotoğraf 3

Erdoğan'ın ilk duplikatasının arkası





İSTANBUL 15. NOTERLİĞİ
Atatürk Bulvarı Cad. No:160/3
Aksaray - İSTANBUL

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İKTİSADİ ve İDARİ BİLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ

Lisans Diploması

Bölümü : *İktisadi*
Uzlaşım Dili :
Öğrenim : *İktisadi*

Dışın Yeri ne Tarihi : *İstanbul-1984*
Mezuniyet Tarihi : *1987*
Diploma No : *8345*

Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesinde dört yıl süreli lisans öğrenimini tamamlayarak ve ilgili yönetmelik hükümlerine göre bütün sınavlarını başarıyla geçiren

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan


kamunların verdiği bak ve yetkililerden yararlanmak üzere bu diplomanı almıştır.

İSTANBUL 15. NOTERLİĞİ
MEHMET NECAT ÖÇEL
Yenne Imzaaya Yetkili Kağıt
EMINE SEVEN

Dekan
Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Batirel

İSTANBUL 15. NOTERLİĞİ
İşbu örnek dairesi dışarı çıktıktan sonra imzalanmalıdır.

[illegible]



Fotoğraf 6 Milletvekili Tur Yıldız Becer'in, Erdoğan'ın zorunlu askerlik hizmetine başladığında Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ne hangi üniversite diplomasını sunduğuna ilişkin TBMM'ye sorgu talebi

KVKK Aydınlatma Metni Engelsiz Meclis Linkleri Geç Site Haritası Ana Sayfa İletişim Languages

TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ

ANA SAYFA MİLLETVEKİLERİ YASAMA DENETİM TUTANAKLAR PARLAMENTOLARARASI İLİŞKİLER KURUMSAL YAYINLAR

Yazılı Soru Önergesi Bilgileri

	Yazılı Soru Önergesinin Metni
Dönemi ve Yasama Yılı	26/1
Esas Numarası	7/6890
Başkanlığa Geliş Tarihi	20/06/2016
Önerenin Özeti	Cumhurbaşkanı'nın askerlikte beyan ettiği diplomasına ilişkin
Önerenin Sahibi	CHP Manisa Milletvekili TUR YILDIZ BİÇER
Önerenin Muhatabı	Milli Savunma Bakanı Kocaali FİKRİ İŞİK
Önergeyi Süre Dışı Cevaplayan	Milli Savunma Bakanı Kocaali Milletvekili FİKRİ İŞİK
Önerenin Son Durumu	Süresi Geçtikten Sonra Cevaplandı
Cevap Bildiriliş Tarihi	10/10/2016

Süresi Geçtikten Sonra Gelen Cevap

Sorgu Ekranına Git


Sosyal Medya

Sosyal Ağlarda TBMM

Arama

Duyurular

Genel Duyurular
Sınav Duyurusu
İhale Duyuruları
İnsan Kaynakları Staj Duyuruları
Etkinlikler
Sağlık Duyuruları - Hak Sahipliği
Sıkça Sorulan Sorular



Fotoğraf 7 Yüksek Seçim Kuruluna sunulan üniversite belgesinin noter tarafından tasdiki zorunluluğunun kaldırılmasına ilişkin kanun



TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ
"EGEMENLİK KAYITSIZ ŞARTSIZ MİLLETİNDİR"

ANASAYFA | BAŞKAN | MİLLETVEKİLLERİ | YASAMA | DENETİM | TUTANAKLAR | GÜNDEM | KURUMSAL | YAYINLAR

GENEL KURUL KONUŞMASI

Konu: Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun noter onaylı diploma koşulunu kaldırmasının gerekçesini ve AKP Genel Başkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın diplomasını kamuoyuyla paylaşıp paylaşmayacağını öğrenmek istediğine ilişkin açıklaması

Yasama Yılı: 3

Birleşim: 94

Tarih: 02.05.2018

MEHMET TUM (Balıkesir) - Teşekkür ederim Sayın Başkan.

30 Nisan Pazartesi günü Resmi Gazete'de yayınlanan kararla, Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve milletvekilliği genel seçimlerinde adaylık başvurusu yapanların onaylı diploması ibraz etmelerine dair koşulu kaldırmıştır.

Hükümete soruyorum: Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun noter onaylı diploma koşulunu kaldırmasının gerekçesi nedir? Yüksek Seçim Kurulu bu kararla, 16 Nisan'da mührsüz oylanı kabul ettiği gibi şimdi de mührsüz diplomaları mı kabul edecektir? Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun bu kararının Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan için alındığı iddiaları doğru mudur? AKP Genel Başkanı Erdoğan, Yüksek Seçim Kuruluna başvurusunda ibraz edeceği diploması kamuoyuyla paylaşacak mıdır? Ülkemizin geleceği diplomaları yöneticilere mi emanet edilecektir? (CHP sıralarından alkışlar)

TBMM TV

f

twitter

instagram

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PARLAMENTOLAR ARASI İLİŞKİLER

KÜTÜPHANE VE ARŞİV

ANAYASA VE İÇTÜZÜK SİTESİ

KANUN VE KARAR BİLGİ SİSTEMİ

E-DİLEKÇE

BİLGİ EDİNME


DUYURULAR

Genel Duyurular

Sınav Duyurusu


İnsan Kaynakları Staj Duyurusu

Sağlık Duyuruları



Fotoğraf 8 Erdoğan'ın mezun olduğunu iddia ettiği fakülteden mezun olan başka bir kişiye ait mezuniyet belgesinin aslı






Fotoğraf 9 Erdoğan'ın mezun olduğunu iddia ettiği fakülte ve üniversite yılı olan İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Ticari İlimler Fakültesi 1980-1981 yılı mezunları rehberi

Kitabın tamamına bu linkten ulaşabilirsiniz:
www.odatv4.com/siyaset/okul-yilliginda-da-erdogandan-iz-yok-1203161200-91089.



1980 - 1981

SON SINIF YILLIĞI



Fotoğraf 10 Cumhurbaşkanlığı web sitesinde yayınlanan Erdoğan'ın özgeçmişinin İngilizce ve Türkçe versiyonları





Main Article

السيرة التعليمية لرجب طيب أردوغان والنفسية الشعبوية

(The educational biography of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the populist psychology)

(Sheth Jerjis)

شيث جرجيس

This article concerns the Arabic translation of the same English-language contribution in this 2023 volume of our journal, translated by the author himself.

English Abstract *Many populist attitudes and behaviours lead to the belief that the average populist lacks a full educational resume, especially a university education. Numerous publications have appeared questioning the possession of university degrees by many populists, including populist presidents such as Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, India's president Narendra Modi and even America's former president Donald Trump.*

A very high number of articles has been published questioning Erdogan's entire educational biography, which include strange facts, not only in the contents of the published documents, but also in the interventions of higher academic authorities and state departments in Erdogan's defence. Despite the abundance of publications on Erdogan's educational biography and the documents published around it, to date there has been no article that exclusively includes all the aspects of the topic.



Today, Erdogan, who caused a stir regionally and globally, is considered one of the biggest populists. A detailed study of the large gaps in his claimed educational career will certainly help in understanding his populist personality.

In collecting information, we relied mainly on articles published on Turkish newspaper websites and on listening to Erdogan's speeches and various programs discussing Erdogan's policy on Turkish TV channels.


It is found that Erdogan's educational curriculum is full of contradictions, and that the published documents related to his certificates, particularly that of the university he supposedly attended, contain flagrant errors.

In terms of the populist personality, all of the Big Five personality traits, which are Extraversion, agreeableness, degree of conscientiousness, level of openness and emotional stability, contrast with the personality traits of those who have achieved academic success (see Table 1). Low self-esteem also dominates the populist personality and the personality of those who fail academically. Hence it seems that low self-esteem plays an important role in explaining populist behaviour and approach.

In this article, Erdogan's educational history is discussed in detail and brief information on the psychology of the populist is provided.

خلاصة

تؤدي العديد من المواقف والسلوكيات الشعبوية إلى الاعتقاد بأن الشعبوي يفتقر إلى سيرة ذاتية تعليمية متكاملة، وخاصة التعليم الجامعي، وبهذا السياق ظهرت منشورات عديدة



تشكك في حيابة العديد من الشعبويين لشهادات جامعية، بما في ذلك، الرؤساء الشعبويين مثل الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان ورئيس الهند ناريندرا مودي وحتى الرئيس الأمريكي السابق دونالد ترامب.


تم نشر أعداد كبيرة جدًا من المقالات تُشكك في سيرة أردوغان التعليمية بأكملها، والتي تتضمن حقائق غريبة ليس فقط في محتويات الوثائق المنشورة، ولكن أيضًا في مداخلات السلطات الأكاديمية العليا ودوائر الدولة في الدفاع عن أردوغان. على الرغم من كثرة المنشورات حول سيرة أردوغان التعليمية والوثائق المنشورة حولها، لا توجد مقالة تتضمن حصريًا الجوانب الكاملة للتحصيل الدراسي له.

يُعد اليوم أردوغان الذي أحدث ضجة إقليمية وعالمية من أكبر الشعبويين. إن الدراسة التفصيلية للفجوات الكبيرة في سيرته التعليمية المزعومة ستساعد بالتأكيد في فهم شخصيته الشعبوية.

في جمع المعلومات اعتمدنا بشكل أساسي على المقالات المنشورة على مواقع الصحف التركية وفضلا على الاستماع إلى خطابات أردوغان والبرامج المختلفة التي خصصت لمناقشة سياسة أردوغان في القنوات التلفزيونية التركية.

تبيّن أن سيرة اردوغان التعليمية مليئة بالتناقضات، وأن الوثائق المنشورة المتعلقة بشهاداته، خاصة شهادته الجامعية التي يفترض التحقق بها، تحتوي على أخطاء فاضحة.

فيما يتعلق بالشخصية الشعبوية، فإن جميع سمات الشخصية الخمس الكبرى وهي الانبساط، التوافق، الضمير، مستوى الانفتاح والاستقرار العاطفي تتناقض مع السمات



الشخصية لأولئك الذين حققوا نجاحًا أكاديميًا (جدول ١)، إذ يهيمن تدني احترام الذات على الشخصية الشعبية وشخصية أولئك الذين يفشلون أكاديميًا، من هنا يبدو أن تدني احترام الذات يلعب دورًا مهمًا في تفسير السلوك (النَّهج) الشعبي.


في هذا المقال، سيتم مناقشة تاريخ أردوغان التعليمي بالتفصيل مع تقديم معلومات موجزة عن نفسية الشعبي.

مقدمة

منذ ظهور أردوغان على الساحة السياسية التركية وتوليّه رئاسة بلدية إستانبول في عام ١٩٩٤، ثم رئاسة الوزراء وبعد ذلك رئاسة الجمهورية التركية وذلك بعد فوزه الساحق في انتخابات متتالية منذ ٢٠٠٢، أحدث ضجة كبيرة في تركيا وفي الأوساط الدولية بشخصيته ومكره وسياساته الشعبية الدينية المتهورة.

لدى أردوغان خصوصيات وسلوكيات تثير الشكوك حول امتلاكه لسيرة تعليمية كاملة وخاصة التعليم الجامعي وهذا يُعد شرطًا لتولي منصب رئيس الجمهورية في تركيا، إذ يهاجم الحكومات بكلمات قاسية غير مألوفة لدى السياسيين، يشتم المعارضة، ويثير العواطف بطريقة عارية وساذجة، ويشوه باستمرار الموضوعات لتضليل الجماهير، ويوجه اتهامات فاضحة وكاذبة لإثارة مشاعر الكراهية التي تسبب الاستقطاب بين الناس.

كما اعتاد اردوغان على الادلاء بتصريحات غير طبيعية وغير منطقية، مما يقوض القيم الاجتماعية المتمثلة في الاتساق والاستقامة والصدق. على سبيل المثال، "التشريع




والقضاء رباط الكاحل لي" (أنكوت ٢٠١٧: ٢٣)، "الديمقراطية هي ترام، نذهب حيث نذهب، ثم ننزل هناك" (كوهن ٢٠١٨)، "السيادة للشعب دون قيد أو شرط. إنها كذبة عظيمة. ... السيادة ماديا ومعنويا لله دون قيد أو شرط" (حسنبارسان ٢٠٠٧)، "كيف تدار شركة مساهمة، يجب أن تدار تركيا على هذا النحو" (بدري بيردربير ٢٠١٥).

الغريب في أفكار أردوغان السياسية أنها تصل في بعض الأحيان إلى درجة الهذيان، إذ يقول في إحدى خطاباته عام ١٩٩١ في مدينة كيفا بمحافظة سقاريا، "إخواني وأخواتي الأعزاء، العالم على مفترق طرق جديد، عند مفترق الطرق الجديد هذا. هناك أربع قنوات تتدمج لتشكل قناة واحدة في المستقبل. من بين هذه القنوات الأربعة المنفصلة، واحده هي العالم المسيحي وواحدة هي العالم اليهودي وواحدة هي العالم الملحد والأخرى هل تسميها الشنتوية أو ... أيا كان ما تقوله هناك دين آخر، إنهم جميعًا يتحدثون في المستقبل ويشكلون معًا العالم الصليبي. من هم ضدهم؟ من هم ضدهم؟ من هم ضدهم؟ هو العالم الإسلامي" (كيفا كوم ٢٠٢١).

فيما يلي بعض الغرائب الأخرى في افكار أردوغان:

- رغم أنه يعاني من صعوبات كبيرة في إثبات شهادته الثانوية والجامعية والأخطاء الجسيمة الموجودة في وثائقه المطروحة، إلا أنه يذكر باستمرار في خطاباته أنه خبير اقتصادي، حتى لو تحدث لوسائل إعلام دولية (بي بي أس تي في ٢٠١٧)،
- من المعروف اليوم أن نظام الدولة في تركيا سار مع أردوغان نحو الإسلاموية والسلطوية (التن أورش وأكجاي ٢٠٢٢) وتآكلت الديمقراطية وازدادت انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان وانخفضت الثقة في القضاء بشدة (اورسلي وبيليحي ٢٠٢١، طائي ٢٠٢٠). وعلى الرغم من الوضوح الكبير لهذه السلبيات في عهد أردوغان، والذي




تجاوز عقدين، إلا أنه يؤكد مرارًا في خطابه على التطور الديمقراطي في تركيا. في إحدى خطابه، وصف أردوغان نفسه باستخدام اقتباس من مالكوم إكس: "أنا مع الحقيقة، بغض النظر عن قولها. أنا مع العدالة، بغض النظر عن هو مع أو ضد" (أودر ٢٠٢١:٤٧٣).

إن شهادة أردوغان الجامعية وحتى شهادة الدراسة الثانوية محل شك في الصحافة التركية حتى قبل أن يتولى السلطة في تركيا. لم يتمكن أردوغان من تقديم أي دليل موثوق به يثبت تعليمه الجامعي وشهادته الثانوية. والواقع أن جميع الوثائق المتعلقة بتاريخه التعليمي والتي يتم تداولها في الأوساط الإعلامية ودوائر الدولة، وحتى تلك الصادرة عن الجامعة التي يدعي أنه درس فيها، تحتوي على أخطاء جسيمة.

يمكن تعريف الشعبوي بأنه "سياسي يحشد الجماهير الكبيرة لإحداث تغييرات جذرية في النظام الإداري". وإن هذه العملية تحتاج إلى عاملين أساسيين وهما الشخص الذي يمتلك الإمكانات الشعبوية والاستعداد الجماهيري. وبالتالي فإن العملية الشعبوية هي في حد ذاتها عملية شرعية. ومع ذلك، فإن الشرعية (القانون) ولأسباب في الطبيعة الشعبوية تُنتهك في مجالين تحديداً، الأول في وسائل تعبئة الجماهير وثانياً عند إحداث التغيير. في النهاية تصبح العملية الشعبوية عملية سلبية تقوض استقرار المجتمع. إذن فالشعبوية هي مقارنة سياسية غير بناءة متكاملة في وسائلها في استخدام الجماهير، في أهدافها في السيطرة على السلطة (الحكم) وفي نتائجها القيام بالتغييرات الإدارية.

وبالتالي، فإن الشعبوية هي ظاهرة اجتماعية - سياسية تعتمد على سيكولوجية الفرد الشعبوي والمجتمع. والشعبوي يتمتع بشخصية وخصائص نفسية تمنحه الزخم الهائل




والقدرة الهائلة على الانجاز، بغض النظر عما إذا كان الإنجاز الشعبي إيجابيًا أم سلبياً. فالشعبي يُتقن فن تطوير أفكاره في سياق تعبئة الجماهير وتوجيهها.

إن تحويل المشاعر والأفكار المكبوتة إلى طاقة غير عادية يمكن أن يُفسر الدافع الشعبي، إذ أن نظرية أدلر تقدم أحد التعريفات لهذه الفرضية، وهو أن الشعور بتدني احترام الذات يتحول إلى شعور بالتفوق ومحاولة الفرد لتحقيق هذا التفوق. تقدم آلية الدفاع النفسي 'الاستبدال' تفسيراً آخر للدوافع الشعبية، إذ يمكن استبدال الشعور بتدني احترام الذات (الشعور بالنقص) بالبحث عن شعور بتقدير الذات العالي من خلال الإنجاز. في كلتا الحالتين ونظراً لأن احترام الذات هو حالة شبه مستقرة في الفرد، فإن الشعور بتدني احترام الذات يتطلب من الفرد أن يبحث باستمرار عن شعور بالتفوق (احترام عالي للذات)، والذي يعني في الوقت نفسه استمرار الإنجاز.

التاريخ التعليمي لأردوغان

التحق أردوغان بمدرسة بيالا باشا الابتدائية في حي قاسم باشا في إستانبول في عام ١٩٦٠ وتخرج في عام ١٩٦٥. ثم التحق بمدرسة إمام خطيب إستانبول في حي الفاتح كطالب في القسم الداخلي، وأكمل الدراسة في عام ١٩٧٣.

كانت فترة الدراسة في اعدادية الامام خطيب في تلك الفترة سبع سنوات منقسمة الى مرحلتين، أربع سنوات للمرحلة المتوسطة وثلاثة سنوات كمرحلة ثانوية. في عام ١٩٧١ تم إلغاء المرحلة المتوسطة لإعدادية إمام خطيب التي مدتها ٤ سنوات، وتم تمديد المرحلة التي مدتها ٣ سنوات إلى ٤ سنوات، مما أدى إلى اختصار سنوات الدراسة في الإمام



خطيب إلى أربع سنوات. أكمل أردوغان دراسته في مرحلة الامام خطيب في ٨ سنوات (جليك ٢٠١٦: ٥٢١). وهذا يعني أن أردوغان قد رسب لسنة دراسية واحدة على الأقل.

الشهادة التي كان يتم الحصول عليها من مدرسة الامام خطيب في تركيا في تلك الفترة لم تكن معادلة لشهادة الثانوية العامة. وحسب السيرة الرسمية لأردوغان، انه اجتاز امتحانات لدروس إضافية في عام ١٩٧٣ في مدرسة أيوب الثانوية، والتي تطلبت لمعادلة الشهادة المأخوذة من مدرسة الامام خطيب بشهادة الثانوية العامة (موقع الرئاسة-انظر الى بيبليوغرافي).


ووفقا لسيرة أردوغان الرسمية المنشورة على الصفحة الإلكترونية لرئاسة الجمهورية التركية النسخة الإنكليزية، فقد تخرج من كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم الإدارية بجامعة مرمره في عام ١٩٨١. وهذا يعني أن أردوغان أكمل دراسته الجامعية في ٨ سنوات (نفي المصدر).

هناك الكثير من الشكوك في سيرة أردوغان التعليمية (المدرسية) بأكملها، وهناك عيوب بارزة تبطل بوضوح الوثائق التي يقدمها. يمكن دراسة الموضوع تحت العناوين التالية:

- التناقضات في التاريخ التعليمي؛
- الانتقادات والشكاوى؛
- النواقص والأخطاء في الوثائق المنشورة.

التناقضات في التاريخ التعليمي

إذا كان ادعاء أردوغان صحيحاً أنه التحق إلى أكاديمية إسطنبول للعلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية، فوفقاً لتاريخ هذه الأكاديمية المنشور على الصفحة الإلكترونية لجامعة مرمره،




فإن أردوغان التحق إلى معهد وليس الى كلية. لأن أكاديمية إسطنبول افتتحت معاهد بين عامي ١٩٧٢ و ١٩٧٤، وهي الفترة الذي يدعى أردوغان أنه التحق بالجامعة، وتحولت هذه المعاهد إلى كليات في المرحلة الأكاديمية ١٩٧٧-١٩٧٨. (جامعة مرمره ٢٠٢٢)

ومن المثير للاهتمام أن أردوغان لم يتحدث عن دراسته الجامعية، سوى القليل، ولم يرد على مئات الانتقادات التي وُجّهت لمعظم مراحل تعليمه وثائقه المنشورة إلا ما ندر منها وبإجابات غير وافية. علاوة على ذلك لا أحد لديه أية معلومات واضحة وموثوقة عن دراسته الجامعية وامتحانات لمعادلة شهادته من مدرسة الامام خطيب، وفقاً لبعض المصادر، فإن أردوغان لم يكن طالباً ذكياً في ثانوية الامام خطيب (چاكر وجالموك ٢٠٠١: ١٩).

من المعتاد في تركيا أن تحتفظ كل مدرسة بجميع سجلات طلابها التي تتضمن الملاحظات والتقييمات. والسؤال المطروح هنا، لماذا لم تنتشر المدارس التي درس فيها أردوغان وثائقه؟ اذ من المعروف أن المدارس التي يصبح طلابها رئيساً لدولة ما او يشغلون منصبا رفيعا، ستنشر بكل فخر واعتزاز التقارير والمذكرات المدرسية والشهادات الخاصة بذلك الطالب، لكن هذا لم يحدث في حالة أردوغان.

المعلومات المنشورة عن تعليم أردوغان تشير الى أنه في عام ١٩٧٣ تخرج من مدرسة الإمام الخطيب، ودرس فيما بعد لمعادلة شهادته واجتاز الامتحانات، ثم درس لامتحانات الجامعة واجتازها والتحق الى الجامعة في العام نفسه، او حسب مصادر اخرى في العام التالي. ان المراحل الجامعية هذه تطلب استعدادات كثيرة وفترات دراسة رسمية والعديد من الامتحانات التي لا يمكن اكمالها في العام نفسه او في عام واحد. عند مطابقة دبلوم الإمام الخطيب مع دبلوم المدرسة الثانوية العامة، كان ينبغي على أردوغان أن يدرس دروساً إضافية لمدة عام واحد في مدرسة أيوب الثانوية وأن يجتاز الامتحانات (بيركون ٢٠٢١).




علاوة على ذلك، ووفقاً لسجلات مدرسة الإمام الخطيب، بان اردوغان لم ينجح من دروس اللغة العربية والقرآن والذي كان يتطلب جهداً اضافياً في تلك الفترة في الامتحانات النهائية (دوندار ٢٠٠٧). بالإضافة الى ذلك، لا توجد أي وثيقة ثبوتية قدمها أردوغان أو أي مصادر موثوقة أخرى تؤيد بأنه حاصل على شهادة معادلة من مدرسة أيوب العليا.


المعروف بان أردوغان قد أكمل دراسته الجامعية المزعومة في ثماني سنوات، علماً ان قانون الجامعات التركية في ذلك الوقت ووفقاً للمادة ٥٤ كانت تنص على فصل الطالب من الجامعة، إذا لم يتخرج في فترة واحدة ونصف من الفترة الرسمية للدراسة. في حالة أردوغان كانت فترة الدراسة في معهد الاقتصاد والعلوم التجارية ٣ سنوات، وعليه كان من المفترض ووفق المادة أعلاه يجب طرد أردوغان من الكلية حتى إذا كانت مدة الدراسة أربع سنوات كما يزعم اردوغان (سوزجو ٢٠١٦، جمهوريت ٢٠١٥). مشيرة إلى أنه عندما حصل أردوغان على سلطة برلمانية كافية لتغيير الدستور التركي، تمت صياغة المادة المتعلقة بالدراسة الجامعية للمرشح الرئاسي بحذف مطلب أربع سنوات (موقع الكتروني الري هبر ٢٠١٦).

يدعي أردوغان أنه تخرج من كلية آق ساري للعلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية عام ١٩٨١. غير انه لا يوجد هناك أي دليل موثوق يؤيد او يثبت على أن أردوغان كان قد التحق الى هذه الدراسة وأكملها. الوثائق التي تم نشرها حول المراحل التعليمية لأردوغان مليئة بالأخطاء (صور ١-٥). فيما يلي بعض الملاحظات التي تدحض ادعاءات اردوغان:

- لم يتم نشر أي صورة التقطت لأردوغان أثناء دراسته في الجامعة، لا من قبل اردوغان ولا من قبل زملائه. على الرغم من أن السياسيين الأتراك والصحافة التركية تحدّوه بنشر حتى ولو صورة واحدة التقطها أثناء دراسته في الجامعة،



- لا يوجد أي زميل لأردوغان سبق وان اعطى معلومات كافية وموثوقة حول تخرج اردوغان من كلية آق ساراي للعلوم التجارية،
 - تخرج العديد من الطلاب من نفس المعهد وفي الفترة الدراسية نفسها، لم يعرفوا أو يعرفوا على أردوغان أثناء دراستهم (جولشان ٢٠١٤)،
 - أردوغان يتحدث عن فترة دراسته الابتدائية وعن دراسته في ثانوية الامام خطيب بأسلوب حماسي في الصحافة المرئية والمسموعة، لكنه لا يتحدث قط عن حياته الجامعية. اللافت للنظر أن الذين يديرون المقابلات معه لا يسألونه عن حياته الجامعية في البرامج التلفزيونية، وبالأخص في وسائل الإعلام الموالية له (نياز تي في ٢٠١٣)،
 - في الوقت الذي رفع فيه أردوغان آلاف الدعاوى القضائية لأدنى حد من الانتقادات الموجهة اليه، فانه لم يقاضي أحداً ممن كتب او تحدث عن تزوير شهادات تخرجه، وهم كثيرون،
 - قال يوسف ضياء أوزجان، رئيس سابق لمجلس التعليم العالي التركية (دائرة حكومية على مستوى وزارة) والذي خدم فيه أوزجان من ١١ كانون الاول ٢٠٠٧ حتى ١١ كانون الاول ٢٠١١، إنه عندما كان رئيساً للمجلس بحث عن الشهادة الجامعية لأردوغان فلم يستطع العثور عليها (دوفار ٢٠٢٣)،
 - حسب ملفات حزب الرفاه لعام ١٩٩٤، عندما كان أردوغان مرشح الحزب وفاز في انتخابات رئاسة بلدية إستانبول، التحق أردوغان بالجامعة في فترة "١٩٧٤-١٩٧٥" وتخرج منها عام ١٩٧٩. وهو الآن يدعي أنه تخرج عام ١٩٨١ (اودا تي في ٢٠١٦).
- يُظهر سجل التأمين الخاص بأردوغان بأنه كان يعمل بدوام كامل في شركة إستانبول للكهرباء والترام والأنفاق خلال السنوات التي يقول إنه كان يدرس فيها في الكلية. (بالجين ٢٠١٤: ٥٧، اودا ٢٠١٥).




تتص النسخة الإنجليزية من سيرة أردوغان المنشورة (موقع الرئاسة باللغة الإنجليزية) على موقع رئاسة الجمهورية التركية، على أن أردوغان تخرج من كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم الإدارية، بينما تذكر النسخة التركية على نفس الموقع تخصصاً آخر، وهو كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم التجارية (موقع الرئاسة باللغة التركية) (صورة ١٠).

الانتقادات والشكاوى

على الرغم من أن تقييمات المراحل التعليمية وانطباعات المعلمين والتقارير والدرجات التي حصل عليها الرؤساء ورؤساء الوزراء الأتراك قد تم الإعلان عنها من قبل أنفسهم أو من قبل مصادر رسمية أو غير رسمية، إلا أن ذلك لم يحدث مع أردوغان. تم نشر ثلاث وثائق تتعلق بشهادة أردوغان الجامعية المزعومة (صورة ١، ٢، ٤)، تم تأييد اثنين منهما من قبل اثنين من رؤساء جامعة مرمره، وآخر نُشر من قبل الصحافة التركية. ان جميع هذه الوثائق تحتوي على أخطاء واضحة جدية.

جاءت الشكوك في شرعية شهادات اردوغان التعليمية في كل مرة مع محاولات اردوغان بالقيام في تغييرات في الدستور التركي، وكانت اولها في عام ٢٠٠٧، عندما ذكر أركون أوزيدون انه أعد دستوراً خاصاً لأردوغان (اودا تي في ٢٠١٤). بعد ذلك، توقف الحديث عن تغيير الدستور، ومعه توقف النقاش حول امتلاك أردوغان لشهادة جامعية.

مع إعلان أردوغان ترشيح نفسه للانتخابات الرئاسية التركية في عام ٢٠١٤، تصاعدت المناقشات مرة أخرى حول ما إذا كان أردوغان قد حصل على شهادة جامعية أم لا. إذ




من الشروط الأساسية للترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية التركية هو الحصول على شهادة جامعية مدة الدراسة فيها أربع سنوات.

من بين الشكاوى العديدة كان طلب استجواب برلماني قدمه النائب علي أوزتورك إلى رئاسة البرلمان التركي، لكنه لم يتم الرد عليه (بيركون ٢٠١٦). في هذا الصدد، قال نائب آخر، باريش ياركاداش: "سألت داود أوغلو (رئيس الوزراء) ولم يكن هناك جواب. تقدمت بطلب إلى جامعة مرمرة للحصول على معلومات. قالوا لي إنهم ردوا على علي رضا أوزتورك، الذي كان عضواً في البرلمان عن الفترة السابقة، وأن القضية أصبحت علنية. لسوء الحظ، الإجابة غامضة إلى حد ما. تقدمت بطلب إلى الهيئة العليا للمعلومات. أتوقع ردًا في الثاني عشر أو الخامس عشر من هذا الشهر" (هاجال اوغلو ٢٠١٦).

جاء الرد الرسمي الأول على المناقشات حول عدم حصول أردوغان على شهادة جامعية من مصدر ليس من مسؤوليته التدخل في مثل هذه الأمور قط. في ٢٤ نيسان ٢٠١٤، تدخل رئيس جامعة مرمرة، ظفر كول في الأمر ونشر على حسابه الشخصي على تويتر بياناً ردًا على السياسيين والإعلاميين الذين زعموا أن أردوغان لا يملك شهادة جامعية. ونشر كول بما سماه وثيقة تخرج اردوغان المؤقتة (صورة ١) التي تحتوي على مجمل من العيوب والنواقص وهذا يعطي انطباعا واضحا بانها مزورة. مع العلم أن رئيس الجامعة ظفر كول تم تعيينه من قبل السلطة الثانية في حزب العدالة والتنمية بعد أردوغان، رئيس الجمهورية التركية آنذاك عبد الله كول (فرات ٢٠١٦، اودا ٢٠١٥، ٢٠١٤).

لإعاقة إجراء مزيد من التحقيقات حول الشهادة الجامعية لأردوغان، قررت محكمة جنابات الأناضول الخامسة في إستانبول في ١٨ تموز ٢٠١٤ منع الوصول إلى أرشيف شهادات جامعة مرمرة (بيركون ٢٠١٦).




في غضون ذلك، نشر البروفيسور يوسف هالاج أوغلو، نائب رئيس الكتلة البرلمانية لحزب الحركة الوطنية، وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة لأردوغان، والتي نشرها كول، ونسخة طبق الأصل من شهادة أردوغان (صورة ٢، ٣). وأكد أن فترة الدراسة في معهد أكساراي للعلوم التجارية كانت ثلاث سنوات. وفقًا لذلك، فإن أردوغان غير مؤهل لمنصب رئيس جمهورية تركيا (سوزجو ٢٠١٦ ب).

نشر الكاتب الاستقصائي أركون بويراز في ١٧ ايلول ٢٠١٥ الذي كتب عدة مقالات وكتابًا عن حياة أردوغان لأول مرة نسخة طبق الاصل اخرى لأردوغان (صورة ٤، ٥)، موضعًا متى ولماذا وأين تم تنظيم الوثائق الثلاثة (صورة ١، ٢، ٤)، المنشورة التابعة لأردوغان (اودا ٢٠١٥).

في ١٠ حزيران ٢٠١٦، تم نشر هذه النسخة من طبق الاصل الثانية (صورة ٤) من الشهادة الجامعية المزعومة لأردوغان بشكل رسمي من على حساب تويتر لحزب الشعوب الديمقراطي مع الملاحظة التالية "بناءً على طلبنا، نشارك نموذج الشهادة المؤقتة من كاتب عدل المرسل لنا من قبل الهيئة العليا للانتخابات (ها دا يا ٢٠١٦).

تقدم حزب التحرير للشعب في ٢٨ ايلول ٢٠١٥ بطلب إلى الهيئة العليا للانتخابات يطالب بإقالة رئيسه مدعيًا أنه وافق على ترشيح اردوغان لانتخابات رئاسة الجمهورية بالاستناد على الشهادة الجامعية المزورة لأردوغان (سوزجو ٢٠١٥).


لم يتم الرد بشكل معقول على أي من الشكاوى الرسمية وغير الرسمية المقدمة للجهات الحكومية المعنية بالزام أردوغان بإبراز شهادته الجامعية أو التحقق من صحة وثائقه، والتي تحتوي على أخطاء تجعلها باطلة.



مع خطوات أردوغان المتسارعة نحو فرض الطابع الإسلامي على النظام العلماني التركي فضلا عن مسيرته الحثيثة نحو الاستبداد، بدأ بالاستعدادات في عام ٢٠١٦ لتغيير الدستور التركي نحو الديكتاتورية الرئاسية وزيادة سلطات اردوغان الى ابعد الحدود.

اندلعت النقاشات مرة أخرى في وسائل الإعلام التركية بين السياسيين والمثقفين الأتراك حول ما إذا كان أردوغان حاصل على شهادة جامعية أم لا وحول الشكوك على وثائق اردوغان المنشورة والمقدمة الى الدوائر الحكومية. مرة أخرى بدأ تقديم الشكاوى إلى الجهات المختصة، للمطالبة بالتأكد من شرعية وثائق أردوغان، بينهم شكاوى من قبل أعضاء البرلمان الى رئاسة البرلمان، على سبيل المثال:

- قدم النائب البرلماني من أنقرة، علي حيدر هاكويردي في نيسان ٢٠١٦ طلبا إلى إدارة جامعة مرمرة للحصول على معلومات حول الشهادة الجامعية التي حصل عليها أردوغان. في حزيران ٢٠١٦، قدم هاكويردي طلبا اخر لاستجواب برلماني حول صحة شهادة لأردوغان الجامعية (بيركون ٢٠١٦)،
- قدم البرلماني من إستانبول، باريش ياركادش في حزيران ٢٠١٦ طلبا لاستجواب برلماني حول صحة الشهادة الجامعية لأردوغان (هاجال اوغلو ٢٠١٦)،
- قدم الرئيس السابق لنقابة القضاة والمدعين العامين التركية، عمر فاروق أمين اغا أوغلو في حزيران ٢٠١٦ طلبا إلى الهيئة الأعلى للانتخابات للتحقيق في الشهادة الجامعية، التي قدمها أردوغان إلى الهيئة. رفض الهيئة الطلب بالإجماع (سوزجو ٢٠١٦ ج)،
- في الشهر نفسه، رفع أمين اغا أوغلو دعوى قضائية ضد رئيس جامعة مرمرة، متهما إياه بالسلوك غير القانوني وعدم الوفاء بمتطلبات الواجب وإساءة استخدام المنصب (جمهورية ٢٠١٦)،



- رفع حزب التحرير في تموز ٢٠١٧ دعوى إلى المحكمة الدستورية مدعياً بأن شهادة الرئيس أردوغان الجامعية مزورة (ها كا يا ٢٠١٧). كما قدم الحزب طلبات مختلفة لجهات مختلفة مثل جامعة مرمره، يطلب فيها معلومات عن شهادة أردوغان الجامعية،
- قدم نائب رئيس حزب الشعب الجمهوري، تور يلديز بيجر في ١٠ أكتوبر ٢٠١٦ استجواباً برلمانياً إلى رئاسة البرلمان التركي، متسائلاً: ما هي الشهادة التي قمتها الرئيس رجب طيب أردوغان لدوائر الجيش التركي حتى يتسنى له أن يخدم كضابط احتياطي؟ ردّ البرلمان التركي على الاستجواب بالقول إن الوثائق ذات الصلة قد تم إتلافها (نيوز سايت ٢٠١٦) (صورة ٦).

وبقيت جميع الشكاوى دون نتيجة سواء كانت تم رفضها من البداية أو تم تقديم أعذار بعدم إمكانية التحقيق في الأمر. ثم جاءت الخطوة القانونية لعرقلة التدقيق في شهادة أردوغان في ٣٠ نيسان ٢٠١٨، إذ ألغى الهيئة العليا للانتخابات شرط تصديق الشهادة الجامعية من كاتب عدل لمن يتقدمون للترشح للانتخابات الرئاسية والنيابية العامة. هذا لأن أردوغان ليس لديه شهادة جامعية موثقة بشكل قانوني. يوم ٢ مايس ٢٠١٨ سأل البرلمان محمد توم في نقاش برلماني هل اتخذ هذا القرار من الهيئة الأعلى للانتخابات لصالح الرئيس أردوغان؟ (أحوال ٢٠١٨) (صورة ٧)

النواقص والأخطاء في وثائق أردوغان المنشورة

يبدو أن أردوغان لم يكن بحاجة إلى وثيقة التخرج إلا عند الضرورة القصوى وفي حالات خارج اختصاصه، وفي كل مرة قدم فيها وثيقة كانت غير تلك التي سبقتها. كانت المرة الأولى التي احتاج فيها أردوغان إلى وثيقة تخرج عندما جاء وقت أداء خدمته العسكرية




الإجبارية، ومن أجل تقصير المدة والعمل كضابط احتياط، أعد اردوغان الشهادة الأولى وهي وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة (صورة ١). ثم قدم اردوغان وثيقة التخرج في مناسبتين أخريين. المرة الأولى عام ١٩٩٤ عندما ترشح لمنصب رئيس بلدية إستانبول حيث أعد أول نسخة من طبق الاصل (صورة ٢). أما المناسبة الثانية فكانت عندما خطط اردوغان للترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية التركية عام ٢٠١٤، فقدم النسخة الثانية من طبق الاصل (صورة ٤).

أما بالنسبة الوثائق المنشورة بخصوص شهادة تخرج اردوغان من الجامعة فهي كالتالي:

- أ. وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة؛
 - ب. نسخة طبق الاصل الأولى؛
 - ت. نسخة طبق الاصل الثانية.
- أ. وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة (صورة ١)

قدم رئيس جامعة مرمره، ظافر كول، في نيسان ٢٠١٦ هذه الوثيقة وادعى أنها وثيقة تخرج اردوغان المؤقتة، مما يعني أنه يدعم صحتها، على الرغم من احتوائها على أخطاء جسيمة.

أن وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة ليست بالشهادة الجامعية، بل هي وثيقة تُعطى للخريج عندما يحتاج إلى شهادة لم تكتمل بعد، على شرط جلب الشهادة الاصلية لاحقاً. وفقاً لجامعة مرمره، فإن وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة صالحة لمدة ٦ (ستة) أشهر (جامعة مرمره ٢٠٢٣، جامعة مرمره ٢٠١٨). من المعتمد بالنسبة للجهة التي يتم إحضار وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة لها أن تطلب الشهادة الأصلية عند إصدارها.




لم يعلم أحد بهذه الوثيقة قبل نشرها من قبل كول، اما بالنسبة للنسخة الاصلية لهذه الوثيقة فلم يذكر أحد بانه رآها. نشر رئيس الحزب الوطني والصحفي كوكجا فرات نسخة من هذه الوثيقة في ايلول ٢٠١٥، اذ توقع ان يكون اردوغان قد استعمل هذه الوثيقة لأداء خدمته العسكرية كضابط احتياطي، كما يدعي اردوغان، وإلا كان يجب أن يخدم كجندي اعتيادي (فرات ٢٠١٦). كما ذكر اعلاه تقدم النائب بيجر بطلب إلى رئاسة البرلمان التركي يطلب التحقيق في اية شهادة جامعية استخدم اردوغان للخدمة العسكرية، الذي بقيت دون الوصول الى النتيجة.

دافع رئيس جامعة مرمرة عن صحة هذه الوثيقة علما بانه ليس من مسؤولية رئيس الجامعة الدفاع عن صحة مثل هذه الوثائق (الشهادة)، بالأخص التي تتعلق بكبار موظفي الدولة كرئيس الوزراء. كما ذكر أعلاه، فتح أحد رؤساء اتحاد القضاة والمدعين السابقين دعوى قضائية ضد رئيس جامعة مرمرة في هذا السياق (جمهورية ٢٠١٦). كما ان الوثيقة تحتوي على العديد من الأخطاء الجسيمة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك لم يقدم رئيس الجامعة أية أدلة لأثبات ادعائه. هناك في كل دولة دوائر متخصصة مسؤولة عن تثبت صحة الوثائق الرسمية او الكشف عن التزويرات في الوثائق.

وأشار كول إلى أن اردوغان درس في الجامعة لمدة ٤ سنوات، دون أن يشير إلى أي مصدر، لكن هناك جهات أكاديمية تركية تزعم أن اردوغان درس في معهد كان مدة الدراسة فيه ثلاث سنوات (سوزجو ٢٠١٦ب، جمهورية ٢٠١٦ب).

كما ان الرئيس السابق لجامعة مرمرة، محمد أمين أرات، الذي يدعي أنه زميل اردوغان في تلك الدراسة في نفس الكلية، لا يكتب في سيرته الذاتية أنه تخرج من جامعة مرمرة




كما يفعل أردوغان، بل يكتب أنه تخرج من أكاديمية إستانبول للعلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية (أرات بيوغرافي، الموقع الإلكتروني لجامعة مرمره).

بالنسبة للأخطاء الرئيسية في وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة التابعة لأردوغان، بالأخص إذا ما قورنت بوثيقة أصلية أخرى (صورة ٨)، فهي:

- تصميم الوثيقة وعنوانها ليس تصميمًا ولا عنوانًا لشهادة تخرج مؤقتة، بل تصميم وعنوان لشهادة التخرج الاعتيادية. بالنسبة لوثيقة التخرج المؤقتة، يجب ان يكون عنوانها وثيقة تخرج مؤقتة وبتصميم اخر (زيللي ٢٠٢٣)،
- على هذه الوثيقة مكتوب بخط يد أردوغان عبارة "استلمت باليد أصل وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الخاصة بي" وهذه العبارة موقعة بتوقيع أردوغان. إن كتابة مثل هذه العبارات على وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة من قبل حامل الوثيقة أمر غير قانوني ومحتوى الكتابة خاطئ أيضًا. لا توجد وثيقة تسمى وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الأصلية،
- لا توجد صورة لصاحب الوثيقة (أردوغان)، وهي إجبارية في مثل هذه الوثائق،
- لا يوجد ختم المدرسة التي أعطت الوثيقة، وهذا إجباري أيضا،
- توقيع العميد مزور.

في منتصف ٢٠١٦، نشرت الصحافة الموالية لأردوغان عددا من الصور لأردوغان مرتديا زي ضابط احتياطي وسط مجموعة من ضباط الاحتياط، زاعمة أن الصور تم التقطتها خلال خدمة اردوغان العسكرية. كان الغرض من نشر هذه الصور لأردوغان إقناع الرأي العام التركي بأنها دليل على أن أردوغان خريج دراسة جامعية مدتها أربع سنوات (كوكدمير ٢٠١٦).




وفقاً للتشريع التركي، تمنح دراسة جامعية مدتها أربع سنوات حاملها الحق في أداء الخدمة العسكرية كضابط احتياط في الجيش ولفترة أقصر. واستعمل اردوغان وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة عند التحاقه للجيش (فرات ٢٠١٦). حسب وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة لأردوغان، فإنه تخرج من كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم التجارية في ٣ نيسان ١٩٨١ والتحق بالخدمة العسكرية في شهر اذار من عام ١٩٨٢ (يالجين ٢٠١٤: ٨٦). وهذا يعني أن وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة لأردوغان لم تعد صالحة عندما التحق بالجيش. مثلما ذكر اعلاه، ان وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة صالحة لمدة ٦ أشهر فقط (جامعة مرمره ٢٠١٨).

بناءً على هذه الحقائق، فإن وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة هذه والتي تخص اردوغان باطلة.

ب. نسخة طبق الاصل الأولى (صورة ٢، ٣)

وفقاً لجامعة مرمره، فإن تعريف نسخة طبق الاصل للشهادة الجامعية هو كما يلي: في حالة فقدان الشهادة الاصلية أو تمزقها أو تلفها إلى درجة لا يمكن استخدامها، يتم إصدار نسخة طبق الاصل وتصميم جديد، وفيها يجب كتابة رقم الشهادة الاصلية. فضلاً عن ذلك يرفق صورتين للخريج والشهادة التالفة أو الممزقة عند التقديم لطلب نسخة من طبق الاصل، يتم كتابة العنوان والاسم واللقب ومهنة الموقعين ضمن حقول التوقيع والموافقة لنسخة طبق الاصل، كما هو الحال في الشهادة الاصلية، ولكن بدون توقيعات (أرات بيوغرافي، جامعة مرمره ٢٠١٨).


على الرغم من ظهور هذه الوثيقة لطبق الاصل في عام ٢٠١٤، إلا أن الكاتب الاستقصائي أركون بويراز، نشر الوثيقة على حسابه في الفيس بوك والتويتر في أيلول ٢٠١٥، موضحاً متى ولماذا وأين تم تنظيم هذه النسخة لطبق الاصل. وفقاً لبويراز



ولمصادر مختلفة أخرى فإن هذه النسخة أعدت عام ١٩٩٤ لاستخدامها من قبل أردوغان في انتخابات رئاسة بلدية إستانبول والتي فاز بها (بويراز ٢٠١٥).

توجد هناك عدة أخطاء كبيرة في وثيقة طبق الاصل الأولى المتعلقة بشهادة أردوغان الجامعية وهي:

- لم يتخرج أردوغان لا من جامعة مرمره ولا من كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم الإدارية بجامعة مرمره كما هو مدرج على نسخة طبق الأصل، إذ ان جامعة مرمره لم تكن قد تأسست في عام ١٩٨١، مثلما هو دارج على وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الباطلة.
- إذا كان أردوغان قد تخرج فعلا من الكلية كما يدعي، فإن تخرجه من المفترض ان يكون من كلية العلوم التجارية وليس الإدارية، أي من أكاديمية إستانبول للعلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية حسب وثيقته التخرج المؤقتة الباطلة وليس من جامعة مرمره. (الصورة ١)
- يبدو أن منصب رئيس البلدية والمجال السياسي من المجالات التي يتوجب اشغالها ذوي الاختصاص الاداري، لذا فإن تخصص الإدارة كان أكثر ملاءمة لأردوغان، وعليه تم استبدال تخصص التجارة بتخصص الإدارة. لا يمكن أن تحدث مثل هذه التغييرات في جوهر الشهادة إلا في مستندات مزورة وفي قضية مليئة بالتزويرات الكبيرة والبارزة، كما في حالة الشهادات التعليمية المتعلقة بأردوغان. يظهر هذا الخطأ أيضًا عند مقارنة سيرة أردوغان المنشورة على موقع رئاسة الجمهورية التركية، نرى في القسم الإنجليزي يُكتب (الإدارية) وفي القسم التركي يُكتب (التجارية). يشير تغيير أردوغان مجال اختصاصه من التجاري إلى الإداري بهذه السهولة إلى مدى استعداده الكبير للتلاعب بالحقائق وتشويهها،
- جامعة مرمره تمنح نسخة طبق الأصل من الشهادة الجامعية للخريج وفقا لشروط، منها:
 - يجب أن تكون الشهادة الأصلية مفقودة أو ممزقة أو تالفة واصبحت غير صالحة للاستعمال. في الاحتمال الأول يجب نشر خبر فقدان الشهادة الأصلية في وقتها في




إحدى الصحف المحلية، وفي الاحتمال الثاني يجب تقديم الشهادة الأصلية التالفة. في كلتا الحالتين لا توجد معلومات حول تقديم أردوغان للأدلة المطلوبة،

- يجب كتابة رقم الشهادة الأصلي على نسخة طبق الأصل. لكن أردوغان لا يملك شهادة أصلية. حتى أن الرقم الموجود في هذه النسخة من طبق الأصل ليس هو نفسه الموجود في الوثيقة الوحيدة المبلّغة بالأخطاء التي قدمها أردوغان حول دراساته الجامعية المزعومة، وهي وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الباطلة،
- يجب أن تحتوي نسخة طبق الأصل صورة شخصية لصاحب الشهادة، غير أنه لا توجد صورة لأردوغان على هذه النسخة من طبق الأصل،
- يجب أن تحتوي نسخة طبق الأصل العنوان والاسم واللقب ومهنة الموقعين، المدرجة في حقول التوقيع والموافقة على الشهادة الأصلية، ولكن بدون التوقيعات. لكن:
- ليس لدى أردوغان شهادة أصلية لمعرفة العنوان والاسم واللقب ومهنة الموقعين،
- أسماء رئيس الجامعة والعميد الواردة في هذه النسخة طبق الأصل لأردوغان ليست هي الأسماء نفسها الموجودة في وثيقة تخرجه المؤقتة الباطلة، والتي يستخدمها أردوغان بشكل غير قانوني كشهادة أصلية.

ت. نسخة طبق الأصل الثانية (صورة ٤ و ٥)

ليس من الواضح لماذا احتاج أردوغان لنسخة ثانية من طبق الأصل، أن الفوارق الرئيسية بين النسخة الأولى وهذه النسخة هي الاختلاف في تصميم الشهادة ووجود توقيع لكل من عميد الكلية ورئيس الجامعة في هذه النسخة. كما ذكر أعلاه، وفقاً لجامعة مرمرة لا ينبغي أن يكون هناك أي توقيعات على نسخة طبق الأصل.




في ٣ حزيران ٢٠١٦، نشر رئيس آخر لجامعة مرمرة محمد أمين آرات على الموقع الإلكتروني للجامعة بياناً من أربع صفحات يحمل توقيعه يعطي سيرة أردوغان التعليمية بشكل كامل تقريباً، والتي تضمنت تناقضات وأخطاء مختلفة. دعم البيان صحة الوثائق المتعلقة بشهادة أردوغان المزعومة. وبحسب آرات فإن هذه النسخة من طبق الاصل صدرت في ١ نيسان ٢٠١١ (آرات ٢٠١٦).

يبدو أن أردوغان شارك مع رئيس جامعة مرمرة محمد أمين آرات، في كتابة بيان الاخير حول مسيرة أردوغان التعليمية، لأن أردوغان كان في جامعة مرمرة في اليوم نفسه الذي نشر فيه آرات تقريره عن أردوغان وألقى كلمة هناك. تحدث أردوغان في خطابه بطريقة وكأنه يأمر أعضاء هيئة التدريس في الجامعة بإحضار شهادة جامعية له بأي شكل من الأشكال. هذه هي ما قال اردوغان:

"لقد بدأوا مناقشة هذه الأيام حول ما إذا كان لديه (يقصد نفسه) دبلوم أم لا. اخرجته من الأرشيف، هل ستتشره، ماذا ستفعل؟ ... ربما سيصدقون إذا أعلن رئيس الجامعة" (ت ٢٤ ٢٠١٦).

فضلا عن ذلك ألقى أردوغان في خطابه بعض النقاط الرئيسية حول تخرجه الجامعي المزعوم، والذي أدرجها آرات في بيانه. وتضمن البيان معلومات مفصلة ودقيقة عن السيرة التعليمية لأردوغان، إذ لا يستطيع معرفة هذه المعلومات إلا الأشخاص المقربون جدا منه، أو قدم اردوغان نفسه هذه المعلومات لرئيس الجامعة مباشرة (نفس المصدر).


عندما تم أعداد النسخة الثانية من طبق الاصل لشهادة أردوغان الجامعية في عام ٢٠١١، كان رئيس جامعة مرمرة هو ظفر كول، الذي نشر البيان الأول في نيسان ٢٠١٤ ودعم صحة وثائق أردوغان المشبوهة. أما نائب رئيس الجامعة كول آنذاك كان محمد أمين آرات والذي أصبح فيما بعد رئيساً لجامعة مرمرة في عام ٢٠١٤ هو الذي نشر البيان



المطول الثاني في حزيران ٢٠١٦ لدعم صحة وثائق أردوغان المزعومة، علماً أن امر تعيين رؤساء الجامعات كان ولا يزال يتم بشكل رئيسي من قبل اردوغان.

فيما يلي بعض الملاحظات على تصريح رئيس جامعة مرمره محمد أمين آرات حول شهادة الجامعية المزعومة لأردوغان:

- وصف آرات جميع الانتقادات الموجهة لتعليم أردوغان بأنها لا أساس لها وتتناقض مع الحقائق. وكما هو الحال في تصريح رئيس الجامعة السابق ظفر كول لم يقدم آرات أيضاً أي دليل يدعم مزاعمه أو يثبت بطلان الانتقادات الجدية العديدة لجميع المراحل التعليمية لأردوغان،
- ادعى آرات أن أردوغان تخرج بتقدير جيد من ٤١ درساً، وهو ما يتناقض مع حقيقة أن أردوغان أكمل دراسته في ثماني سنوات. كما لم يقدم آرات أي دليل لإثبات ادعائه، ولا يوجد منشور أو مصدر محايد أو مستقل يدعم هذه المعلومات،
- أشار آرات الى ان اردوغان كان قد تخرج من القسم الاداري للكلية وليس من القسم التجاري، رغم أنّ وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الباطلة التي يعتمد عليها آرات نفسه، والتي تُبنى عليها جميع الوثائق الأخرى المتعلقة بشهادة اردوغان الجامعية، يُكتب عليه ان اردوغان درس العلوم التجارية وليس العلوم الإدارية، (صورة ١)
- كما في نسخة طبق الأصل الأولى لأردوغان، فان الأسماء الواردة في هذه النسخة هي أيضاً ليست نفسها الموجودة في وثيقة تخرجه المؤقتة الباطلة،
- من المعروف أن أردوغان يدعي أن آرات تخرج من نفس الكلية التي تخرج منها. يدافع آرات عن استخدام أردوغان في سيرته الذاتية بأنه خريج كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم التجارية بجامعة مرمره، لكن آرات نفسه يكتب في سيرته الذاتية أنه خريج أكاديمية إستانبول للعلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية (آرات بيوغرافي)،




- في عام ٢٠١١ عندما أصدرت جامعة مرمرة النسخة الثانية من طبق الأصل للشهادة الجامعية لأردوغان والتي تحتوي على عدد من الأخطاء الجسيمة، كان آرات نائباً لرئيس الجامعة (نفس المصدر).
- في عام ٢٠١٣ عندما كان آرات نائباً لرئيس جامعة مرمرة، منحت الجامعة أردوغان الدكتوراه الفخرية في العلوم السياسية،
- في عام ٢٠١٤، قام أردوغان بتعيين آرات رئيساً لجامعة مرمرة (نفس المصدر).

تم التصديق على النسخة الثانية من طبق الأصل لشهادة أردوغان من قبل "كاتب العدل"، والتي لا يمكن تحقيقها دون رؤية الشهادة الأصلية. إذ يتوجب عند التصديق، أن يطلع كاتب العدل على الأصل وأن يذكر على ظهر الوثيقة أنها مطابقة للشهادة الأصلية. ومع ذلك وبدون الشهادة الأصلية صادق كاتب العدل على نسخة طبق الأصل مدونا عليها "إنها مطابقة للأصل".

عاقب اتحاد كُتّاب العدل التركية إحدى موظفات مكتب كاتب العدل، التي قامت بالتصديق على نسخة طبق الأصل (الثانية) هذه بعقوبة تحذيرية. قدم أردوغان هذه النسخة من طبق الأصل المليئة بالأخطاء والمُصدّقة بشكل غير شرعي من كاتب العدل إلى الهيئة العليا للانتخابات كمرشح لرئاسة الجمهورية التركية ووافق عليها الهيئة. تم رفض جميع الشكاوى المقدمة إلى المفوضية العليا للانتخابات تطلب رفض ترشيح اردوغان او التأكيد من صحة وثائقه (جمهورية ٢٠١٩).

من ناحية أخرى للتصديق على اية وثيقة لدى كاتب العدل، يجب على صاحب الوثيقة اما إحضار الوثيقة بنفسه الى كاتب العدل او إعطاء وكالة لشخص اخر لإتمام المعاملة. لا يوجد هناك أي احتمال او دليل على ان هذين الشرطين قد تحقق. الشخص الذي



أحضر هذه النسخة من طبق الأصل لشهادة أردوغان إلى كاتب العدل للتصديق عليها هو حسن توكمنز سائق مدير مكتب أردوغان، حسن دوغان (جمهورية ٢٠١٩ ب).


يبدو أن النسخة الأولى (صورة ٢ و ٣) من نسخة طبق الأصل لشهادة أردوغان الجامعية تم تنظيمها بشكل غير قانوني خارج جامعة مرمره، وإلا لما كانت قد أعدت جامعة مرمره نسخة طبق الأصل للمرة الثانية (صورة ٤ و ٥)، أو ان رؤساء جامعة مرمره الذين قدموا معلومات مفصلة حول مسيرة أردوغان التعليمية كانوا قد اشاروا إليها، علاوة على ذلك فإن تصميم الشهادة ليس تصميمًا تابعًا لجامعة مرمره.

وثيقة أخرى (صورة ٩)

دليل خريجي اكاديمية إستانبول للعلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية، كلية العلوم التجارية للعام ١٩٨٠-١٩٨١ (اودا تي في ٢٠١٦ ب).

يحتوي دليل الخريجين على معلومات مفصلة عن حياة الطالب الجامعية، بما في ذلك الاسم الكامل وتواريخ فترات الدراسة بما في ذلك تاريخ الالتحاق بالجامعة وتاريخ التخرج ورقم الطالب وصور الطلاب مع ملاحظات قصيرة وبيانات عن سلوكهم وشخصيتهم. كما يتضمن الدليل أسماء أعضاء لجنة إعداد الدليل وأسماء رئيس الجامعة وعميد الكلية ونوابهم والمحاضرين.

من بين المعلومات الواردة في دليل الخريجين عن الطالب، كيف كان حضوره في الكلية، على سبيل المثال: "كان يأتي إلى المدرسة من حين لآخر"، "كان قد أهمل المدرسة"،



"كان يأتي إلى المدرسة فقط في أيام الامتحان "و" واصل الدراسة والعمل معاً". يستخدم أردوغان باستمرار سنوات الفوضى في السبعينيات في تركيا كذريعة لعدم معرفة أي شخص أي شيء عن حياته الجامعية أو لم يره أحد في الجامعة.


نشرت الصحف التركية في مارت ٠١٦، دليل الخريجين للكلية التي يدّعي أردوغان أنه كان قد تخرج منها، وهو العام نفسه الذي تخرج فيه أردوغان أي عام ١٩٨١، لم ترد فيه أية معلومات عن أردوغان.

يوجد في الدليل صور مختلفة للطلاب وفي مراحل الدراسة المختلفة، في داخل وخارج المدرسة، مع المحاضرين، في الرحلات المدرسية، وفي الفرق الرياضية. لا وجود لأردوغان في هذه الصور. يُعرف أردوغان باهتمامه بكرة القدم في شبابه واحترافه بها وانضمامه لفرق كرة القدم في الدوري التركي. ومع ذلك، فهو غير موجود حتى في صور فريق كرة القدم بالمدرسة. علما أنه ورد في الدليل أنه لم يتم استبعاد أي طالب.

النفسية الشعبوية

ظهر عدد كبير من الشعبويين في العقدين الماضيين بعضهم يتمتع بسلوك شعبي قوي نجحوا في الفوز بالسلطة، وحكم بعضهم لسنوات عديدة، وما زال كثيرون يحكمون. لقد قاموا خلال حكمهم بتغييرات جذرية في أنظمة الحكم في دولهم، وفي بعض الأحيان قلبوها رأساً على عقب.

منذ سنوات، يناقش المجتمع الأكاديمي ووسائل الإعلام العالمية بشكل مكثف الشعبوية والقادة الشعبويين في معانهم السلبية. هناك عوامل جوهرية في النهج الشعبوي تجعله ينحرف عن السياقات السياسية المعتادة.




الشعبوية نهج سياسي يعتمد بشكل أساسي على القائد واستخدام المشاعر، حيث يلعب شخص واحد الدور الأساسي في الحصول على دعم الجماهير الكبيرة جدا والحفاظ عليه. الاعتماد حصريًا على القائد واستغلال المشاعر غالبًا ما يؤدي إلى:

- الانحراف في مناقشة الجماهير،
- إن الحصول على دعم هذا العدد الكبير من الجماهير يجعل الانحرافات في مخاطبة الناس أمرًا لا مفر منه، مثل استقطاب المجتمع (روبرتس ٢٠٢١) واستغلال الشعور القومي أو الديني أو الوطني أو الشعور بالفقر لدى المحرومين اقتصاديًا،
- إساءة استخدام السلطة،
- إن الحفاظ على دعم هذه العدد الكبير من الجماهير والقيام بإجراء تغييرات جذرية في النظام الحاكم يجعل إساءة استخدام السلطة أمرًا لا مفر منه.

هناك العديد من الجوانب السلبية الأخرى للسلوك الشعبوي.

- يتواجد التضليل والمعلومات الخاطئة في صميم الخطابات الشعبوية (هاينريش ٢٠١٧)،
- يستخدم الشعبوي خطابات الكراهية والألفاظ النابية والتفسيرات الاعتبارية ولا يتردد في قول الأكاذيب (دال ٢٠٢١) (الحاشية ١)،
- يستخدم الشعبوي نظريات المؤامرة بشكل متكرر، وهم يجيدون خلق أعداء للشعب والدولة والوطن، داخليًا وخارجيًا (بيرغمان ٢٠١٨)،
- تشويه صورة (شيطن) المعارضة والضغط العاطفي للجماهير يعتبران من السمات الرئيسية للشعبوية،




- تعتبر إساءة استخدام الديمقراطية من أكبر الجوانب السلبية في النهج الشعبي (كايل ومونك ٢٠١٨) (الحاشية ٢) كما انهم ينتهكون القوانين والتشريعات بسهولة وحتى الدستور (آداميديس ٢٠٢١، كوفالتشيك ٢٠٢٢).

هكذا، يعتبر النهج الشعبي جهدًا هائلًا فرديًا دائمًا تقريبًا وتحديًا لشرائع اجتماعية كبيرة، مثل النظام القائم بالكامل والصحافة والاقليات والمدافعون عن حقوق الانسان.

كل هذه الموصفات تكشف عن شخصية ذات خصوصيات مختلفة، ومن أبرز هذه الخصائص الرغبة الجامحة في السيادة والسيطرة والقدرة الهائلة على العمل والاقناع وعدم التردد في إساءة استخدام القواعد والقوانين والقيم الأخلاقية والاجتماعية.

في هذه الحالة لا بدّ ان يكون للتعليم الذي يشغل اليوم جزءًا كبيرًا من ممارسات الحياة اليومية للإنسان، دورًا في التأثير على نفسية الشعبي وشخصيته ومن ثم في سلوكه واجراءاته، كما ان افتقار النخبين إلى التعليم والشهادة الجامعية يلعب دورًا مهمًا في ظهور الشعبية (بروير ٢٠٢٢).

والحقيقة أنه بالرغم من أن التعليم يعتبر من الوظائف الأساسية للدولة ويهدف إلى تنقيف الناس حول القيم التي تقيد المجتمع، كما أنه يعد أحد الأهداف الرئيسية لمؤسسات الأمم المتحدة المعنية بالتعليم (بيرغان وداميان ٢٠١٠: ١٢٢-١٢٣)، توجد اليوم إخفاقات جامعية وتحديات أخلاقية في سياق التعليم العالي على المستوى العالمي، مما يتطلب وضع الأخلاق والقيم في مركز الاهتمام عند البحث عن الحلول (بريساكاريو وشاه ٢٠١٦: ١٥٢).




لا يمكن تفسير ظهور الشعبوية، التي لها الخصائص غير البناءة المذكورة أعلاه، والتي تقوض الأسس السياسية والاجتماعية المألوفة، من خلال عدم كفاية نظام التعليم وحده. في محاولة لتبرير التعليم أو على الأقل عدم إلقاء اللوم على التعليم بالكامل في صعود الشعبوية، يمكن العثور على العديد من الشعبويين المخضرمين يفتخرون إلى سيرة ذاتية تعليمية كاملة.


يفتقر أردوغان تركيا كما هو موضح أعلاه إلى منعطفات مهمة في مسيرته التعليمية، وافقاره إلى التعليم الجامعي شبه ثابت. مثلما هناك الكثير من الشكوك حول السيرة التعليمية لترامب أمريكا (فالانبا ٢٠١٩، إليوت ٢٠١١)، هناك عيوب في قصة الدراسات الجامعية لمودي الهندي، ولا تزال الشكوك تنتشر في وسائل الإعلام (بهاتاشاريا ٢٠١٨). فيما يتعلق بموراليس بوليفيا، حتى تعليمه في المدرسة الثانوية مشكوك فيه. بدأ بوريسوف بلغاريا العمل كرجل إطفاء بعد تخرجه من المدرسة الثانوية التي لا تتطلب تعليمًا جامعيًا، ثم تخرج في أوكار الحزب الشيوعي ونال هناك شهادته الجامعية. الشعبوي المخضرم زوما جنوب إفريقيا لم يذهب إلى المدرسة أبدًا.

يكشف تحليل العلاقة بين السمات الشخصية الخمس الكبرى، والإنجاز (الأكاديمي) أو الأداء واحترام الذات المرتبط بالشعبوية عن خصائص مهمة. (الجدول ١)

- تُظهر بيانات السمات الشخصية الخمس الكبرى للشعبوي عدم تطابق تام مع السمات الشخصية للأداء (الأكاديمي) أو الإنجاز،
- يهيمن تنني احترام الذات على السمات الشخصية للشعبوي، بينما يهيمن احترام الذات العالي على السمات الشخصية للفرد مع الإنجاز (الأكاديمي) أو الأداء الجيد (إنفايتي ومايرين ٢٠٠٨، صوفي، نميرجي وصديقي ٢٠١٤، أريانا ٢٠١٠، هيرن ٢٠١٩: ٤٤، كومار ٢٠١٧)،



- الحقيقة هي أن الشعبي يحقق في الواقع إنجازًا عظيمًا للغاية، الذي لا يعني ان هذا الانجاز إيجابي، وهذا يتعارض مع المعادلة السابقة بأن تدني احترام الذات يؤدي إلى مستوى متدنٍ من الإنجاز أو الأداء،
- هنا، يظهر دور الانبساط كواحد من السمات الشخصية الخمس الرئيسية للشعبي، والتي لها علاقة إيجابية بتقدير الذات العالي (مكارثي ٢٠١٧). الانبساطية المتطرفة هي أيضًا أحد الضرورات المطلقة للسلوك الشعبي، بمعنى آخر يجب أن يكون الشعبي مفتتحًا للغاية من أجل جذب عدد هائل من الجماهير وكسب دعمهم،
- قد يكون هذا الانبساط المفرط عند الشعبي يساعده في تحقيق انجازات عظيمة كتعويضٌ مفرط عن الحالة السلبية العامة لتقدير الذات عنده، الذي يعتبر ضد الإنجاز أو الأداء الجيد.
- يمكن أن تفسر السمات الأربع (توافق منخفض، ودرجة منخفضة من الضمير، ومستوى منخفض من الانفتاح، واستقرار عاطفي منخفض) غير البناء لسمات الشخصية الخمس الكبرى للشخصية الشعبية، والتي ترتبط جميعها بتدني احترام الذات، الجوانب السلبية للسلوك الشعبي (الشخصية)،
- يتواجد شعور الفرد بالذات (احترام الذات) في سن الخامسة، وسيكون مستقرًا نسبيًا في سن الحادية عشرة، ثم يضل ثابتًا نسبيًا طوال حياته (ماكألروي ٢٠١٥، دوشارم ٢٠١٨)، بينما تبدأ سمات الشخصية في الظهور بعد سنوات عديدة مع المراهقة (نيل ٢٠١٩). لما كان تدني احترام الذات تظهر وتستقر قبل ظهور واستقرار سمات الشخصية، فإذا ما دور تدني احترام الذات في بناء السمات الشخصية للشعبي. بعبارة أخرى ما هو دور الشعور بالنقص (عقدة النقص) في ظهور الشعبية؟ موضوع يتطلب دراسته.



الفرضية هي أن الفرد يستبدل (بوعي أو بغير وعي) حالته العامة من تدني احترام الذات (الشديد) بالانبساط (الشديد)، وهو عنصر من عناصر تقدير الذات الإيجابي (تعويض)، مما يؤدي إلى ظهور الشخصية الشعبوية، بعبارة أخرى فإن الحالة العامة لانخفاض احترام الذات الشديد للشعبي تثير وتُضخّم من حدة حالة الانبساط عنده، مما يخلق قدرة الشعبوية الهائلة على كسب جماهير كبيرة وتحقيق التقوى والسيادة والحفاظ عليهم.

الجدول ١، العلاقة بين السمات الشخصية الخمس الكبرى والإنجاز الأكاديمي (الأداء) واحترام الذات لدى الشعبي

الشعبي	احترام الذات ^١	الإنجاز (أكاديمي)	احترام الذات ^٢
الانبساط ^١	إيجابي	انطواء	سلبي
التوافق منخفض ^١	سلبي	التوافق عالي	إيجابي
الضمير منخفض ^١	سلبي	الضمير عالي	إيجابي
مستوى الانفتاح منخفض ^٢	سلبي	مستوى الانفتاح العالي	إيجابي
استقرار عاطفي منخفض ^٢	سلبي	استقرار عاطفي عالي	إيجابي

٢. ناي ٢٠١٩، تشيكورا ٢٠١٥


١. ناي ومارتينيز آي كوما ٢٠١٩، ناي ٢٠١٩

٤. أميرازودي ٢٠١١، إسوري،

٣. ناي ومارتينيز آي كوما ٢٠١٩

كور وكافيتا ٢٠١٩

٥. أميرازودي ٢٠١١، إسوري، كور وكافيتا ٢٠١٩، إنفانت ومارين ٢٠٠٨




الاستنتاج

تظهر هذه الدراسة أن غياب الشهادة الجامعية الأصلية لأردوغان هو السبب الرئيسي في فشل محاولاته لإثبات حصوله على شهادة جامعية. أن جميع محاولاته تستند إلى ما يسمه اردوغان بانها وثيقة تخرج مؤقتة (صورة ١) والتي تحتوي على اخطاء تجعلها باطلة وبشكل واضح. المشكلة الأخرى في التَّحَقُّق من صحة ادعاء أردوغان على أنه حاصل على شهادة جامعية هي أنه حتى وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الباطلة لم يتم التحقيق فيها، ولم يراها أحد.

قام اثنين من رؤساء جامعة مرمرة في الدفاع عن أردوغان، أي في الدفاع عن وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة الباطلة وحاولا تبرير صحتها وبدون تقديم اية أدلة. حتى أنهم أصدروا نسخة طبق الاصل (الصورة ٤) من هذه الوثيقة، والتي بدورها تحتوي على أخطاء كبيرة وحسب شروط جامعة مرمرة نفسها.

إنها حقيقة أن افتقار الفرد لأي مرحلة تعليمية او شهادة جامعية لا ينعكس بالضرورة على سلوكه أو شخصيته، لكن السذاجة والتناقضات والتضاربات وغياب الحدود في أقوال الفرد وأفعاله والشذوذ في آرائه يمكن أن تعطي انطباعًا عن تدني مستواه التعليمي. ناهيك عن أن الشعبوي غالبًا ما تنتهك القوانين والقيم الاجتماعية التي هي تُعد - او يجب ان تكون - من بين الأهداف الأساسية للتعليم. تتجلى العديد من هذه الخصائص في خطابات أردوغان وسلوكه. لاحظ أن أردوغان جعل الخطاب السياسي الديني والوطني شغفًا واتخذ السياسة كمهنة منذ شبابه في المدرسة الثانوية، مما جعله يُحسن ويُثقف فن الخطاب السياسي.

على الرغم من الضجة الكبيرة والمستمرة في الصحافة التركية حول عدم حصول أردوغان على شهادة جامعية، بل تزوير وثائقه، إلا أن الدوائر الحكومية ذات الصلة لم تأخذها




في الاعتبار، مما يشير إلى مدى هيمنة أردوغان (أو الشعبوي) على الدوائر التنفيذية والقضائية في الدولة وسيطرته على مشاعر جماهيره الذين يديمون دعمهم له.

إن مسار قصة مناقشات شهادات أردوغان، وهي موضوع هذه الدراسة، مؤشر واضح على فرض أردوغان الباطل على المجتمع، والذي يشير إلى مواصفات مهمة أخرى للشعبوي وهي 'التضليل' و'الرغبة الجامحة' في الحصول على السلطة والحفاظ بها، وكذلك، الإصرار في 'انتهاك القوانين'.

تلعب العديد من العوامل دورًا رئيسيًا في كيفية قبول المجتمع لمثل هذا السلوك غير المذهب، وإدامة دعمه للشعبوي وإبقائه في السلطة، كما في حالة أردوغان.

من بين الأسباب الرئيسية لهذه الظاهرة:

- تحتل الاحتياجات اليومية اهتمام نسبة كبيرة من المجتمع وخاصة في الدول النامية مثل تركيا.
- لا تصل نسبة كبيرة من المجتمع إلى الأخبار والمقالات لأسباب عديدة، من بينها عدم انتشار الإنترنت في العديد من المناطق النائية في البلدان النامية؛
- يقوم معظم الشعبويين بإخضاع الإعلام لنفسه أو لنفسها، والتي لا تنتشر أخبارًا ضد الحكومة، وأردوغان مثال نموذجي في هذا السياق؛
- يتم دعم الشعبويين بشكل أساسي من قبل الأشخاص البسطاء والأقل تعليمًا (ماركيس ٢٠١٩، بروير ٢٠٢٢) والذين لديهم تقاليد منخفضة جدًا في القراءة. لاحظ أن تقليد منخفض في القراءة تشمل العديد من الشرائح الاجتماعية في المجتمع.




هناك احتمال كبير أن يكون أردوغان أو أي شعبي آخر على دراية بهذه الخصائص الاجتماعية، لأنه يبدو أن التأثير على الجماهير هو حالة غريزية عند الشعبي أو انه اتقنها لاحقاً.

العامل الرئيسي الآخر في قبول مثل هذا السلوك من قبل نسبة كبيرة من المجتمع هو الأيديولوجية الأساسية التي يعتمد عليها الشعبويون في استغلال مشاعر الجماهير. التمسك بالسلوك الإسلامي في القيادة والإدارة يدفع الجماهير الإسلامية لتقديم الدعم المطلق لأي سياسي هنا أردوغان.

بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يستغل أردوغان مشاعر القومية والوطنية التركية أيضاً. مثل هذه الأيديولوجيات مقدسة لدى المتشددين، وهي كافية للحفاظ على دعم الجماهير وإبقاء الشعبي في السلطة على الرغم من كل سلوكه السليبي. إن خلق الاستقطاب هنا هو نتيجة طبيعية للشعبوية، لأن المتشددين ينظرون إلى الآخرين على أنهم أعداء. وهذا واضح جداً في خطاب أردوغان الإسلامي الراديكالي، وزعيم حزب الحركة القومية دولت بهجلي، القومي المتطرف، والتي يلقونها أسبوعياً في البرلمان. مع الأخذ في الاعتبار أن الدين أو الإسلام يلعب دوراً مساوياً للعرق، وربما أكثر، في القومية التركية. الحرمان الاقتصادي بحد ذاته أو كعامل ثانوي هو عامل تآزر قوي مع الأيديولوجيات المتطرفة في خلق الشعبوية.

أما فيما يتعلق بالشعبي النموذجي، مثل أردوغان وأوربان وموراليس، الذي يتميز بتوجه غير عادي وقدرة فائقة على تعبئة الجماهير الكبيرة، وتحدي الطبقات الاجتماعية الكبيرة والاستمرار في التمسك بالسلطة، تشير إلى أن الشعبي يتميز بدافع أو دوافع نفسية قوية، والتي تعني في نفس الوقت رغبة (رغبات) قوية. على سبيل المثال، شعور مبالغ فيه بالمسؤولية أو حساسية مفرطة للظلم والغبن أو أي دافع آخر.




نظراً لأن الشعور بانخفاض احترام الذات، والذي يعني في نفس الوقت الشعور بالنقص أو عقدة النقص، يهيمن على الشخصية الشعبوية، (الجدول ١) فالسؤال الذي يطرح نفسه هنا هو، هل ان عقدة النقص هي الدافع الرئيسي في تشكيل الشخصية الشعبوية، وبالتالي سبب جوانبها السلبية؟

لاحظ أن بعض أهم العوامل التي تسبب تدني احترام الذات موجودة في حالة أردوغان، مثل الفقر المدقع والتعرض الشديد للعنف في مرحلة الطفولة. كان أردوغان طفلاً شقياً وذو لسان مسيء، لذلك، تعرض لعقوبات مستمرة من والده. على سبيل المثال، ربط والده أردوغان ذات مرة بمروحة في سقف الغرفة. كما ان تدني احترام الذات يؤدي إلى الفشل الأكاديمي والفشل الأكاديمي بدوره يشكل سبباً آخر لتدني احترام الذات.

لاحظ أن شخصية الشعبوي وشخصية الناخب الذي يصوت له أو لها قد خُطيت بنصيب جيد من اهتمام الباحثين حتى الآن. إن دراسة الجوانب النفسية الأخرى للفرد الشعبوي قد تضيف رؤية حاسمة لفهمنا للظاهرة الشعبوية.

اثتان من العوامل المهمة التي تفسر ظهور الشعبوية وزيادة عدد الشعبويين هما أولاً، التطورات الهائلة في وسائل الاتصال في العقود الأخيرة التي سمحت للسياسيين بالوصول إلى جمهور كبير باستمرار والحفاظ على التواصل بسهولة. ثانياً، التطورات الديمقراطية وانتشارها الذي أتاح لأي شخص الانخراط في السياسة. علاوة على ذلك، التطورات في مبادئ حقوق الإنسان وانتشارها، التي وسعت حرية الفكر والتعبير وضيق نطاق المسؤولية عن الكلام، مما فتح السبيل لإساءة استخدام الخطاب السياسي على وجه الخصوص. يبدو أن هذين العاملين سيستمران في التطور، الأمر الذي سيؤدي منطقياً



إلى تطور الشعوبية وزيادة في عدد الشعبويين. وبالتالي، فمن الأهمية بمكان أن تصبح الشعوبية جزءاً من المناهج الدراسية في المدارس والجامعات.

شيث جرجيس هو رئيس مؤسسة بحث حقوق الانسان لتركمان العراق
مقرها في هولندا

البريد الالكتروني s.jerjis@kpnmail.nl

باللغة الهولندية (Stichting Onderzoekscentrum Iraaks Turkmeense
Mensenrechten (SOITM))


(Sheth Jerjis is Chairperson of the Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation (Stichting Onderzoekscentrum Iraaks Turkmeense Menschenrechten (SOITM) in Dutch) based in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. s.jerjis@kpnmail.nl soitm@turkmen.nl)

الحواشي

الحاشية ١

بعض من العديد من التناقضات في خطابات أردوغان

في عام ١٩٩٤ قال أردوغان: "السيادة للشعب دون قيد أو شرط، إنها كذبة كبيرة". بعد توليه السلطة بدأ أردوغان يقول عكس ذلك. في ٥ أيلول ٢٠١٠، قال أردوغان: "لأن السيادة ملك للشعب دون قيد أو شرط، فهل هناك من شك؟" في ٥ كانون الاول ٢٠١٣، قال أردوغان: "لم يكن هناك مطار. جاء إلى (محافظة) موش معنا". لكن مطار محافظة موش، افتتح أمام حركة المرور المدنية في عام ١٩٩٢، قبل ١٠ سنوات من وصول حزب العدالة والتنمية إلى السلطة.



في ١ حزيران ٢٠١٨، قال أردوغان: "هل كان هناك مطار في محافظة أديامان؟ نحن بنينا، نحن" تم تشغيل مطار أديامان قبل ٤ سنوات من وصول حزب العدالة والتنمية إلى السلطة.

في ٢٦ كانون الاول ٢٠١٠: قال أردوغان: "أصدقائي الأعزاء، لغة أمتي واحدة، هذه هي الأمة التركية".

في ٢٧ مايس ٢٠١١: قال: "لم اقل لا لغة واحدة ولا دين واحد. لا يوجد لدي مثل هذا التصريح في أي مكان، أنهم آلة كذب".


فيما يتعلق اعطاء الإذن لعملية بلو مرمرة (مرمرة الازرق)، وهي سفينة ركاب معروفة بمشاركة في اسطول الحرية لغزة والمواجهة الدامية من قبل الجيش الاسرائيلي.

في ١٧ تموز ٢٠١٤، قال أردوغان: "من هي السلطة، هل هم أربابنا في الجنوب؟ إذا كنا السلطة في تركيا، فقد منحنا الإذن بالفعل. ولكن بالنسبة لهم هي إسرائيل".

في ٢٩ حزيران ٢٠١٦، قال أردوغان: "هل سألت رئيس الوزراء (يقصد نفسه) في ذلك اليوم عندما جلبت مثل هذه المساعدة الإنسانية؟"

الحاشية ٢

في هذا الصدد، هناك محاولات تنتهاهاو لكبح جماح القضاء، ومسيرة أردوغان الحثيثة نحو الديكتاتورية، وتغييرات دستورية لموراليس رغم القوانين للحفاظ على الرئاسة، ومحاولات تزامب لتسييس القضاء والتأثير على المحكمة العليا.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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الملاحق


صورة ١ وثيقة التخرج المؤقتة لأردوغان




Yusuf Halaçoğlu
@yusufhalacoglu

Başbakanın mezuniyet belgesi. Ne dersiniz?

[Translate Tweet](#)



8:01 PM · Apr 24, 2014



صورة ٢ نسخة طبق الاصل الاولى لشهادة أردوغان



Yusuf Halaçoğlu 
@yusufhalacoglu

Bu diploma eksik olan imzalar.Üniversite 1982 temmuzda kuruldu.Mezuniyet 1981.

[Translate Tweet](#)




8:01 PM · Apr 24, 2014




صورة ٣ ظهر نسخة طبق الاصل الأولى لشهادة أردوغان







الصورة ٤ : نسخة طبق الأصل لشهادة أردوغان





الصورة ٥ • ظهر نسخة طبق الأصل لشهادة أردوغان





صورة ٦ طلب استجواب من البرلمان تور يلديز بيجر الى البرلمان التركي حول اية شهادة جامعية قدم أردوغان الى الدوائر العسكرية التركية عند التحاقه للخدمة العسكرية الإلزامية

KVKK Aydınlatma Metni Engelsiz Meclis Linkleri Geç Site Haritası Ana Sayfa İletişim Languages



ANA SAYFA MİLLETVEKİLLERİ YASAMA DENETİM TUTANAKLAR PARLAMENTOLARARASI İLİŞKİLER KURUMSAL YAYINLAR

Yazılı Soru Önergesi Bilgileri

Yazılı Soru Önergesinin Metni	
Dönemi ve Yasama Yılı	26/1
Esas Numarası	7/6890
Başkanlığa Geliş Tarihi	20/06/2016
Önerenin Özeti	Cumhurbaşkanı'nın askerlikte beyan ettiği diplomasına ilişkin
Önerenin Sahibi	CHP Manisa Milletvekili TUR YILDIZ BİÇER
Önerenin Muhatabı	Milli Savunma Bakanı Kocaeli FİKRİ İŞİK
Önergeyi Süre Dışı Cevaplayan	Milli Savunma Bakanı Kocaeli Milletvekili FİKRİ İŞİK
Önerenin Son Durumu	Süresi Geçtikten Sonra Cevaplandı
Cevap Bildiriliş Tarihi	10/10/2016

Süresi Geçtikten Sonra Gelen Cevap

Sorğu Ekranına Git


Sosyal Medya

Sosyal Ağlarda TBMM

Arama

Duyurular

Genel Duyurular
Sınav Duyurusu
İhale Duyuruları
İnsan Kaynakları Staj Duyuruları
Etkinlikler
Sağlık Duyuruları - Hak Sahipliği
Sıkça Sorulan Sorular



صورة ٧ قانون ألغاء شرط تصديق الشهادة الجامعية، التي تقدم الى الهيئة العليا للانتخابات، من قبل كاتب العدل

**TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ**
"EGEMENLİK KAYITSIZ ŞARTSIZ MİLLETİNDİR"

EN

Q

ANASAYFA | BAŞKAN | MİLLETVEKİLLERİ | YASAMA | DENETİM | TUTANAKLAR | GÜNDEM | KURUMSAL | YAYINLAR

GENEL KURUL KONUŞMASI

TBMM TV | [f](#) | [t](#) | [i](#) | [v](#)

Konu: Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun noter onaylı diploma koşulunu kaldırmasının gereğini ve AKP Genel Başkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın diplomasını kamuoyuyla paylaşıp paylaşmayacağını öğrenmek istediğine ilişkin açıklaması

Yasama Yılı: 3

Birleşim: 94

Tarih: 02.05.2018

MEHMET TUM (Batıkent) - Teşekkür ederim Sayın Başkan.

30 Nisan Pazartesi günü Resmi Gazete'de yayınlanan kararla, Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve milletvekilliği genel seçimlerinde adaylık başvurusu yapanların onaylı diploması ibraz etmelerine dair koşulu kaldırmıştır.

Hükümete soruyorum: Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun noter onaylı diploma koşulunu kaldırmasının gereğini nedir? Yüksek Seçim Kurulu bu kararla, 16 Nisan'da mühürlü oyları kabul ettiği gibi şimdi de mühürlü diploması mı kabul edecektir? Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun bu kararının Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan için aldığı iddiaları doğru mudur? AKP Genel Başkanı Erdoğan, Yüksek Seçim Kuruluna başvurusunda ibraz edeceği diploması kamuoyuyla paylaşacak mıdır? Ülkemizin geleceği diplomalar yöneticilere mi emanet edilecektir? (CHP sıralarından alkışlar)

PARLAMENTOLAR ARASI İLİŞKİLER

KÜTÜPHANE VE ARŞİV

ANAYASA VE İÇTÜZÜK SİTESİ

KANUN VE KARAR BİLGİ SİSTEMİ

E-DİLEKÇE

BİLGİ EDİNME


DUYURULAR

Genel Duyurular

Sınav Duyurusu

İnsan Kaynakları Staj Duyurusu

Sağlık Duyuruları



صورة ٨ شهادة اصلية عائدة لشخص اخر تخرج من نفس الكلية الذي يدعي اردوغان بانه تخرج منها

No: 303.. T.C. 469

ISTANBUL

IKTISADI VE TİCARİ İLİMLER AKADEMİSİ

TİCARİ BİLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ

MEZUNİYET BELGESİ

Fotoğrafi yukarıda onaylanmış bulunan ...A=2724 numaralı Kâzım Oğlu

Nural Dik Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi, Maliye ve Muhasebe Yüksek Okulu öğretim

programına tabi tutulmuş ve gerekli sınavlarda başarı göstererek 1979 1980 Öğretim yılı 1980 dō-

neminde ...IXI... derece ile mezun olmuştur.

Lisans diploması hazırlanmakta olduğundan, sonradan aslı ile değiştirilmek üzere işbu geçici

belge kendisine verilmiştir.


MEZUN OLDUĞU BÖLÜM:

VERİLDİĞİ TARİH : 13/11/1980

NŞ/NŞ işbu belgede kazıntı ve silinti yoktur.

DEĞİŞİKLİK

ART




صورة ٩ دليل خريجي أكاديمية اسطنبول للاقتصاد والعلوم التجارية، كلية العلوم التجارية لعام ١٩٨٠-١٩٨١، الكلية والسنة التي يدعي أردوغان أنه تخرج منها
يمكن العثور على الكتاب بأكمله على هذا الرابط:

www.odatv4.com/sivaset/okul-villiginda-da-erdogandan-iz-vok-1203161200-91089




1980 - 1981

SON SINIF YILLIĞI



الصورة ١٠ النسختان الإنجليزية والتركية من السيرة الذاتية لأردوغان المنشورة على صفحات الويب الخاصة برئاسة الجمهورية التركية





(Advertisement)

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استغلال بدون رحمة وانتهاك للقانون الدولي (الطبعة العربية)

من إصدارات مؤسسة بحث حقوق الإنسان لتركمان العراق

الناشر: مؤسسة سويتيم
تاريخ النشر: كانون الثاني ٢٠١٩
اللغة: العربية
الإصدار: ١٣٥ - ١٩٥ ملم
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حول كتاب "السياسة التركية تجاه تركمان العراق"

إن التركمان في العراق واحد من المجتمعات من الأصول التركية الذين يعيشون في العديد من البلدان المجاورة لتركيا.

العداء والكراهية التي ظهرت تجاه العثمانيين في العقود التي سبقت سقوط الامبراطورية انعكست على هذه المجتمعات ذو الأصول التركية في البلدان التي أنشئت بعد تفكك الامبراطورية العثمانية، والتي كانت جميعها تحكمها حكومات غير تركية. تعرض الأتراك في البلقان إلى مجازر، وفي اليونان لا تزالون محرومين من حقوقهم الاثنية، وفي البلدان العربية، إنهم مهمشون ويتعرضون لسياسات استيعاب خطيرة، كما في حالة تركمان العراق وتركمان سورية.

لم يكن أمام هذه المجتمعات المعرضة للاضطهاد خيار آخر سوى اعتبار تركيا المنقذ الوحيد لهم، وخضعوا أنفسهم لتركيا، التي ادى في الوقت نفسه الى ازدياد العداء ضدهم وحرمانهم من إمكانية الحصول على مساعدات من أية قوة وطنية أو إقليمية أو دولية أخرى.

وفي الجانب الآخر، لم تكن لتركيا القدرة ولا النية على مساعدة هذه المجتمعات من الأصول التركية، على العكس، بقيت تركيا لا تبالى بمعاناتهم بل تستغلهم لمصالحها مستفيدة من طاعتهم العمياء للدولة التركية.

يقدم هذا الكتاب تاريخ ثلاثة عقود من السياسة التركية تجاه تركمان العراق، والتي يمكن اعتبارها نظرة حية للسياسة التركية تجاه تلك المجتمعات من الأصول التركية في البلدان المجاورة لتركيا.



Dorsey's Column

The Gaza War: the Middle East may never be the same

James M. Dorsey

Foreword

Thank you to all who have demonstrated their appreciation for my regular *Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer* column by becoming paid subscribers. This allows me to ensure that it continues to have maximum impact. Maintaining free distributions means that news websites, blogs, and newsletters across the globe can republish it. I launched my column, *The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer*, over thirteen years ago. To borrow a phrase from an early proprietor of *The Observer*, it offers readers, listeners and viewers “the scoop of interpretation”. If you are able and willing to support the column, please become a paid subscriber by clicking on Substack at <https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com> on the subscription button and choosing one of the subscription options.

Introduction: the impact of the Hamas attack

Hamas, the Islamist militia that controls Gaza, will likely emerge a victor regardless of how the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian fighting ends. Hamas' unprecedented attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, described by



some analysts as the Jewish state's 9/11, changes the dynamics of Middle Eastern geopolitics. ¹

The brutal attack on that fateful Saturday involved prolonged fighting with the Israeli military in Israeli towns and cities, the firing of thousands of rockets at Israeli population centers, the random killing of innocent civilians in Israeli homes and at festivals and other public places, and the kidnapping of scores of Israeli soldiers and civilians.

BBC foreign correspondent Secunder Kermani described sirens sounding off and multiple explosions as he disembarked at Tel Aviv airport on that Saturday. ²

Like the Turkish assault on Kurdish positions in Syria and Iraq in the wake of the October 1, 2023 suicide bombing in Ankara, the Hamas attack and Israel's retaliatory pounding of Gaza call into question the sustainability of a regional de-escalation that freezes rather than tackles perennial conflicts.

Similarly, the Hamas attack pours cold water on the long-standing notion of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative coalition partners that Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands can be sustained indefinitely.

Iran and its allies' role in the Palestinian-Israeli hostilities

On Hamas' tailcoat, Iran, long opposed to Arab normalisation of relations with Israel, sees the Palestinian offensive as vindication of its position. Only days before the hostilities, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cautioned that normalisation of relations with



Israel amounted to “gambling” that was “doomed to failure”. He warned that countries establishing relations with the Jewish state would be “in harm’s way”.³

Raising the spectre of a wider regional conflict, Hamas spokesman Ghazi Hamad told the BBC that the group had direct backing for the attack from Iran. Mr. Hamad did not specify what support entailed.⁴ Even if suggestions prove correct that Iran helped Hamas plan and prepare for the October 7 attack, the group launched its assault because it served its purposes rather than Iranian interests.

Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shiite militia, bolstered the threat of a regional conflagration by firing rockets at the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms in southern Lebanon just one day after the Hamas attack. Israel retaliated with armed drones.⁵ The Hezbollah attack came after Israeli soldiers opened fire on pro-Hamas demonstrators carrying the group’s flag on the Lebanese side of the border. There were no reported casualties.⁶

Saudi Arabia and its allies’ role in the Palestinian-Israeli hostilities

Meanwhile, a Saudi statement suggested that the Hamas attack had complicated US-led efforts to engineer Saudi recognition of Israel. The Saudi foreign ministry recalled the kingdom’s “repeated warning of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities”.⁷



The statement indicated that the fighting in Gaza reinforced Saudi conditioning of diplomatic relations with Israel on viable steps toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Already, the fighting has stopped Environmental Protection Minister Idit Silman from becoming the third Cabinet-level Israeli official to visit Saudi Arabia in less than two weeks. Ms. Silman was expected to attend the 'MENACW 2023', the Middle East and North Africa Climate Week conference in the kingdom⁸—one of four Regional Climate Weeks held worldwide ahead of the COP28 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai in November.

In what diplomats described as an indication of the United Arab Emirates' predicament, Emirati officials insisted that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussion of the fighting on Sunday October 8th would be a closed session rather than a private meeting. The UAE called for the meeting alongside Malta. Unlike a private meeting, the closed session excluded Israeli and Palestinian representatives. It ended without a Council statement.

The UAE was one of four Arab states to recognise Israel in 2020. At the same time, UAE officials reiterated their long-standing designation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation.⁹

The Palestinian voice in the Security Council meeting was President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestine Authority, dominated by Al Fatah, Hamas' archrival, which has United Nations observer status but was caught in a bind by the outburst of fighting. During the weekend of the unprecedented Hamas attack, Mr. Abbas was reduced to issuing a



statement insisting that Palestinians had the right to defend themselves against the “terror of settlers and occupation troops”.¹⁰

With the perennial potential collapse of the Palestine Authority, Hamas’ attack strengthens the latter group in a likely struggle to succeed 87-year-old Mr. Abbas, who has continuously lost public support over recent years.

Turkey and its allies’ role in the Palestinian-Israeli hostilities

While the Israeli-Palestinian fighting was likely to boost popular Arab rejection of relations with Israel, social media responses in Turkey indicated a different sentiment among one major segment of Turkish public opinion. Indeed “Israel is probably more popular than ever among Turks,” said Turkish Middle East scholar Karabekir Akkoyunlu.

Mr. Akkoyunlu attributed Israel’s popularity in Turkey to rising anti-Arab sentiment in Turkey, while paradoxically approving Arab countries normalising relations with the Jewish state—and to Israeli support for Azerbaijan against Armenia during the latest fighting over the predominantly Armenian enclave of Nagorno Karabakh which increasingly brought the latter under Azeri control.¹¹

That did not stop many Turks from marching in Istanbul during the weekend of October 7th to support the Hamas attack.¹² Indeed, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hosted Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July 2023—and has allowed the group to operate for years.¹³



However, unlike Arab statements that blamed Israel for the violence in Gaza and the West Bank, Mr. Erdogan offered to mediate between Israel and Hamas.¹⁴

Israel's position on the Gaza conflict

The fighting risks, at least in the short-term, stiffening Israel's refusal to entertain steps that would enable the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel or a viable one-state solution—even if the Netanyahu government, the most ultra-conservative and ultra-nationalist in Israeli history, becomes a victim of renewed violence.

Hamas' attack has emboldened armed Palestinian resistance on the West Bank and reinforced Israeli reticence to work towards a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would involve the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

Some Israeli sources suggested that Israel's focus in the last year on Palestinian resistance in the West Bank had led Israel to pay less attention to Gaza. More than 50 years after initial Egyptian-Syrian advances in the early days of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War caught Israel by surprise, the Hamas attack has put a dent in Israel's image of military superiority, prowess, and perception of security.

In addition, perceptions of Israeli weakness may increase once the guns fall silent, with the country likely to be wracked by assertions that the Hamas attack was an intelligence and operational failure. Nevertheless, Israel would likely benefit from an international community breathing a sigh of relief should the Netanyahu government,




too, pay a high price with its possible demise. No Israeli government has survived longer than six months in the aftermath of a major war like the 1973 war or the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Even so, the Hamas attack is likely to impact Israeli public opinion. On the one hand, it is expected to harden attitudes towards Palestinians, reinforced by Hamas' brutal attacks on innocent civilians and abuse of captives. On the other hand, Israelis will probably have less confidence in Israeli security for the foreseeable future. "I'm worried. I can't believe what happened. I've lost confidence," said an Israeli woman in a text message to this writer.

Concluding observations on the Gaza conflict

Mr. Netanyahu has sought to capitalise on the hostilities and the more than 1,100 people killed in Hamas' October 7 attack by inviting opposition leaders Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz to join an emergency government.¹⁵ Mr. Lapid said in a statement that Mr. Netanyahu would have to ditch his far-right and ultra-conservative coalition partners in forming an emergency government. The prime minister "knows that with the current extreme and dysfunctional security cabinet, he can't manage a war. Israel needs to be led by a professional, experienced, and responsible government".¹⁶

Mr. Netanyahu's invitation came as the fighting temporarily eased the prime minister's immediate domestic concerns. The rocket attacks and fighting in Israeli towns and settlements close to Gaza ended, at least temporarily, nine months of mass protests against Mr. Netanyahu's planned judicial changes.



It also halted protests by military reservists, including fighter jet pilots currently striking Gaza, who had earlier refused to report for duty because of the planned judicial changes. Israeli ultra-nationalists and military commanders warned that the reservists' protest would weaken Israeli military readiness.¹⁷

On Saturday October 7, 2023 Israel called up reservists for a possible ground invasion of Gaza after Hamas took scores of Israeli soldiers and civilians hostage and transferred them from Israel to Gaza.¹⁸

Israel may take heart from the unconditional US and European support, fuelled by Hamas' Islamic State-style brutality, in public statements after the Hamas attack.¹⁹ However, reality is very different behind the scenes, according to US and European diplomats.

Mr. Netanyahu has not endeared himself to Western leaders by heading a government that has expanded Israeli settlements in the West Bank; tacitly endorsed increased anti-Palestinian violence by Israeli settlers; violated fragile understandings on the Temple Mount or Haram-ash-Sharif, a site in Jerusalem holy to Jews and Muslims; and responded brutally to Palestinian resistance.

In addition, Mr. Netanyahu has embraced nationalist and far-right European leaders, who look more favourably at his policies than Western Europeans, the European Union, and US President Joe Biden.²⁰

Distressing images from Gaza could counter that as Israel continues with its devastating bombing of Gaza, which has killed at least 300 Palestinians and wounded nearly 2,000 others in less than 24 hours.²¹



Nevertheless, Hamas may have miscalculated by counting on Mr. Netanyahu's strained relations with his Western partners, leading them to take a more even-handed approach to renewed violence.

Selfies of Hamas fighters lynching the corpses of killed Israeli soldiers, reports of killings of Israeli civilians in their homes in towns near Gaza, and the parade of the dead body of a German tattoo artist buried the slim chance of a more nuanced Western attitude.²²

Even so, as a Middle Eastern diplomat confided and argued to the author, the "Middle Eastern paradigm has changed. Everyone is forced to recalibrate. Hamas shattered perceptions. The Middle East may never be the same".

Postscript: Gaza war calls Middle East de-escalation into question

The jury is out on the degree to which the Gaza war threatens pre-war efforts by Middle Eastern states to freeze their differences and focus on economic and security cooperation. To be sure, the war has raised the stakes with tension mounting on the Lebanese-Israeli border and in the Red Sea.

In addition, Israel's devastating assault on Gaza after Hamas' brutal attack across the enclave's border on October 7, 2023 has complicated, if not made impossible, overt cooperation between Israel and Arab states like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain that have diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. The war has also delayed US-led efforts to mediate Saudi recognition of Israel. The kingdom will need serious progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement entailing the



creation of an independent Palestinian state to justify the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state in the wake of the Gaza war.

Even so, no Arab state has broken off relations despite mounting anti-Israeli sentiment across the region given massive and mounting Palestinian casualties in Gaza and the West Bank due to Israeli bombardments and incursions.²³

Egypt may be the only Arab country that can counter public pressure with some justification, arguing that its border is the major funnel for humanitarian aid into Gaza. Egypt, one of the few countries with a direct line to Hamas, also plays a crucial role in arranging truces to facilitate prisoner exchanges and efforts to end the war.²⁴

Qatar's unique role

In a twist of irony, Qatar, which has refused to formalise relations with Israel without a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has emerged, alongside Egypt, as Israel's foremost Arab channel, particularly regarding war-related issues. The Egyptian and Qatari efforts have not earned them unambiguous acknowledgment by Israel, members of the US Congress, and some of Qatar's long-standing Arab critics.

Long a football in Israeli and American politics, Qatar—home to the United States' largest military base in the Middle East—has been taken to task for maintaining a relationship with Hamas, despite its proven utility and the fact that it enjoyed tacit Israeli and American approval.²⁵ A recent headline in *Haaretz*, Israel's equivalent of *The New York Times*,



read “Netanyahu Wants to Make Qatar the Fall Guy for October 7 Massacre. Don’t Let Him”.²⁶

In November 2023, Qatar negotiated a one-week truce during which Hamas released more than 100 hostages kidnapped during its October 7 attack on Israel in exchange for 240 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons and a limited amount of humanitarian aid.²⁷ That did not prevent a senior Israeli official from questioning Qatar’s role: “Right now, we need them. But when this thing passes from the world, we will settle accounts with them,” said Israeli foreign ministry deputy director general for strategic affairs Joshua Zarka.²⁸

Amid calls by Republican members of Congress on Qatar to crack down on exile Hamas leaders in the Gulf state, the outside world’s link to the group²⁹, Qatar agreed in October 2023 with the United States to revisit its relationship with Hamas once all hostages have been released.³⁰

Qatar and Project Raven

Close to Christmas 2023, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)—which was founded by Yigal Carmon, a former advisor to Israel’s West Bank and Gaza occupation authority and Prime Ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin—regurgitated documents leaked in 2019 indicating Qatari interference known as Project Raven in the internal affairs of European, African, and Middle Eastern states.³¹

In 1993, Mr. Carmon resigned in protest against Mr. Rabin’s signing of the Oslo accords, which laid the foundation for the establishment of an



independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. These accords created President Mahmoud Abbas's West Bank-based Palestine Authority.

The leaks, reportedly orchestrated by the United Arab Emirates, were part of a covert information war between the Gulf state and Qatar during a 3.5-year-long Emirati-Saudi-led diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar in which both sides used leaks to portray each other negatively.³² The UAE and Qatar also hired intelligence companies to survey and blacken their opponents' reputations in Europe and the United States.³³

There was no obvious news peg for MEMRI to regurgitate a story with no updates that first broke three years ago and has lied dormant for the past two years—as the media organisation documented in its late December 2023 re-publication.

MEMRI did summarily reference Qatargate, a 2023 scandal involving European Parliament (EP) members who allegedly were on the Qatari payroll, and Project Endgame, reportedly a Qatari-financed operation involving a former CIA operative to spy on the Gulf state's detractors in the run-up to the 2022 World Cup.³⁴

Israel's Gaza war conduct alarm Arab states

Similarly, Israel has alarmed Egypt with calls to ethnically cleanse Gaza by moving a majority of its already displaced 2.3 million population to the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for Israeli re-occupation of the war-ravaged territory, arguing that “if there



are 100,000 or 200,000 Arabs in Gaza and not two million, the whole discourse about the day after will be different".³⁵

At the same time, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu insisted that Israel should retain control of the Egypt-Gaza border zone. "The Philadelphi Corridor—or to put it more correctly, the southern stoppage point (of Gaza)—must be in our hands. It must be shut. It is clear that any other arrangement would not ensure the demilitarisation that we seek," Mr. Netanyahu said.³⁶

Egypt has strongly rejected both suggestions. Egypt and other Arab states fear that Israel's conduct of the war and expansionist ambitions will further inflame public opinion at home and upset, if not deliver a death knell, to a fragile apple cart designed to shelve rather than resolve regional differences that, like the Palestinian issue, could spin out of control.

Earlier in December 2023, 96 per cent of Saudis polled favoured Arab states cutting all ties with Israel, while in a steep increase compared to previous surveys 40 per cent of those surveyed looked favourably at Hamas. Moreover, 87 per cent believed the war had shown "that Israel is so weak and internally divided that it can be defeated some day".³⁷

In a blow to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's effort to project the kingdom as a moderate and tolerant Muslim state, just 5 percent of those polled agreed that Saudis should "show more respect to the world's Jews, and improve our relations with them". Even so, 75 per cent supported Arabs engaging in diplomatic efforts to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians.³⁸




In response to hardening public sentiment, Saudi authorities sought to restrict public support for the Palestinians. The most recent Red Sea Film Festival in Jeddah, the biggest film event in the Middle East and North Africa, for example, welcomed Palestinian cinema but banned the donning by attendees of keffiyahs, the chequered black-and-white scarf, which is a popular icon of Palestinian identity.³⁹

Similarly, the UAE disregarded optics when it put on trial on charges of terrorism 87 Emirati activists, some of whom have lingered for a decade behind bars, as it hosted what officials dubbed “the most inclusive Cop ever,” the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference.⁴⁰ The charges did not involve Gaza-related issues. However, the opening of this trial as world attention focused on Dubai sent a message to Emirati nationals and residents that the UAE would not entertain any public dissent, including in connection with the war and the Palestinians.

More generally, human rights groups and journalists reported the arrests of activists in the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia who had expressed support for the Palestinians. Others were warned not to.⁴¹

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
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
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
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Guest Column

Amendment of the Bosnian electoral law by the High Representative on election night in 2022: its effects and consequences on the election results, politics and society in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Alden Pervan *with* Ab de Buck

Introduction

Bosnia's complicated state structure goes back to the war in the early and mid-1990s. This stems from the Dayton accord, which was concluded in late 1995 under pressure from the United States, Russia and Europe after the 1992-1995 war. Under this Dayton Peace Agreement the country was and continues to be divided into two entities, the Federation and the so-called *Republic Srpska*. In the latter, Bosnian Serbs hold the positions of power. Above the two federations, there is a 'High Representative' installed by the Dayton accord who oversees the country on behalf of the international community. In practice and to the present day, this has always been someone from the European Union.

This complex structure has led to a political stalemate and even violent tensions for years; nationalist politicians, especially of Bosnian-Serb origin in Srpska and of Bosnian-Croat origin in the Federation, habitually block political decision-making, which frustrates and stifles Bosnia's society and economy—and even regularly threaten with secession of




‘their’ mono-ethnic entities and/or regions, which endangers Bosnia’s peace, security and territorial integrity, i.e. very existence.

The fact that the constitution is discriminatory at its core helps to worsen these stalemates and dangers: if one happens to be Jewish or Sinti, for example, one cannot become the country’s President. The same restriction applies if one do not want to be placed in one of the three ethnic ‘boxes’ (Bosniak, Serbian, Croatian). Consequently many young people see no future and leave the country as soon as they get the chance.¹

However, this article ² focuses on a major, reprehensible incident in recent times which may even endanger Bosnia’s future irrespective of the shortcomings of the Dayton accord and the constitution which it helped to shape.³ Indeed, this incident even violates the present constitution—and actually worsens the discriminatory aspects it already contains.

This incident concerns the ‘reforms of the Electoral Act’ which High Representative Christian Schmidt (hereinafter: Schmidt) announced and implemented on the night of the elections in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: FBiH) on October 2, 2022. After the polling stations closed at 7 p.m., Schmidt announced at 9 p.m. the electoral adjustments for FBiH, one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina ever since the implementation of the Dayton peace accord of November 1995. Schmidt’s adjustment had direct effects on:

1. The allocation of seats in the cantons;
2. The composition of the House of the Peoples;
3. The choice of president and vice president.



We explain this more detailed below. We also make a comparison with the situation in the Bosnian-Serb entity Republika Srpska—where elections were held as well on October 2, 2022, but which Schmidt left untouched—and discuss the consequences of the adjustment.

The allocation of seats in the cantons

With Schmidt's change of the Electoral Act, the number of seats per ethnic group, per canton changed immediately upon its implementation. In the preexisting electoral law there already was a very skewed distribution of these seats; the new shift by Schmidt has only helped to reinforce this—worsen it in fact. Table 1 in the Appendix gives the new ethnic distribution per canton. Two examples illustrate this new arrangement:

♣ HNK Canton (Mostar): According to the 2013 census, the HNK canton was home to 118,000 Croats, 92,000 Bosniaks and 6,000 Serbs. Under Schmidt's terms, that canton were to delegate five Croats, two Serbs and only one Bosniak to the Federal House of the Peoples. Thus 118,000 Croats were to delegate five Croats, 6,000 Serbs were to delegate two Serbs and 92,000 Bosniaks, just one Bosniak. Therefore, a Croat from Mostar became four times more valuable than a Bosniak from Mostar overnight.

♣ Canton of SBK (central Bosnia, including Travnik/Jajce): 57 percent of the population of this Central Bosnian canton is Bosniak: according to the 2013 census there were 146,000 people who identified themselves as Bosniak (i.e. 'Bosnian Muslim'), 97,000 who identified themselves as Croat (about 30 percent of the canton's population) and about 3,000 as Serb. With his amendment High Representative Schmidt prescribed that two Bosniaks, four Croats and one Serb from that canton be delegated to



the House of Peoples of FBiH. So three Bosniaks from, say, Jajce became worth as much as one Croat from Travnik/Jajce.

Table 1 in the appendix gives a detailed overview for seven cantons. On average, there came then one seat per 78,000 Bosniaks, one per 20,000 Croats and one per 2,600 Serbs. The voice of a Bosnian Croat therefore came to count four times as much as that of a Bosniak, and that of a Serb even 30 times as much—as shown by Figure 1 in the Appendix.⁴

Effects on Bosnia's constitution, politics, democracy and society

Each election result gradually affects the 'House of the Peoples', the first chamber of FBiH: the vote of every delegate has the same value in this House of the Peoples. Schmidt's electoral change in early October 2022 especially strengthened the position of the Bosnian Croats however.

Schmidt's imposed decision on that fateful election night also increased the number of delegates proposing a list of candidates for the president and vice president of FBiH from 35 to 48% (from 6 out of 17 delegates to 11 out of 23). This ensured the decisive influence of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatian: *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine* or HDZ BiH)—or HDZ in short, the ethnic nationalist Croatian party in FBiH—during the composition of the government in FBiH, and indirectly at the national level of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

During the preceding four years prior to the October 2022 elections, HDZ virtually blocked all significant laws, resolutions and other initiatives in



parliament. Since Schmidt's disastrous electoral amendment HDZ's position of power has only grown stronger still.

At the same time, the position of the Bosniaks became further limited by the fact that Schmidt mandated that they be allowed to hold a maximum of one of the three key positions in FBiH: Prime Minister, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Federation Parliament and Speaker of the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the Prime Minister and the President of FBiH could no longer be from the same constituent ethnic group.

Therefore, summarising, Schmid's gross, misguided and undemocratic intervention in the electoral law has further exacerbated the inequality between Bosnia's main population groups i.e. ethnicities. Since then the vote of Bosniaks counts for even less than that of Bosnian Croats and Serbs—four and thirty times as less respectively. Obviously this lopsided electoral weighting of 'ethnic votes' is extremely discriminatory. Schmidt's unilateral adjustment also reverberates in the composition and voting weights in the House of Peoples—and in the way the FBiH presidency is chosen and functioning in the present day.

Comparison with Republika Srpska

The situation in the FBiH is fundamentally different from that Bosnia's other entity the Republika Srpska. Its Prime Minister and President are invariably Bosnian Serbs, and there are no reserved parliamentary seats for minorities in its parliament. With his decision to change the electoral law on election night of October 2, 2022, Schmidt contributed to an even more far-reaching organisation of both entities, while the supposed goal



of the High Representative to further integration and equality. Ironically, there is good reason to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in Republika Srpska, but Schmidt neglected to rectify this in any shape or form in his electoral adjustment.

The fact that Schmidt tightened with this adjustment the ethnic division in FBiH, and left the situation in Republika Srpska untouched, reinforces the view that he has been acting in a partisan manner—to put it mildly—and the suspicion that he made the adjustment under pressure from the Croatian government which for years if not decades encouraged and even mirrored the ethno-nationalist and exclusivist policies of HDZ.

Misguided and disastrous actions like Schmidt's not only negatively affect Bosnia's democratic legal order with its norms and values, but also cause further ethnicisation of society and the current constitution of FBiH, which ultimately only benefits the ethno-nationalist parties. In this specific case, it secures the nationalist-Croatian HDZ party such a dominant position, which makes it impossible in any future democratic way to form a government without this party. In the past four years, the HDZ has completely blocked the active functioning of parliament. Their position of power is now even stronger since Schmidt's electoral amendment.

With his decision, Schmidt abused his powers and undermined the democratic order. In addition, Schmidt's actions damage not only the reputation of the Office of High Representative (OHR), but also of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by unilaterally and discriminatorily modifying the election results on election day (!), thereby mutilating and marginalising the democratic will of all citizens who voted. These changes to the constitution of FBiH and its Electoral Act were implemented without the



population being informed in advance. The decision was and is actually incompatible with OSCE guidelines. The consequences of his actions are therefore catastrophic.

We therefore believe that Schmidt's actions and decisions showed partiality, a lack of competence and sense of justice, as well as a complete lack of understanding of the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is essential to carry out such a heavily responsible function as the OHR with competence and integrity.


In addition, Schmidt has used the 2013 population census in elaborating and justifying his decision to amend the electoral in the way he did. However, this violates Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which states that all refugees must be able to return to their place of residence of origin if they wished. As far as this is not accomplished in any meaningful and significant way, the only valid census count remains that of 1991, i.e. the one before the war.

Moreover, the Dayton Peace Agreement has given Bosnia and Herzegovina a monistic system, i.e. international law has direct effect in the national legal order and is superior to national law. However, Schmidt ignored all five relevant judgments of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—in which the court considers discriminatory aspects of the Dayton Convention problematic and orders Bosnia and Herzegovina to reform its constitution—and gave priority to a judgment of the national constitutional court (Ljubic judgment) that was already implemented by the same court, and completely redundantly used by Schmidt again as an argument to justify his decisions.



Direct consequences for the Dayton Peace Agreement

- Pursuant to Annex 10, the High Representative has the authority to supervise the implementation of the civil part of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This includes, among other things, fair and democratic elections that have been nullified as such with his decision (and the moment at which this decision was taken) on October 2, 2022. In addition, Mr. Schmidt exceeded his powers (misused these for purposes other than those for which they were intended) by making amendments to the Constitution of one of the entities.
- Violation of Annex 4, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular Article I/2 which describes Bosnia and Herzegovina as a democratic state under the rule of law, with free and fair elections. Schmidt's decision goes against this because rules for the implementation of the election results were changed on election day, while the Commission for Democracy and Law (Venice Commission) also maintains a deadline of one year before the elections for changes in electoral law and the electoral system.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina has a monistic legal order in which international law has direct effect and takes precedence over domestic law. As a result, various international human rights treaties (Annex I) are part of the domestic legal order, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) based on Article II/2 (Annex 4). By valuing citizens on the basis of their ethnic origin and favouring them in the context of the implementation of election results, the High Representative violated both the ECHR and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).



- The High Representative unilaterally decided to use different censuses to compose the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the its government power. However only the 1991 census is in use to counteract the results of ethnic cleansing. This rule applies until Annex 7, the return of all refugees to their place of origin, has been realised. By applying the 2013 census for the composition of the legislature (in favour of the HDZ), the High Representative has violated Annex 7 and recognised *de facto* and *de jure* the results of ethnic cleansing and this Annex, by his actions, declared as realised.

Conclusion: What is needed?

We echo the letter signed by twenty-eight members of the European Parliament and parliaments of EU member states in late January 2023 addressed to Schmidt, demanding that he explains his decision to amend Bosnia's electoral legislation on election night the way he did. In particular they stated that:

The mandate of the OHR is arguably the most powerful and far-reaching international supervision structures in any country in the world. The so-called Bonn Powers can overrule democratic institutions and decisions when OHR sees the DPA [Dayton Peace Agreement] endangered. Thus, the holder of this mandate should take into account a great sense of responsibility, integrity, proportionality and respect for national institutions and the citizens.⁵

They further expressed their deepest concerns about Schmidt's use of the Bonn powers at the close of election day.



We therefore ask these parliamentarians and other representatives and decisionmakers on the European and national levels to exert their influence so that Schmidt withdraws his unilateral, partisan and undemocratic decisions like the ones on election night in early October 2022 and the discussion about reforms of the electoral law can take place again where it belongs, namely in the national institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and particular and in Bosnia society in general.


What is needed is an honest and sincere approach that will enable the country to develop into a fully-fledged democratic society, with a truly pluralistic system based on the rule of (international) law, which gives the country the opportunity to become a full member of the European family.

Drs. Alden Pervan, a new contributor to this journal, is a Dutch legal expert of Bosnian descent who has written about Bosnia and other topics, and has completed a Master thesis on The Dayton Peace Agreement: short-term redemption or long-term tragedy? at Open University in March 2022. pervanalden@hotmail.com.

Drs. Ab de Buck, occasional contributor to this journal, is a Dutch environmental analyst who has frequently written about Bosnia and other (former) conflict areas for and in the Dutch media since the 1990s. abdebuck@live.com.

Endnotes—Sources

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
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
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
Appendix

Figure 1



Main source: *Slobodna Bosna*, 18 October 2022 (see endnote 4).

Figure 2



Main source: *Slobodna Bosna*, 18 October 2022 (see endnote 4).






Table 1 Number of seats per canton


Canton	with city		# inhabitants	# Seats (before October 2022)	# Seats (after October 2022)
HNK	Mostar	Bosniaks	118000	1	1
		Bosnian Croats	92000	3	5
		Bosnian Serbs	6000	2	2
		Other			1
SBK	Travnik	Bosniaks	146000	1	2
		Bosnian Croats	97000	3	4
		Bosnian Serbs	3000	1	1
		Other			1
LK	Livno	Bosniaks	8000	1	1
		Bosnian Croats	67000	2	3
		Bosnian Serbs	10.000	3	4
		Other			1
TK	Tuzla	Bosniaks	392000	4	5
		Bosnian Croats	23000	1	1
		Bosnian Serbs	7000	2	3
		Other			1
ZDK	Zenica/ Dobož	Bosniaks	300000	3	4
		Bosnian Croats	43000	1	2
		Bosnian Serbs	5500	1	2
		Other			1
KS	Sarajevo	Bosniaks	346000	3	4
		Bosnian Croats	17000	1	1
		Bosnian Serbs	13000	2	4
		Other			1
USK	Bihac	Bosniaks	246000	2	3
		Bosnian Croats	8500	1	1
		Bosnian Serbs	5000	0	3
		Other			1


Main source: *Slobodna Bosna*, 18 October 2022 (see endnote 4).

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